



ISSN : 2350-0743

www.ijramr.com



International Journal of Recent Advances in Multidisciplinary Research

Vol. 10, Issue 11, pp.9178-9186, November, 2023

## RESEARCH ARTICLE

### JOHN SEARLE AS A PRACTICE THEORETICIAN

\*Joel Patomäki

University of Jyväskylä, Finland

#### ARTICLE INFO

##### Article History:

Received 17<sup>th</sup> August, 2023

Received in revised form

19<sup>th</sup> September, 2023

Accepted 20<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

Published online 30<sup>th</sup> November, 2023

##### Key Words:

South Asia, Nuclear Politics, Arms Race, Stability, India-China-Pakistan.

#### ABSTRACT

I will research John Searle's (1) idea of a social causation as a collective intentionality and (according to my understanding) even more important notion of a *background*. Furthermore, I will compare Searle's notions of the collective intentionality and the background of the social to Maurizio Ferraris's (2) notions of a text as a replacement of the collective intentionality. The problems that Ferraris addresses are understood here in terms of practises. In this article I will look at more contemporary debates in social ontology and in a practise approach. Theodore Schatzki (3) is a pioneer in this approach. I will also look at economics as social theory and thenomaterialist basis for economics needed according to many debates now days. My viewpoint to Searle comes from two ordinary language philosophers: John Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Performatives and speech acts are also economic tool. I will concentratein understanding ofthe background and the collective intentionality, of being a part of the practise in general. This is a neomaterialist intuition I argue could be against Searele's ideas in constructive ways. There is Schatzkis positioning of neomaterialist ideas as competitor or part of practise approach I will look in here.

#### INTRODUCTION

The ontology of Searle is often seen as a kind of a basic text of the social ontology and that is not itself very comprehensible theory. The theory is based on many elements that the idea of thepractise is based, namely the collective intentionality and the background that make performatives function. And at the same time those very same performatives which held the practise in the words of Searle's theory. Maurizio Ferraris has related a continental social ontology that is strongly tied to John Searle's kind of basic book of social ontology. Ferraris goes through stages of Polands historical borders and states at the end: "It should be clear then, that the identity of Poland is not founded on its molecules. The identity of Poland is founded on treaties, written records, formal agreements, which all have the interesting feature of having signatures at the bottom of their pages." (Ferraris, 2007, 394). Ferraris brings to the forefront of his social ontology an element which Searle sees essential mainly in terms of the causal relationships, but which he plunges in a sense sidelined. At the heart of the theory of Ferraris are registers. In other words, the recordings, which, through the background of the interpretation principles of the model the status functions. I believe that linking registers through the background and the Ferraris of the status functions to each other interpreting systems, whose differences and similarities are determined according to the situation.

In other words large principal distinctions are not made but only context relative distinctions. This is a great possibility for posthumanist thought since the basic idea of X term as basic of status functions makes technique and material in general separate from humans. Material is therefore passive in Searle's theory. On the other hand Ferraris shows how material is structured by different set of rules, recordings and signatures etc. Renault (2016) has differentiated between substantial, relational and processual social ontologies. I will argue that by complementing Ferraris with "The first of these two ontological interrogations deals with the types of entities that compose or constitute the social world. The second approach deals with the type of being that is proper to social reality" (Renault, 2016, 23). This idea of Searle's theory's causal explanation is basically very similar to the practise approach in Schatzki etc. because both see structures of doings and sayings as withholding each other. This means that the background makes the collective intentionality possible which creates performatives. It is important partly, because the popular practise approach draws from the same kind of explanation that does not emphasize action nor structure. I will next go through my basic arguments that explain the basic elements of practise and the collective intentionality as parts of the same structure. This means that the whole practise has been analyzed in Searle (1995) in a way that has three elements instead of one. Dreyfus (1991) has claimed that the contents of collective intentionality is the background as Searle says. Then according to Dreyfus interpretation of Searle (who is writing about Heidegger's idea of practises) Searle does explain the contents of the collective intentionality with its twin concept, namely

\*Corresponding author: Joel Patomäki,  
University of Jyväskylä, Finland.

