



## RESEARCH ARTICLE

### MONEY CULTURE IN KENYAN POLITICS: QUESTION OF MORALITY VIS A VIS INTEGRITY IN GLOBAL VIEW

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#### ABSTRACT

This paper sought to understand and evaluate the money culture in politics. It is appreciable that politics in Kenya has undergone notable changes gravitating around multipartism to dominant singlepartism, and now to coalition politics. On many occasions, experiences of violence have marred Kenya's political choice processes yet, one constant thing that seems to have evolved in the practice of elective politics in Kenya is 'money culture'. Money perse in politics may not be bad because it is what drives political planning and facilitation. However, the way money exchanges hands in Kenyan politics opens avenues for critical enquiries This study guided by the following objectives will ventilate this dilemma. One, the study found out the application of money in political process in global perspective; two, it interrogated the practice of money culture in Kenyan politics; and finally it established money culture vis a vis morality and integrity in Kenyan politics. Guided by the Sociological Cycle Theory, the study used both qualitative and quantitative research design by application of a simple random sample subjected to a population sample of 150, through administration of open and closed ended questionnaire, the researchers then analyzed data and made conclusions that money culture is unethical when applied to influence voters or politicians.

#### INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to analyze politics and the use of money as a way of luring voters or to obtain a mileage against competitors. In this endeavour, the paper outlines the objectives that guided its research, it discusses the relevant literature thematically, it explains the methodology used, narrates the theoretical and conceptual framework, shows study findings, and conclusions.

##### Study Background

Politics is essential in societies and in this case states and so does money as a facilitative element. Simply defined, politics is the interplay of state, public policy and power. It can as well be the states interventions on people and resources using public policy or power by actors empowered by the subjects of the state. The processes of politics require use of diverse approaches to attain successful outcome. Essentially being empowered to lead a people in a society is a result of many strategy options either individually, dualistically or wholistically. This paper presents a model based on constant observations as Money- Personality- Strategy (MPS).

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This strategy asserts that political outcomes may at anytime contain one of the three initials in MPS as a dominant factor. For this study, money being dominant can lead to; M-P-S model or M-S-P model. The order is an observable strength of the three variables in ranks in a particular individual's attempt in seeking people's approval for representation. For aspiring politicians; which model works for you? Is it P-S-M/P-M-S, S-M-P/ S-P-M, or M-P-S/M-S-P? In order of the ensuing acronyms, you will find that in the first set Personality (P) becomes a major determinant followed by others while in the second and third sets respectively it is Strategy (S) and Money (M).

The concern in this study is a situation where "M" (Money) is a strong factor/ determinant. In such a case it works out to alter perceptions on personality and strategies thus money in the end wins. As it gets used in election after election and always becoming an end of a means, it cultures a society's politics. This leads to pertinent questions; Is it morally right to influence (both voters and politicians) in an election? What value does it add or remove from the principles of democracy? And, does this practice auger well with personal integrity? A caution is however given that morality may nullify an act yet it passes integrity test.

## Statement of the Problem

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## Paper Objectives

The objectives that will guide this study include;

- i. Finding out the application of money in election process in global perspective;
- ii. Interrogating the practice of money culture in Kenyan politics; and finally
- iii. Establishing money culture vis a vis morality and integrity in Kenyan politics.

## MATERIALS AND METHODS

### Literature: Views from other Scholars

This section of the study sourced information on different themes and objectives to build the central thought 'money culture ...'. In doing this, practices relevant to this were sought from across the globe.

### The Use of Money in Election Process: Global Perspective

The usage of money in elections has permeated several parts of the globe differently. Ray (2009) confirms this practice in India as, "Money is power, freedom, a cushion, the root of all evil, the sum of blessings". – (Carl Sandburg). Human weakness for riches and wealth more often than not yields against moral and ethical values and temptation or lure for unaccounted and unexpected wealth gets better hand. Softening one's morale and inducing him to depart from discharging onerous duties and responsibilities on being lured or bribed by money power always creates problems in the administration and commercial dealings. But when it interferes with the election process for electing a popular government on the basis of uninterfered and free and fair election by the electorate, it becomes a matter of serious concern.

Ray further asserts that the election process therefore assumes vital importance in the progress of the country. The responsibility to ensure the purity and impartiality of the electoral process is not only of the government, the Election Commission and the political parties but also of every individual and institution and the media as the fourth pillar of this democratic edifice. Oblivious to the fact that the vast majority of people are still below the poverty line, large segments of the society still remain illiterate, extreme maldistribution of nation's wealth is widening the rift between vulgar affluence and abject poverty, large sections of the media seem to be keen in focusing on trivial issues concerning the so-called 'Page-3 Persons' for increasing circulation and earning higher profits instead of addressing serious issues for eradicating social and political evils. The Press Council of India has also received representations regarding alleged payments taken/received by media during Lok Sabha elections conducted in April/May this year for coverage relating to candidates. Money has been playing an increasingly dominant role in American elections. It appears that nobody can seriously run for high office without access to huge sums of money needed to purchase significant amounts of mass media exposure. Supreme

Court decisions over the past several years have nullified efforts to limit the extent to which corporations can influence elections via large expenditures directed toward promoting the views of candidates they favor. Breaking the 2-party monopoly, which is fueled by money supplied by big corporations and wealthy people, might appear to be a hopeless struggle but maybe not. There is more to election campaigns than money. While it takes big bucks to buy time on TV, where most electioneering takes place nowadays, there are other ways to campaign. If we are to come up with a way to further the interests of people as opposed to dollars, then we need to use a people-to-people approach, which shouldn't be too hard, since, ultimately, votes are cast by people (Unger, 2012).

The usage of money in elections cannot be written off as a total vice, it becomes one where the usage is abused. In other parts of the globe, what is spent is easily accessible even for electorates for reference but in other democracies, such information are only known to the candidates not even the electoral body. In the United States of America it is common knowledge as an accountability to suffice these kind of details once every election is over and projections are known before the exercise kicks off.

Below are figures of all money spent by Presidential candidates, Senate and House candidates, Political Parties and independent interest groups trying to influence federal elections between 1998 and 2012:

Cycle	Total Cost of Elections	Congressional Races	Presidential Races
1998	\$1,618,936,265	\$1,618,936,265	N/A
2000*	\$3,082,340,937	\$1,669,224,553	1,413,116,384
2002	\$2,181,682,066	\$2,181,682,066	N/A
2004*	\$4,147,304,003	\$2,237,073,141	\$1,910,230,862
2006	\$2,852,658,140	\$2,852,658,140	N/A
2008*	\$5,285,680,883	\$2,485,952,737	\$2,799,728,146
2010	\$3,631,712,836	\$3,631,712,836	N/A
2012*	\$6,285,557,223	\$3,664,141,430	\$2,621,415,792

Source: www.opensecrets.org , Centre for Responsive Politics, 2015.

According to the table above, it can be evidenced that the years marked by asterix (presidential election years) in the USA have been marked by high expenditures cumulatively because of additional costs from the high office bidders. It is also observed that there is an increasing trend in costs with advancement of years which is a normal trend. Probably this information needs to be adopted across all democracies. Electoral Management Body (EMBs) accountability is usually emphasized as opposed to all other electoral stakeholders thus making electoral management malpractices related to funds non-entity issues yet causes of many unexpected occurrences.

***In his argument, Gary (2012) point, that money in American politics was already an elephant in the room.*** Money alone can't guarantee success. Santorum spent around 74 cents a voter in Iowa and narrowly won; Perry spent around \$358 per vote and came a distant fourth. Debate performances, policy positions, personal histories and retail politics play a role. But the fact that money is not the sole determinant doesn't mean it's not the key one. Last week in a Massachusetts Senate race, both the Republican incumbent and his likely Democratic challenger signed a pact agreeing not to use third-party money. The trouble is that the agreement is completely unenforceable. Downplaying money's central role at this point merely buys

into the illusion of participatory democracy, where ideas, character and strategy are paramount, while others are actually buying the candidates and access to power. Looking at Gary's point, we tend to find level of compliance within either the M-S-P or M-P-S model where money is ranked first above strategies and personality respectively. The money use in elections when excessive instead builds aristocrats into the political domain. This may pose a challenge where the aristocrat is lacking leadership qualities and abilities will money help turnaround situations. Spending money in elections has mixed fortunes in many countries and the shades of its practice are ever at variance. In Brazil, it is associated with much with the association of political elites and the corporate deals arranged much before elections so that in the event of winning there is a sure trade/business arrangements with power barons. In this case it is the politicians receiving as opposed to Kenya where politicians give money and material things. Boadle (2015), reported a reaction to this practice in Brazil which the judiciary seemed to ban;

*"Brazil's Supreme Court decided on Thursday to ban corporate donations to election campaign financing in a move to clean up Brazilian politics caught in a massive kickback scandal. The top court voted 8-3 to allow election donations from individuals but not from companies, a decision that renders unconstitutional a bill passed last week by the country's Congress allowing corporate funding for political parties. The ruling comes in the midst of Brazil's biggest corruption investigation into bribes and political kickbacks on contracts with state-oil company Petrobras. The funds allegedly went into the pockets of dozens of politicians in President Dilma Rousseff's governing coalition. The treasurer of her Worker's Party is in jail, and her election-campaign accounts are under investigation to see whether bribe money was used to help re-elect her last October. The scandal heightened public scrutiny of corporate funding as scores of executives from Brazil's largest construction firms were indicted on corruption charges for paying bribes from overpriced contracts with Petroleo Brasileiro. "We have come to an absolutely chaotic situation in which economic power dominates political power in an illegal way," Justice Luiz Fux said, arguing with the majority that the ban on corporate funding is needed to set an equal playing field for election candidates. The Supreme Court's decision had been on hold for 16 months after one of its members, Gilmar Mendes, asked for more time to consider the issue, arguing that Congress should rule on the matter first. Last week, lawmakers reversed their earlier position and passed a bill that would allow companies to fund parties in election campaigns but not make donations to individual candidates. The bill is awaiting Rousseff's signature to become law."*