the background. So the idea of the practise consist of performatives that form the background and therefore creates the practise as the institution, like the structure that has the collective intentionality that again allows the performatives. Derrida describes many dimensions of the text in saying that “along with an ordered extension of the concept of text, dissemination inscribes a different law governing effects of sense or reference (Derrida, 1981). The collective intentionality along with the background is the basic building block of the social reality that gives the acceptance that enables different institutions, to functions. The collective intentionality of Searle’s theory has been criticized for its simplicity. It has been claimed, that it is a problem that Searle does not explain the contents of the collective intentionality or in other words that his meaning giving structures are too stable. (Meijers 2003, Spivak 1980) This argument combines the Ferrarisian approach that seems to claim that this problem of contents is solved by the text to the idea that the contents should be explained by something in general. Ferraris’s idea that the collective intentionality is better explained through archwriting, the text as the contents (Ferraris, 2013, 154). The Ferrarisian approach uses a different term to explain a causal factor or the concept. The text however is in the scope of the theory since Ferraris claims that the text is the replacement of the collective intentionality. Even though the text is somewhat similar entity to Searle’s term for *the background*, it differs in the sense that the background does not include the collective intentionality. The point is that Ferraris seems to claim (as I do) that the background is a part of the same structure as the collective intentionality in the sense that the background is the content that is missing in Searle’s term collective intentionality, according to Meijers.

Therefore it creates the practise in the same way as Searle. The text and the performatives as the contents and the acceptance, or the background, the collective intentionality and the performatives are basically the same parts, the contents and the acceptance and the deeds that can be performed in this framework. Contents has therefore many qualities that function in different ways to keep up the social, as Dave Elder-Vas and Brian Epstein have claimed. There are differences in the terms that explain how the social world and performatives function (or rather, how many and which terms explain its functioning) and this is where the idea of practise comes into the picture. The practise (understood as the background that creates the collective intentionality or the text). Can the background create the collective intentionality as one of its functions (which is still only a part of the process). There we need the process ontology to analyze this situation. Could and should we explicate that which terms we use to analyze the particles of the practise and different combinations of their relations? In addition which are the relations of these terms? The terms compared here are as mentioned the background, the collective intentionality and the performatives. We have here a threefold analyzation of the situation. The practise does have the same function in both sides. As the rule governed the structure that humans use in order to achieve certain goals, the performatives have little variation in the stylization capacity. The performatives as the monotonically used vehicle also have certain secondary functions, keeping the institution in question intact. People name the boat by the per formative, but also keep up the institution of naming boats in general, even though they don’t mostly talk about it. So the collective intentionality and some parts of the background are influenced by performatives.

I do ask where is the whole thing that makes the social world function according to Searle’s social ontology? The immediate answer is the performative that is on the other hand partly created by the collective intentionality, the background or some other maybe more complicated process?. So Ferraris claims that the collective intentionality can be replaced by the text (Ferraris 2013). He does not mention the notion of the background while suggesting the change of the basic notion of Searle’s social ontology. The social in Searle’s social ontology (Lawson, 2013) is a separate realm that is governed in terms of structural action. According to Lawson “Generally speaking then, the *explananda* of the social realm, the phenomena to be explained are the practises in which people engage and the *explanans* are the physical, social and psychological conditions the relevant action. (Lawson, 1997, 193) This leads us towards the background causation of Searle from the text since the text is a less analytical category of the same phenomena and I am looking for analytical distinctions.

According to Johansson performing a successful speech act is related to general theory of speech acts according to which speech acts rely on institutions, may fail when the speakers or listeners do not meet the right kind of position in the institution. When talking about the President’s acts is out, and their implications for the speech acts, however, assumes that the acts will be successful. When talking about speech acts and their effects it is assumed, that speech acts are felicitous. As an example of a speech act that an official authority does from right kind of position, that fails Johansson represents a situation where a declaration causes rioting and destruction. (Johansson, 2008, 88) On the other hand Searle writes that an ultimate system of status-functions can only operate if it is backed up by monopoly of violence (Searle, 2008, 34).

Registration in the way Ferraris uses the Concept also refers to facts stored to the mind. From this perspective the registrations are part of the collective intentionality. On the other hand Ferraris classifies document to many categories. In my view these classifications help to explain how registers and document and codifications relate to performatives. These categories are only important according to the idea that social is flexible and non real in the sense that it consists of many factors that effect each other through the representations. For example money is represented of money and the material meanings attached to it is only one part of the problematic. It is also a convention that is not connected to any particular material meanings. On the other hand the leaves of a tree are special material components that can move energy from one place to another. This is important also later when I get to criticize the posthumanist discourses.