From the money culture in Brazil, we see corporate funding with returnable futuristic expectations. However, in a reaction the beneficiaries of the practice- the political class are not letting go thus changing by a bill in the national assembly slightly the judiciary's ruling to protect donations to political parties but sever funding of individuals. Another illustration according to studies from Indian experience, the 2014 general election is likely to be the most expensive election in Indian history, with a massive Rs. 30,000 crores being spent by the government, political parties and candidates. As numerous loopholes and lack of transparency mar the current election finance system in India, candidates and parties are able to raise

and spend money without making any declarations as to the sources. There is a need to take comprehensive steps and corroborate financial information received for both parties and candidates from various sources, in order to ensure transparency and accountability in raising and spending money (NDTV, 2014). Vaishnav (2014) asks and follows with an answer. How does this growing hegemony of money on elections affect Indian democracy? Since there is no state funding of elections in India, candidates and parties have to raise money on their own for campaign expenses. Hence, there is no level playing field for candidates. This is clearly shown by the data from Lok Sabha 2004 and 2009, where the poorest 20 per cent of candidates, in terms of their declared financial assets, had a one per cent chance of winning parliamentary elections. The richest quintile, in contrast, had a greater than 25 per cent chance. The menace of black money cannot be curbed by the limited initiatives of the ECI (Electoral Commission of India) alone. It is important that a detailed analysis is done on how the provisions of RPA (Representation of the people Act of 1951) can be made more harmonious with the other financial rules and regulations. This would include looking at the IT Act, the Wealth Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Banking Regulations Act, and Cooperative Society laws and audit standards, so that hidden and illegal funds of parties and candidates can be tracked (Singh, 2014). Many observers have speculated that parties and candidates in developing countries spend a significant portion of campaign funds to illegally influence voters. Few respondents in the 22-country APPFI study, however, said that illegal or corrupt practices were a major portion of campaign expenditures. Perhaps surprisingly, respondents indicated that in most developing countries, political parties spend the majority of campaigns funds for a legitimate purpose—to reach voters and campaign for office. The challenge to contact voters in an effective manner differs from country to country and within regions of any one country, depending chiefly on transportation infrastructure and the availability of communication media; according to National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), (Bryan and Denise, 2005).

Many respondents across regions opined that the practice of vote-buying is not corruption per se, but is a result of poverty and lack of development. One party leader in Cambodia asserted that because "fifteen percent of the population lives in abject poverty without enough to eat, it doesn't matter how idealistic you are. You must buy votes and there is no value in discussing policy"(Cambodia, Member of Parliament and Political Party Leader, Interview 9, NDI, 2005). In Uganda, Democracy Monitoring Group (2011) reports, Political parties are under increasing pressure, faced with a vicious cycle of escalating costs of campaigning, negligible membership income, and deepening public mistrust about the invidious (unacceptable) role of money in politics. Individual candidates' finances are not audited because the money they use for campaigns belongs to them thus candidates never disclose the information, partly because the law and the Electoral Commission are weak to enforce the law. During election campaigns, parties or candidates often provide targeted groups of citizens with cash payments or free goods (refreshments, food, cooking oil, salt, sugar, blankets, and saucepans), services, or other benefits such as deployment of organize thugs that chase away voters from polling areas especially on the day

of party primaries. In fact, this kind of spending has been a significant part of electoral campaign expenditure. Of major interest is the fact that the distributing of money and other direct benefits to voters is seen as "vote buying" and therefore a form of "corruption".

### **The practice of Money Culture in Kenyan politics**

In Kenya, for example according to (NDI, 2015), it is a common practice for individuals and organizations to organize harambees (fundraisings) to raise funds for personal and public projects such as school fees and rehabilitating or building schools. Over the years, this tradition has become a political tool by which civil servants were forced to make donations or lose their jobs. Often, politicians used harambees to spread their influence, awarding contracts to the most generous contributors. Concerns over the link between harambees and corruption recently led to the establishment of a Harambee Taskforce empowered to investigate. In neighboring Tanzania, a similar practice known as takrima allows candidates to legally give gifts to their constituents prior to elections. However, the NDI 2005 report p.17 in a diagrammatic comparison exonerates Tanzania and Uganda from vote buying. The diagrammatic presentation could possibly be having its records on the basis of the magnitude because the researchers tend to have a different opinion over the same because other scholars in this same study have more specifically pointed out 'money culture' in Uganda's politics.