It is an interesting question, how the concept of collective intentionality should be understood? Some problems concerning collective intentionality could be seen as artificial if is perceived from a perspective where the bottom idea is the common sense understanding of collective intentionality. I think it is easy to understand where this kind of critique comes from, because from the individualistic perspective the collective intentionality is understood as individual phenomenon and the main problems: how it could be shared with other subjects? I argue that this problem may be framed in too tight a manner. The real problem in this study will be more technical in two senses. At first I mention the in the second part of this book I will look at the technical ways and concepts that can be used to understand the contents of the collective

intentionality. Now in this first chapter first half of the book I will look what are the boundaries of collective intentionality. Is it connected to psychological or neuropsychological facts and so on. In general what are the boundaries of collective intentionality in the sphere of social and natural. How is this divide between nature and society possible. On the other hand collective intentionality could be understood as a natural product that is not problematic in then sense many theories claim it would be. To put it on other words, collective intentionality could be perceived as a flexible phenomenon that does not need theoretization about the phenomenon itself but rather about the ingredients of the concept. For example many animals have collective intentionality, so perhaps it should not be seen as a phenomenon but completely normal, including the way we perceive the world, and learn from others. Then the problem of collective intentionality would come to be framed in a different way. It would not be about the sharing of collective intentionality only, but concern more broadly the whole mechanics of communication and registration which would in this question have the status of collective intentionality as a whole.

Still it keeps the area of collective intentionality confined to the minds' capacity to reach understanding towards the world in a collective manner. I think this is misleading. If others are not communicating or registering ideas and meanings there could be no such thing as collective intentionality, because people simply could not know how and where to point their minds. I am tempted to think that the formation of collective intentionality is not a fixed process, but rather a constant stage of negotiation in a similar manner to negotiations as commonly understood. According this idea, there could not be a stable general collective intentionality, but rather many collective intentionalities that concern the same elements in the world, and those many collective intentionalities are in constant change. The assumption that constructivist account belongs to twentieth century is supported by Scott Lash. He tries to challenge the assumption that critical theory is modernist and post-structuralism is post-modernist (Lash, 1990, 153.)The constitutive idea of modernity was in many areas that the space and material itself that was before only a instrument to show something or to tell a story but in modernity the space itself was the thing that was being transformed and researched through for example theatre. John W.Cook argues that Wittgenstein Humean view of Causation did not change during his philosophical career. (Cook, 1994,177-181.) In this area of conversation this could mean that modernist monopoly of violence that was celebrated in the 20<sup>th</sup> century constructs ideas that things are somehow random in general. On the other hand the theatre space (that was used as an example) is transformed as something that is also material and it cannot be separated from the social. Therefore as Renault has argued process ontology is the most complex ontology for

This is important to note when examining Searle's theory because Searle seems to give intentionality the central place in creating social objects. It is interesting that intentionality needs reproducing all the time. Physical X term is needed to be in the bottom in Searle's notion of status function. He did think in the beginning that process way that also the material structures the events in more complex way than in his later theories of performatives . If you think about the status function formula as such, either the earlier or later version, as Searle's perception of the status functions - of the relationships between the, suggest how the linguistic reality and registers of will

affect the status- functions in the background. Thus Searle practically admits the significance of the thesis of Ferraris even though on the other hand Searle says that Background and collective intentionality allow the causal significance of status-functions. He background does not work on the basis of the information in the registry, because Searle explains that if people are sentient of the rules they follow according to Searle those peoples follow the rules according to rule sensitivity, namely non-linguistic sensing of rules. Therefore Searle admits the importance of background assumptions, interpretation principles for the formation of status-functions, like Ferraris. On the other hand Searle does not admit that social reality depends on registrations in the same sense as Ferraris.Human practises constitute the meaning and knowledge in the social world. Ian Hacking writes in his book: *Social Construction of What that* "Kant may have cast the mold, but drive for construction belongs to the twentieth century" (Hacking, 1999, 47.) Maurizio Ferraris has claimed that Documentality is the basic notion in the understanding of causality and the structure of social ontology in general. Main difference between theories of Ferraris and John Searle is that Ferraris wants to replace the activities falling under the intentionality by Documentality. Searle's theory was a pioneering work in analytical branch of social ontology. Ferraris separates also written and spoken acts. The general framework of the theoretical frame of reference the Ferraris set the written acts first. According to Ferraris speech-act can be only a manifestation and the necessary conditions for the performative are in the registers. (Ferraris, 2013, 171-172) As far as I can see, performativien subordinate station in theory of Ferraris, is very essential feature. It leads to significant new services of the textual factors. Smith's theoretizations of documentary acts rely on communication, that increases the pressure to rely on Ferraris when interpreting the Searlean idea of the deontic forces coupled with Derridean idea of textual constitution.

So if the collective intentionality is a pseudo-problem and the background is the scientific phenomenon, what is then the meaning and the function of writing? The text in the Ferrarisan sense govern the social, so what is the distinction between the material and semiotic or symbolic culture? Namely the superstructure. Therefore the idea of Ferraris seem to be in tact compared to the basic structure of Searle's theory. The background is a some kind of combination of discourses and the material environment. In this sense the discourse can be only a systematic version of material deeds. By the material deeds I mean the idea that certain dispositives govern our actions in a Foucauldian sense. In Searle's theory the performatives that form the background that is the contents of the collective intentionality which is supporting them. In other words, the contents of the collective intentionality is the collective intentionality but it is the background that allows it to happen. On the other hand the text seems to be exactly the same structure just in a way that the background and the collective intentionality are both replaced by a single notion of the text. So if speech acts want to be understood in this posthumanist sense, then there is only one substance. We are not distinct from the environment. The collective intentionality is made possible in the first place by the environment. Let's look at the concept of the collective intentionality in the broadest possible (in some senses) scale. The concept of the collective intentionality in Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy is a broad one. According to Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

*"Collective intentionality is the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or values. Collective intentionality comes in a variety of modes, including shared intention, joint attention, shared belief, collective acceptance, and collective emotion. Collective intentional attitudes permeate our everyday lives, for instance when two or more agents look after or raise a child, campaign for a political party, or cheer for a sports team"*

(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Collective intentionality, (Internet, Sources))

Secondly, Searle's idea of collective intentionality does not include variation caused by communication. I believe that this much criticised lack in Searle's theory draws an oversimplified picture of causal relationships. This is because there is no variation in relation between representations and the way reality is construed, that many theories give to social sphere. Realism loses its meaning if there is no social that is controlled by its own laws that are independent of representations as Searle puts it. I must make a distinction between Searle's idea of ontology as a whole and speech act theory, because Searle and Derrida debate has namely in the genre of speech act theory. It might be useful to see the ontological positions created by the speech act theory developed as part of the ordinary language philosophy that Wittgenstein was also part of. On the other hand the social ontology of Searle is more based on scientific understanding of the underlying physical, brain chemical etc. structures. So there there could be seen two kinds of structures. Scientific somehow based on nature and interpretation based on rules. This is the Kantian distinction. This idea shows clearly for what Searle criticized Wittgenstein for. Namely the idea that there are no explicit rules but people just act one way and not the other. This is important since Searle has also criticized Derrida for not being explicit about the rules. On the other hand it has been suggested (Staten ???) that the ideas of Derrida and Wittgenstein are somewhat similar. There is an emphasis on unclear historically formed practices on both. On the other words the idea of practices is important as they are formed in working one way not another. Often these processes are unconscious. These ideas of Searle are resembled in his dismissal of non explicit unclear rules manifested by the theories of Derrida and Wittgenstein. Henry Staten has discussed differences between Derrida and Wittgenstein in his book. John Searle seems to have therefore a clearer set of rules. Derrida-Searle debate is also opened towards Wittgenstein by Searle saying that Wittgenstein's idea of background of rules that just happen to be followed in an unclear manner. Ferraris claims that positivity; parts of the world that are not dependent on subjects (Ferraris, 2015, 37)

Derrida (2001) has referred to archiving in Freudian sense in his essay "Freud and the Scene of Writing. In my thesis I will concentrate on the Freudian side of Derrida's thinking. Most important aspect of the Freudian side is the aspect in unconsciousness that most of the facts that shape our knowledge and understanding are not available to consciousness. Also the idea of Archives represented in Derrida's (1994) book *Archive Fever* is important for the Freudian reading of Derrida. There Derrida uses the ideas developed in "Freud and the scene of writing" to understand the meaning of archives which consist of traces, documents etc in the sense that also Ferraris uses these terms. When the mind is directed towards the object as it says, then the object is sometimes part of you.

When social facts are understood as the social (which of course implies a distinction between the nature and the social) then Searle's approach comes more reasonable. According to Searle social facts are in some sense collective intentions. They contain the collective intentionality. (Searle, 1996, 23-26) So if institutional facts are necessarily constituted by the collective intentionality what is the role of more historical processes that are embedded in the notion of practice? This is the question posed for the process ontology since if Searle's theory is monistic in the sense that social facts can and should contain the collective intentionality then the condition of their possibility is a process related mechanism. Searle seems to be developing some kind of practice approach that is keeping distance to the more collective senses of the modelling reality. This can be seen by the vagueness of the terms background and the collective intentionality. They are developing in top of the ontology consisting of the performatives. On the other hand the collective intentionality seems to be only a concept that can be thrown away as unnecessary as Smit, Buekens and Plessis do in their article. (VIITE).

Therefore I think the concept itself needs more precise formulation in many ways. The interpretation according to which Searle's concept of the collective intentionality is problematic, could be interpreted to suit many different approaches to Searle's system of the collective intentionality. One point of view is that Searle seems to be opposed to individualism. That is a fact. More important notion however is that he tries to save some parts of individualism in the mechanisms and expectations of his system. Maybe Searle's project drops in to the box that Hargreaves and Varoufakis (1995, 108) give to the ventures outside rational choice model by introducing conventions. They describe them as "half-disguised invitations to Wittgenstein, Kant or Hegel". This is only partly true since Searle's idea of the collective intentionality and the background imply some kind of entity in the social that is not individual. It is a convention. This is one of the basic particles of the practice approach in a way or another.