According to one of the politicians interviewed (International IDEA Political Finance Database) for this study, the culture of vote buying has negative implications beyond the electoral process itself, because it is one of the major triggers of corruption by politicians after they get into power, because they want 'to get return on money invested during election campaigns'. From the observations of Ohman and Lintari (2015), there have been few restrictions on how Kenyan political parties can raise and spend money, and election observation statements have been full of reports on vote buying and abuse of state resources. Kenya was in this sense behind the regulatory situation in most sub-Saharan countries until 2013. A draft bill containing significant changes, including donation and spending limits and increased reporting requirements, was introduced in parliament in 2011. This bill was a logical follow-up to the new political party and electoral acts, which in turn resulted from the significant problems encountered in relation to the 2007 elections. However, the draft bill became stuck in parliament, and was not passed until after the 2013 general elections. The provisions in the 2013 Election Campaign Financing Act therefore remain untested in a general election. The stakes involved in the elections in the country make it even much harder for women and political amateurs as far as money is concerned to attempt to offer their leadership to the electorates. Whether it can be true that best leadership talents are locked from state management hence the sorry situation in the country's governance is a debatable statement. However, elections in Kenya are highly competitive, in part because Kenyan MPs are the highest paid in the world relative to per capita GDP (Afritorial 2012). This salary combined with access to other resources (including in some cases government contracts) means that winning election to parliament can be very profitable (even after MPs agreed to a significant pay cut after the last elections) (BBC 2013). This

increases the importance of winning elections for ambitious politicians. Those with access to resources may often be willing to use large amounts of money in order to access even larger sums further on. This increases the role of money in elections, and decreases the chances of those with less access to money, including women and the youth. Despite the wrong way of using money power in politics as it may in Kenya, (Ballington and Kahane 2014) opine the imperative of money in politics by suggesting that there is ample evidence that money is one of the most influential factors determining whether women and men can successfully enter and remain in electoral politics. Ohman and Lintari (2015) avers that vote buying dubbed in this paper as money culture in Kenya is a frequent occurrence in electoral processes around the world, and it can have a very negative impact on the quality and fairness of elections. This form of illegal campaign spending can sometimes become a major part of the necessary outlays for candidates and other actors. According to various election observation bodies (EU EOM 2007), vote buying is a major part of Kenyan elections. The EU EOM noted that 'significant amounts' were handed out in the 2007 election and that no candidates were immune: 'even candidates who disapproved of this practice felt pressured to hand out money'. This issue goes beyond strict transactions between candidates and voters. It concerns the entire relationship between political parties, politicians and the electorate. To some, 'rather than support the parties, the public expect the parties to give them handouts if politicians want their support' (Ohman 2014a).

The evidence of this culture which is now very secretive was reported by Al Jazeera (2013), two candidates standing for governor seats in Kenya's upcoming elections have been caught on camera appearing to give cash bribes to groups of youths in exchange for votes. Ferdinand Waititu, standing for the Nairobi governor seat for the TNA, was caught on camera seeming to bribe a group of young people in Donholm, on February 6. The video footage showed Waititu giving a speech promising jobs, food security, funding for women and youth groups, and railing against cheap alcohol and then appears to leave a bundle of cash with one of the young people in the group, giving instructions that it be shared among the rest. In Kisii County, in southwestern Kenya, James Ongware - an aspiring governor is shown instructing a crowd of youths and middle-aged men to queue up in order to receive cash at a campaign event near a primary school. In its rejoinder report towards this, KHRC said "a significant number of positive steps have been and continue to be undertaken towards securing a free, fair and peaceful election" - but bribery, violence and intimidation, incitement and "the use of unsavoury language" have been observed across the country.

### **Money Culture vis a vis Morality and Integrity in Kenyan politics**

Vote buying carries different meanings to different people and these meanings can vary not only by class, but also by religion, ethnicity, levels of education, and the like. They can lead to unhappy consequences, among other things; a clash of moral codes observes Schaffer (2008). In their words (Neeman and Orosel, 2006), vote buying has long met with suspicion. Three types of arguments are usually made against it. *First*, it is argued that because vote buying gives wealthier individuals an unfair advantage it violates the principle of equality. *Secondly*,

it is sometimes argued that votes belong to the community as a whole, and should therefore not be alienable by individual voters. And *thirdly*, there is a concern that vote buying may promote inefficiency. Hasen (2000) offers a critical analysis of these three arguments and concludes that although all three are justified in the context of general political election, they are all unjustified in the context of corporate elections, despite the apparent similarity between the two cases corporate vote buying has recently been challenged by Cole (2001) who argued that with decreasing costs of obtaining and conveying information, corporate vote buying may seriously undermine efficiency by facilitating "looting" of the corporation. Whether vote buying can be plausibly said to promote or harm efficiency (Neeman and Orosel, 2006) depends on the following conditions. Effective governance generally requires overcoming two major agency problems: adverse selection, or how to ensure that the incumbent is highly capable; and moral hazard, or how to ensure that the incumbent does indeed behave well.