**John Searle and the Collective Intentionality:** According to Searle social facts always contain the collective intentionality. Searle clarifies that the collective intentionality creates the social facts in action where individual persons' intentionality functions as part of the collective intention. For example in team sports people will work as a part of the collective intentionality. In other words, the collective intentionality is an intentional action as part of the collective action that forms the collective intentionality. (Searle, 1996, 23-26) Searle writes that the function requires a status in order to function and the status requires the collective intentionality that includes the continuing of collective acceptance. (Searle, 1996, 114) So status functions is the use of practice for most individuals. It is in some sense part of the person like the welfare institutions of Finland are part of me. The social as only social can maybe end at some point. If however everything is interconnected, as in the process ontology in general, then it is a different story. On the other hand Searle says that the collective acceptance does not need ongoing maintenance if it ends. On the other hand he comments that there are no individuals involved in the collective intentionality. According to Searle: *"No set of I Consciousness even supplemented with mutual belief adds up to a We Consciousness. The crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting, believing etc.) something together, and the individual intentionality that each*

person has derived from the collective intentionality that they share" (Searle, 1990, 25)

Being together is ongoing process in some senses that Searle also realizes when he puts the background in the theoretical position in his social ontology that makes possible of being together that gives humans these possibilities to benefit from the status function in a performative manner. According to Antonie. WMeijers, the idea of sharing of the collective intentions is underdeveloped in Searles ontology. Meijers claims that: "for intention to be shared it is not enough that intentions are coincident" (Meijers, 2003, 175) I think that in the previous statement Meijers seems to think that collective intentionality is an individual phenomena and that these kinds of phenomena should be explained by mapping how those intentional states are shared. On the other hand if the states contain also objects as actors in this network then the story is very different. Searle seems to think that the effects go to the material that is just a passive receptor or whatever. The piece of paper is not important in itself and therefore it only adapts. Meijers writes about Searle's concept of the collective intentionality that the concepts content is underdeveloped. According to Meijers in Searle's framework the only possible way to illustrate the collective intentionality that different individuals can have different tokens of same types of we states. According to Meijers this view has been criticized a lot, because it is not enough for a condition of shared intention that it is the same by coincidence. (Meijers, 2003, 174-175). The real problem here is an argumentative proponent of a posthumanist understanding of the states of affairs as processes. It could be asked if Searle's theory is useful for understanding how we use something. Ironically the same argument is used against Latour by (KTSTST) that Latour is more concerned about how we use things that about the underlying structures that are not about individual.

On the other hand Meijers claims that: "His (Searle's) account of collective intentionality is basically an account of intentions of individuals, that is, collective intentions, where the sharing of these intentions is not a matter of concern." (Meijers, 2001, 176) But on the other hand there is no point to put your finger in the term individuals because they only act in a way enabled by the rules or conventions of the practice. The practice consist of the elements Searle says but there are also other ways of seeing the situation. The practice is not a general concept and is divided in different theoretical branches. Different frameworks enable the practice and performatives for individuals in it. I think that the collective intentionality is an artificially framed concept and so also the problems concerning the sharing of the collective intentionality would be kind of pseudo-problems, arising out of the too tight framing of the concept of the collective intentionality. Searle's account on the other hand is based on the assumption that the collective intentionality is a primitive phenomenon. So Meijers critique directed against the sharing of the collective intentions is not matter of concern for Searle for a reason, in other words, the collective intentionality is a primitive phenomenon. This primitiveness seems to hide its many layers in terms of a content. This idea of the primitive phenomenon must be deconstructed in some sense (deconstruction is not referring here only to the Derridean theory). Because the psychological states are only a small part of the idea of collective being and theoretizations about structures and practices in general, then it must be noted that the psychological theories cannot be at the center of the collective intentionality and that's how it sounds