Surprisingly enough, until recently, vote buying received almost no attention in the literature. Clark (1979), and more recently Levmore (2000) presented informal arguments in favor of vote buying but they either ignored or otherwise dismissed the problem of looting or the possible existence of bad equilibria. Many in the ABC classes (Espina, 2001), are troubled by the kind of politics which results. Typical is the opinion of this newspaper columnist:

*"Many of the ills complained about in the preparation, conduct and post-election activities have their roots in the flawed Martial Law Constitution....Under the old 1936 Constitution - only citizens at least 21 years old who were able to read and write were given the privilege to vote. On the theory that we should "democratize" the right of suffrage, under the Marcos Constitution, illiterates were allowed to vote and the voting age was lowered to 18 years old. I have no problem with that provided that the requirement of literacy was kept. It is common practice that illiterate voters are accompanied by relatives or friends who are authorized by law to do the voting for them. Th[ese] (with some exceptions) are the voters who are usually from the poor or squatter areas especially of the urban centers who are usually herded, fed and paid by politicians for their controlled votes....You are wondering why some mayors of urban towns and cities are or pretend to be helpless in preventing squatting on government as well as private lands?... Why sidewalks are appropriated by "rolling stores" cum living quarters? The simple answer is that these usually illiterate squatters are the politician's piggy bank controlled votes to win an election. The more squatters the better!"*

Finally, according to Anonymous (2015), the following are very pertinent lessons about voting under the theme of morality;

*When we vote, we can make government better or worse. In turn, our votes can make people's lives better or worse. If we make bad choices at the polls, we get racist, sexist, and homophobic laws. Economic opportunities vanish or fail to materialize. We fight unjust and unnecessary wars. We spend trillions on ill-conceived stimulus plans and entitlement programs that do little to stimulate economies or alleviate poverty. We fail to spend money on programs that would work*

*better. Voting is morally significant. Voting changes the quality, scope, and kind of government. The way we vote can help or harm people. Electoral outcomes can be harmful or beneficial, just or unjust. They can exploit the minority for the benefit of the majority. From a moral point of view, voting is not like ordering food off of a menu. When you order salad at a restaurant, you alone bear the consequences of your decision. No one else gets stuck with a salad. If you make a bad choice, at least you are hurting only yourself. For the most part, you internalize all of the costs and benefits of your decision. Voting is not like that. If anything, when we vote, we are imposing one meal on everybody. Now, in voting, nobody chooses by herself. Each vote counts, but it does not count much. We decide electoral outcomes together. How we vote has consequences; how you vote does not. However, there are moral principles governing how people ought to behave when participating in collective activities.*

The moral and integrity issue as far as Kenya's politics on the basis of the ongoing premise becomes clear that;

- It is a clash of morals unacceptable but silently lurking to many
- It has led to undue advantage to others and against others while promoting inefficiency to the polls body and elected leaders.
- It has led to skewed national development (determining inclusion and exclusion) tendencies.

## Methodology

This study used a mixed method design comprising the use of qualitative and quantitative designs. In order to apply the open/close ended questionnaire - data collection instrument, the researchers used simple random sampling. The technique for sampling adopted by the authors to attain the requisite sample in the desired three counties was thumb rule which necessitated using population in the upper limit of tens where 50 persons each were reached as respondents drawn from Uasin Gishu, Kisii, and Kisumu Counties of Kenya to represent the general populace. Data was analyzed using content and thematic analysis for written information from different scholars; and use of tables, data groupings, and graphs for quantitative data employed.

## Data Collection Instrument

The data collection instrument that guided the study is hereby presented below;

## Questionnaire

I, ..... (researcher) wish to undertake a short study on "Money Culture in Kenya's Politics: a Question of Morality vis a viz Integrity". I kindly request your participation by answering the few questions that follows.

**(Please tick ONLY one answer in each question or answer the blank spaces appropriately)**

1. Have you ever been approached with/ or given money or material things to influence your intention to vote? Yes { }  
No { }

2. Between Money and Other Material things, which is commonly given out by politicians?  
.....
3. Did you like it? Yes { } No { } If No, WHY? Morality Issue { } Integrity Issue { } Both { }
4. How often is money used in Kenyan politics? Very Often { } Often { } Least Often { }
5. When do you think money culture began in Kenyan politics? Single Party Era { } Multiparty Era { } Since Independence { } How can money culture be changed? **(Give two suggestions only).**  
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How do you see the future of money culture in Kenya's politics?  
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\*\*\*\*Thanks for your participation\*\*\*\*


**Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical frame that informs this study is Sociological Cycle Theory. This theory in part describes societies as fields where certain trends and patterns are likely to evolve and characteristically with time advancement tend to define the societal activities. The nature of the trends ought to be repetitive. Arguing that events and stages of society and history generally repeat themselves in cycles, such a theory does not necessarily imply that there cannot be any social progress. Social cycle theories are among the earliest social theories in sociology. In the early theory of Ssu-Ma Ch'ien and the more recent theories of long-term ("secular") political- demographic cycles (e.g. Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006) as well as in the Varnic theory of P.R. Sarkar an explicit accounting is made of social progress. Modern social scientists from different fields have introduced cycle theories to predict civilizational collapses (Turchin, 2003) in approaches that apply contemporary methods that update the approach of Spengler. In Sarkar's Law of Social Cycle social progress is defined in terms of a new vision of human progress. By placing an emphasis on human spiritual development, Sarkar devises an exit strategy from such a development, based on the role of enlightened moralists.