when Searle put it. Next I will posit an alternative model which is based on Searle's concepts but tries to deconstruct the psychological states which *per se* philosopher cannot talk about in the analytical sense. I will try to explain the world in the DeLandian sense. According to Searle the status function (or a declaration) is needs to have the collective intentionality on its back in order to work. Have the function it ought to have. Searle's understanding of the collective intentionality is very simple. As far as I can see Searle is trying to rule out from the concept of the collective intentionality, the effects of recordings and therefore, also an iteration to Searle's formal formulas. The effects of recordings mean the many relations we have to objects and back. Some part of the Ferrarisan theory can be used to represent this briefly. Recordings and an iteration are two terms that function as the basic function of the text in Ferraris (2013) alternative the Derridean social ontology. The recordings are the things we somehow remember (via memory or some more formal media). The iteration means the ability of recordings to re-contextualise. These means a partly instable network of meanings. In terms, this means that the process of giving meaning (or granting status via the collective intentionality) is individual. On the other hand the using of the performative theory (as earlier noted) are not the way to categorize individualism or non-individualism since the point in Searle (at least implicitly) that there are collective entities in his social ontology and processes behind them as the notions of the background and the collective intentionality suggest. From only the use of performatives you cannot therefore make valuations about the orientation of theory in an individual collective axis in the context of ontology.

According to Searle, the original formulation of status-function was a formula that is causally explained by the collective intentionality and the background. Status functions follows the following form according to Searle: "X counts as Y in C" (Searle, 1996, 28) Therefore X means object or person that functions as a status indicator and Y means special status/meaning to X. C describes the circumstances where X is counted as Y, in other words, where the offset from X term to Y term is possible. For example the police badge means a status in the context of Finland. In my view Searle leaves unnoticed how the collective intentionality and the background effect the formation of the context and in that way the transformation in the causal way. This has implied in it the material object and the meaning of the object performatively, and the context c which has actually two overlapping elements. Firstly, the background, secondly the collective intentionality. Finland as an effective platform C for creating the status function as police badge is overlapping the collective intentionality on the background as has been noted to be a dominant interpretation of Searle's theory earlier. The place in his theory Searle gives for the collective intentionality in one that makes a middle way between Marxist practices and a liberal understanding of companies. Searle explains that by the collective intentionality he means cooperative behavior, and shared intentional states. Searle says that obvious examples of the collective behaviour are the ones where: "I am doing something only as part of our doing something" (Searle, 1995, 23) But this part of our doing is normally a case that can be even deeply unconscious. For example the notion of the class fight might be beneath many layers in the process when human starts to tag his name in walls of the street. It might be in other words completely instrumental advertising of the self and at the same time it is through the background (and maybe the

some kind of collective intentionality) an act of shouting: "here we are, remember me, we have something". This however is effecting all material and discursive effects around you in a scheme able to re-contextualise. Against this theory however goes that Searle claims that the collective intentionality is a primitive phenomenon and therefore non-reducible to the individual intentionality. (Searle, 1995, 25) So it does not matter what the individual intents. Ok, why should psychology or normal scientific world view matter more than this? Searle has changed the principles of the status function in a new form in his new book *Making the Social World* that has been published in 2010. In doing so, he says he has been wrong in an original formulation. He writes in the new book that the form represented in *The Construction of Social Reality* is special case. All the inclusive formula is according to him the form: *We make the case by declaration that status Y exists in context C*" (Searle, 2010, 100). So this declaration is a highly institutionalized form of the human practise. Therefore, in this example used now as the context of that discussion in these pages for example the police badge can still work as a status function that forms the context for C declaration: you are under arrest, that causes Y which is in this special case that a state deprives freedom from an individual, to whom the declaration is represented. The new model developed by Searle brings the theory closer to the theory of speech acts and performatives, because Searle admits in the former formulation of status function that speech-acts are behind almost all the status functions. The performatives are speech acts and therefore the performatives are at the heart of opportunities and possibilities of speech acts.

So Searle tried to use more general formulas at first in his 1995 but in 2010 he had already turned more straight in the context of speech acts which are at the center of his social universe and especially causation in it. According to Searle the formula of status function is always connected to possibility of doing something, or preventing someone from doing something. This idea of potentialities is the one underlying critical realist reading of practises. In the critical realism theory of science that is adapted as a part of the larger canon of theoretical sociology that discusses with poststructuralism and the possibility of realist Marxism influenced ontology. Critical realism contemplates the sameness of natural and the social universes. It argues both have same kind of generative mechanisms which is the central term in understanding causality of the social structures. It is not about actualities but about possibilities. There will rise the question inside Searle's ontology that is it possible to understand the effect of natural particles in terms of socially enabled possibility of doing something. For example a leaf that is green might be a symbol of some social activity but even though in most cases the biological capacity of the leaves is connected to the social phenomena it still is contingent because green leaves can be artificial and do the same thing. Still in some societies there is no material resources etc. and only way to put up these symbols is through green leaves in general. Searle claims, that the negation of the collective acceptance does not need ongoing maintenance opposed to conventional power which usually requires the constant maintenance in a way or another. (Searle, 1995, 109) So the practise that enables the effect that need to be maintained is different from the practise that is in process. Is that what Searle basically says in relation to the idea of the status function. If we think it through in posthumanist sense then there is the situation where for example some service or possibility is privatized and large

amount of people need to live without this service etc. connected to their personal system of expectations. Does this not need maintenance even more than the old system that was stable? This is the Foucauldian idea that the power constitutes power and there is no power neutral point zero somewhere. In this theory of causality is understood in to be been performative in Searle's framework. By the performative framework I mean the basic idea of cause and effect between somebody uttering a sentence and effects it causes. This process is at work for example the declaration of war etc. It basically works in the following way I say something that you recognize it as the declaration of war (in large or small scale). Another question however is, what is the status of causality, in itself as (outside) part of this process? This question can be answered by using Roy Bhaskars(1979) idea of causal effects as potentials that work on tendency principle which means that tendency can actualized as an actual force etc. but however it exists even in a potential form. The same is often true in human institutions. This idea is true for example of a word. There is the potential to do a declaration even if no one ever uses it. The important point here is that the understanding of the nature of conventions (un)consciousness etc. is crucial for understanding a causality according to the performatives. Collier (1994) writes about critical realist understanding of the unconsciousness. The idea of the unconscious as mentioned earlier is a common notion in the discussion about the performatives. It is very present for example in the famous Derrida-Searle debate.

There is the question that some words (or utterances) cause different kind of effects. The notion of cause is not anyway understood in deeper (scientific, conceptual etc.) way but cause it is understood only as a conventional relation between meaning and object the effect and a causality is not important in itself (as it is not for one of y main points of reference namely John. R Searle) but the causality is understood as the successive performatives which in turn cause effects which are not tied to the performative that causes these effects in any essential way. The level where the brute facts cause the effects is an emergent level of the social according to Searle. If I say that a meeting is started and bang the table with a hammer and different kinds of conventions are from there on being followed it does not mean that the banging of the table would necessarily lead to such effects.

The plane of practise is therefore separate from any other level. So in this idea, Searle is not separate from the practise approach. The way he makes the separation that he draws his theory closer to the neo-materialist theory by admitting the material nature of the status function in his 1995 social ontology. I will look into the question of causality of the performatives through the ontology of Searle. It is important how the material background enables differences. At the bottom the problematics could be about Derrida's idea of the possibility of an illocution. It means that the speech act is enforced and does surely succeed. On the other hand a perlocution is more random in effects. The text cannot work causally if no difference is done between the perlocution and the illocution, because only the illocution has the billiard ball touch. To say it in other way it is possible that causal patterns that are connected to social facts or are them an impossible combination? If social facts are understood to be socially constructed? The answer is, since as learned from Bhaskars account of the causality (connected his practice approach to social sciences) potential is the main source of a social sphere.

So in Bhaskars notion nature is not separate from the society in some sense in the same way as for example Latour. This leads us to aposthumanist notion of everything as one. Then everything can re-contextualise everything is a micro and a macro level and therefore nothing would have any structure (meaning global theory here). There is an interpretation of the background (which is usually seen as the context C in Status Function) as the practise itself because the first is coded in the other.  $X=y$  in C. The background is seen as a part of the practise as the collective intentionality as noted earlier. On the other hand the background can always change. Therefore this would lead to a certain amount of perlocution to every speech act because there are complex combinations of material and discursive elements *under* every social practise (which as earlier noted, can be in some sense reduced to the The rules are very vague in the sense that the context is governed by the practises that are not very explicit rules. Rules are again not functional in itself but it depends on the collective intentionality that on the other hand depends on the background. This notion of the background is the one that makes the rules vague. This same idea is represented by the idea that the text is always beneath the practise (Ferraris 2013) There is a process of deeds that creates the practise. The practise is anyhow according to Searle, basically rooted to the conventional power.

This is a very important addition to the ideas concerning the functioning of the social world since it makes sense to the idea of causality in a way that do not split it to two separate pieces like Searle's conception of causality in his social ontology that splits into the collective intentionality and the background. This is because then he can battle on two fronts. He can be a collectivist that tries to smuggle Wittgenstein and Kant to social sciences at least to cover some areas instead of rational choice theory. On the other hand, he is developing ontology that rejects many parts of the collective intentionality understood as the unconscious process that is asocial fact if social facts (as Searle says) are always embedded as a part of the collective intentionality which is in part constituted by the background. This is the weak spot in Searle's theory. Basically the practises are connected to the power underneath those very same practises. According to Searle destruction of a conventional power advances through the collective acceptance not through the content of collective acceptance (Searle, 1995,106) This makes it pure power which is not connected to the large contents of the concept. This means basically that the rules and the background that keeps the practise in tact are not important in itself in a way that the acceptance comes from the fact that everybody repeats the same movements and same practises as the background knowledge that are often understood as deeds that are made to achieve certain outcomes.