It is their role, based on self-less virtues and ideation on the divine, to apply energy and accelerate social momentum when the evolutionary process is caught up in social stasis. If this is not done, the ruling class, after having abandoned its original virtues, by placing an intense focus on its own social agenda begins to inflict tremendous and unjustified misery on other sections of society. The downfall of Soviet Communism in 1990 (Batra, 1978), the Great Depression of the 1930s (Batra, 1987), and the crisis of present day Capitalism (Batra, 2007) are manifestations of such social stasis. This theory is very

applicable in the case in point since it views the electioneering periods as cyclic events thus the giving out of money which forms the money culture is perennial to the elections after every five years to confuse electorate while for politicians, it is a consolidation of voters thus a way to achieve their interests. Those who view it as an old theory may have no solid justification if its applicability finds relevance to current events.

**Conceptual framework**



Source: Authors, 2015

The conceptual framework by large draws from the sociological cycle theory. It expounds that periodic and consistent use of money in its various forms often lead to a culture in society. This in the end generates socio-economic-political dimensions which are both negative and positive. The positive use of money involves the acceptable application in planning and facilitation which are normal parts of political process as opposed to the inference in this study - "money culture" (unethical use of money).

**Data Presentation, Interpretation, Discussion, and Analysis**

The study came up with findings pertaining to the respondents on confirmation of whether money culture exists in Kenya's politics, enquiring whether the targeted beneficiaries like it or not, interrogating the intensity of this practice in Kenya's politics, the probable genesis of this culture, and finally suggestions towards changing the culture. These areas of inquiry enabled the researchers to derive supportive responses useful in addressing the research objectives. This study carried out between September and November 2015 was commended by many respondents who acknowledged its timeliness and relevance to the prevailing Kenya's politics.

**Questioning about having been approached or Given Money/ Material Things to influence voting**

Response Type	Count	Count (in %)	Cumulative Count	Cumulative %
Yes	120	80%	120	80%
No	30	20%	150	100%


A number of respondents while answering this question pointed that they have been approached or alternatively given tokens to vote for a candidate in an election. In following up the question by another enquiry as to which between money and other tokens take lead in usage by politicians, the responses attributed that money as a means of attaining political support leads other tokens. The presentation below captures this;

**Between Money and Other Material things, which is commonly given out by politicians?**

Response Type	Count	Count (in %)	Cumulative Count	Cumulative %
Money	135	90%	135	90%
Material Things/ Tokens	15	10%	150	100%

**Did you like the practice (money culture in politics)?**

Most respondents from across the study areas confirmed liking the culture as displayed in the pie chart below;



The outcome in the chart marked by the bigger portion of the chart represented a majority of 108 respondents (affirmation to the question/Yes) who liked the money culture out of the 120 responses who had been approached with money or tokens/material things. The insignificant portion represents those who did not like the practice (money culture).

The respondents who liked it were asked through open ended questions to state why and the reasons given were that this money is taxpayers money and that it originates from corruption thus taking it is getting back what is naturally citizens while on the other hand, leaving it is enriching the honourable members un necessarily. Also suggesting that it is justifiable to receive because once they are in office they tend to forget the electorates.

**Reasons for not liking the money culture**

The data collection was a bit specific towards this question thus it gave respondents three options. One of the options was; not liking the practice as a morality issue, because of integrity, and alternatively both. One would ask whether morality issue and integrity differ. The study finds them different in the sense that integrity issues are probably legally pegged whereas morality goes beyond the laws to self-worth thus a metaphysical attribute in man. Integrity leads people majorly to be conscious with the existing requirements of legal frameworks whereas beyond these, morality still exists. The table below illustrates this response;

Response Type	Count	Percentage (%)	Cumulative Count	Cumulative %
Morality Issue	3	10%	3	10%
Integrity Issue	3	10%	6	20%
Both	24	80%	30	100%

This research confirmed that money is often used in Kenya's politics. In using a three layered likert- scale styled question, the study subjected respondents to answer how often money is used in Kenya's politics. The response was unanimous towards the frequency of very often (see table below).

**How often is money used in Kenya's politics?**

Response Type	Count	Percentage (%)	Cumulative Count	Cumulative %
Very Often	150	100%	150	100%
Often	0	0%	0	0%
Least Often	0	0%	150	100%

From the respondents, table in 8.5 clearly shows that money use in Kenyan politics is too frequent. It can be assumed that without it many fail to win. It is a syndrome before, during, and after elections. Before here means it is used an entry point, then during electioneering period it becomes a commodity for sale (give and take), and after elections it may extend to courts and its participants being compromised.

**Postulations of genesis of money culture in Kenya's politics (Table below)**

Response Type	Count	Percentage (%)	Cumulative Count	Cumulative %
Single Party Era	45	30%	45	30%
Multi Party Era	45	30%	90	60%
Since Independence	60	40%	150	100%

There is a mixed understanding as to when money culture began in Kenya. Some respondents felt that it has a nexus to the single party regime in Kenya while others equally attach it to multi-partism. A substantial number in this study attribute money culture to have started way back at the independence time. In our discussion, all these answers have some truth as seen in some of the literature herein.

For those alluding the origin to single party era, they could be having in mind the reciprocal exchanges that existed especially during the Moi regime (dubbed the Nyayo era) where politicians would want to express their loyalty through gifts to the head of state and in exchange would take delegations to Kabarak where their supporters would be given goodies and at the same time presidential visits which brought 'development' hanging on continued loyalty. Postulating the independence school of thought, Jomo Kenyatta built his support by rewarding close cronies with land. In the new dispensation of multipartism, apart from money culture still targeting the electorates, it also spreads among the political elite who exchange own support/ support base to presidential candidates with future intentions to be appointed in case of failure to get elected or getting substantial share of say in appointments thereafter elections.

**How can Money culture be changed in Kenyan politics?**

This culture has entrenched itself, as the open ended question responses showed. There are skepticisms surrounding approaches of fighting this culture. Respondent MC<sub>1</sub> (among those who did not want to be known were given pseudo names; MC for money culture) made the following comments;

*This culture has deep roots in this country because it is supported by big names in this country's political landscape. The person who doesn't want to use the means is committing a political suicide. Why should one attempt to do that when you can use some amount and replace it once you are in office. Again, what is wrong with donating to people money in*

*harambee (fundraising) when they are willing? Doing that will be anti- development.*

From this response, the researcher finds it agreeable that indeed big names have involved themselves in this exercise in various elections past elections. Probably, though a bit remote in a sense is also how even an institution that man electoral process has been implicated in the vice of money culture but in this case in form of open corruption with client firms allegedly involving big time officers of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC). The scandal that became known as the 'chicken scandal' followed a prosecution of a UK citizen who colluded with the Kenyan electoral body officials in corruption. According to Herbling (2015), Kenyan election officials pocketed millions of shillings in bribes to award lucrative printing contracts to a British company over a two-year period, prosecution documents filed in a London court show. In a legal battle that exposes one of the best documented international corruption networks in Kenya's history, UK prosecutors have filed in court loads of written evidence implicating senior election officials in the corruption ring, including Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) chairman Ahmed Issack Hassan. The documents show that the Kenyan taxpayer paid dearly for the illicit dealings between senior Smith & Ouzman (S&O) officials and the senior managers and commissioners in the defunct Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC). One part that is hard is to ever find a single politician in the process of giving out money to electorates openly ('election benevolence'). Most often the practice takes the form of loyal proxies within the patron- client web or family members getting involved, and also by using other means such as going to churches, schools, and amoebic groups to donate funds. This method turns round to justify what is bad in intent and practice to be generally acceptable. At this point, we also point out that the Kenya's Election Offences Act 2009 is a Field Offence- Act law because it is skewed to view electoral offences as only centering on field officers. This neglects the wholesomeness of elections in structure, system, and in cycle. In other words the offences should be inclusive to involve the actions of those in offices and making it known for easy interpretation to all.

According to MC<sub>2</sub>;

*"I was born when this practice was going on and I continue to see it being used and working for people in politics. Why should I think of changing a system that has made many into the political who is who while that is what I need. You better stop it after I have attained my goal. As long as the society finds it acceptable I will use it, but I don't see it in the near future ending anyway. One who fails to give is branded a 'mean- guy' and is not electable."*

The basis of MC<sub>2</sub> is quite an absurd situation. It depicts a new generational thought which seems to be swayed into the vice opportunistically and embraces it without caring. The problem here is that it might reflect an existence of many citizens who have resigned from optimism towards any likely positive change. Whereas the respondent may be a representation of regressive voices, the truth in the assertion here is that it takes time to cause such rooted practices to reduce, thus sociological cycle to reverse the order equivalently takes time. Ethically again this discourse finds people comfortable to break their morals and integrity than branding as 'mean-guys'

In my opinion, MC<sub>3</sub>;

*"Money culture is very bad as it is dismissive to the rightful actions by the right willed Kenyans who mean well for their country especially when the corrupted finally win in an election. In addition to this, as a country we shall be pretending to fighting corruption when this is not dealt with. Again, the electoral body cannot have muscles to fight it because monitoring this act is not easy hence clouded with secrecy. If it is to be done away with, a new generation cultured through training that the vice is terrible need to be brought up."*

This respondent like others who did not elaborate their responses see this vice as unstoppable due to the fact that the efforts cannot succeed unless it is supported by institutions mandated to manage elections. In the words of (Long, 2008), despite voters' attempts to use elections as mechanisms of accountability, weak institutional environments in emerging democracies do not always succeed at providing its supply. Indeed, a number of institutional deficiencies affect the lives of citizens in developing countries, from poor rule of law and ineffective courts to corrupt police and security forces. Nonetheless, in as much as the culture may look so dinosaur in nature, the study gave many reasons were given as a way of changing money culture. These included;

- Reducing poverty,
- Addressing public empowerment and employment issues,
- Creating awareness on the ills of the practice and re-instilling of societal morals,
- Prohibiting the vice,
- Law enforcement and related mechanisms,
- New resolve to fight corruption among leaders,
- Enhancing wealth redistribution among Kenyans equitably, and
- Regulate pay of all Kenyans.

Some of the proposed solutions may need in-depth analysis to figure out how they should be applied. Still, reading them one may note overlapping tendencies yet they are different. This study goes further to evaluate the suggested ways to changing this practice especially the issue of regulating pay of all Kenyans. In our thinking, first and foremost it seems to be true on the basis that there has been a lot of debate about public wage bill being ever rising. According to Serem (2013), establishment of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) was to transform the negative impacts of public wage bill. Wages must be managed to ensure resources are directed towards productive sector. Establishment of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission should transform the negative impacts of public wage bill. Prior to creation of SRC to address the concerns, the Permanent Public Service Remuneration Review Board (PPSRRB) was established as a permanent institution in the Public Service through Gazette Notice No. 7941 dated 7 November 2003. The Board developed a Pay Policy that was to guide the entire public service on issues of determination of pay, management of remuneration and significantly reduce disparities. Job content, skills competences and position responsibilities were to be considered. The implementation of the Pay Policy was selective leading to further disparities. This commission has talked and proposed very wonderful ideas but it has failed to implement those that touch on the legislature and executive but contrary it has eminently vocalized matters of pay policies against the middle class/teachers.



On the basis of the report by Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), it comes as no shocker, that the budgetary allocation for development expenditure has been lower than the allocation for recurrent expenditure - which mostly goes towards the payment of salaries and allowances of civil servants/government officials. It is also worth noting that there are disparities in salaries to officials even for those within the same job group, some even with similar qualifications. This is because the remuneration package is not based on a systematic job description and pay analysis. It is also important to note that government is a non-profit making entity, meaning its employees are rarely motivated, even with the introduction of performance contracts. Of concern though, is the rate at which the public sector wage bill has skyrocketed, to the extent that it is threatening to stifle government's normal operations and consequently, economic growth (Jairo, 2014).

The same report notes that today, people around the world are demanding for better goods and services from the government, in return for the taxes they pay, which should be used to procure the goods and offer services. Another critical view of this attempted changing of the money culture as suggested by respondents prompts us/authors to cluster these views as either individual-citizen related vis'-a- viz structural related. Under the former; one can have instilling morals, corruption, and self-resolve whereas the latter associated with structures may involve; educating voters, putting measures to reduce unemployment, enhancing wealth redistribution, public empowerment, regulating pay of Kenyans whether in politics or outside it, reducing poverty as a honest strategy of governance, and putting legal measures in place backed by implementation will.

## Conclusion

From the literature in this paper, there seems to be evidence that money is generally used in politics globally. It again comes out clearly that there is variance in meaning attached to its application and how it is used globally. Despite that variance, the cycle of this menace exists as politics persist. There is need to inculcate the sociological cycle theory backwards in an attempt to make it a cycle of cultural change to undo its effects in the Kenyan politics. In other parts of the world unlike Kenya, corporates sponsor politicians expecting to be rewarded when they finally attain elective positions, a trend that has seen people against such head to courts to challenge this. Whereas courts have also at times struck corporate support to politicians, many democracies have always come out to protect support to political parties against individuals.

The "money culture" in Kenya and other places that use similar means are characterized by poverty and ignorance of masses thus politicians take advantage of circumstances at hand which they don't change. The practice involves things/tokens and sometimes promises which influence electorates. It is an immoral act to buy the conscience of voters, at the same time it touches on ones integrity. The integrity of the person giving (politician) may be defined in legal frameworks but that of the receiver however later becomes commensurate with the after election services and outcomes of the giving representative. Money culture as it were in elections has costs which are often hidden based on the words of Schaffer. Finally, a bribe is equivalent to development lost and a silent cause of conflict.

## Recommendation

1. This paper recommends that proper use of money as facilitation and for planning should be supported, but for accountability purposes it should be made known to electorates before and after elections and should be controlled.
2. There is need for more awareness on ignorant citizens about the malpractice of money in influencing voters, governments, NGOs, electoral bodies, civil societies, and non-state actors should find it an activity to spearhead to strengthen democracy. The classification here does not exonerate political parties and electoral observes.

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