On the other hand all this is unimportant for the destruction of conventional power. When the collective acceptance ends it just ends the practise as a whole. That is the implication of Searle's theory. Here we must keep in mind the thesis of Ferraris that registrations are the basic building block of social reality. By registrations Ferraris means the same thing as Derrida with the text. The idea of Ferraris does explain the problems in Searle's theory of the collective intentionality. On this view the collective acceptance only changes the text to a different format. There is no entity without history which is the text. In this sense the end of one acceptance makes the text different at one part but most likely does preserve some parts

of the original text that governs the activities in this are partly overlapping. In the Latourian sense this history is more like an alliance between actors. The actors can be also nonhumans (Latour 2005). AsLatour explains in his introduction to actor-network theory. According to Searle two basic modes of conventional powers are approval and requirement. (Searle, 1996, 108) The idea of Searle where rules are clear on/off type rules comes clear in Searle claims, that the negation of collective acceptance does not need ongoing maintenance opposed to conventional power which usually requires constant maintenance in a way or another. (Searle, 1995, 109) This implicates that rules do not vary and change over time but actually go on or off. If they are of no work for their maintenance is needed. This is Searle's mechanical idea of the nature of social world. The idea of practise is in many ways a kind of middle path between Searle's analytical tradition and the Foucault-Deleuze inspired posthumanism. If this is titled "Searle as practise theoretician", what does it mean?

**Searle as a Practice Theoretician:** In order to shed light on these questions I will go through Searle's ideas with various twists and turns. It is important to note for the need for nuances of material parts of the textual formations. In Searle's theoretical framework, the causality is understood in the performatives, which function as a part of the collective intentionality and the background. By the performative I mean the basic idea of the cause and the effect between somebody uttering a sentence and effects it causes. This means that the performatives are the function in which individuals use the institutional practises for their own ends or rather cause effects in an institutional framework. I refer to the practises that are beneath single performatives as the background structure. I will look into the principles that give light on the principles according to what the performances are organized as the background structure in order to form the collective intentionality in the Searlean terms. There is the complex institutional structure beneath that it is hard (or impossible) to explicate all the underlying rules and institutions. In common speech act theory the rules that make some speech act possible are always clear. This is anyway an illusion that does not take into account the idea that the background is beneath the collective intentionality (Dreyfus 1991). Then the rules are clear but the whole practises around the speech act are not clear in the same way.

There is the question that some words cause different kind of effects. The performatives are therefore understood as a variation of the practise that seems to follow specific rules as an individual speech act which have been catalogued by Searle himself. These performatives are performed to cause certain effects and those performatives have also the secondary function which is to uphold the practise that allows the effects to take place. These secondary effects are not always controlled by so straightforward rules as I have noted in the understanding of the background as a part of the secondary function. In other words, the background is a part of the thing that the secondary functions create. For example to name a boat so it can be called by its specific name. The calling the name of the boat in general in its various variations is then the practise in general that is a part of the practise bundle that gives meaning to the naming of a boat as a *useful function*. Ferraris has criticized Searle's view of the collective intentionality by asking that if the collective intentionality is the glue of social ontology what is then the function of documents? (Ferraris, 2013, 154) Theodore Schatzki writes

that the idea of an expressive body (that is at the center of the performative culture theory) can be seen as the Wittgensteinian vision of the social practises that create the social reality by expressing meanings through bodily practises. On the other hand Schatzki claims that the Wittgensteinian idea strongly resembles the Judith Butler's performance theory of a gender identity, because like Wittgenstein, also Butler" rejects the notion that a person (gender or sex) would be is a substance, or metaphysical substrate, whose identity lies in the continuing possession of specific "inner" properties" (Schatzki, 1996, 46.) According to Butler's somehow the Wittgensteinian notion, the performative gender is a process that is not rooted in the brute physical facts. In Butler's notion it is somehow unclear is she overemphasizing the difference between the nature and the reality in the sense that doesn't give the material reality clear enough role in her theory in posthumanist sense. The word stylized, from the reference paragraph from Schatzki refers in my view to the concept. So the point where all these claims about the Construction of Social Reality seem to return is the network of these elements of the social reality. It is small changes that relate to the background practise in things like graffiti when there often is not very explicit collective intentionality, but the variation of practises like avoiding the cops and writing your name in varied styles.

Searle is talking about this network but from my view, he seems to lack the necessary sophistication of the theories that really describe the networks. Anyway, the idea of network is at the very center of the causal explanation of the social reality in Searle because in his 2010 later theory he bases the collective intentionality and declarations in the notion of the background network power (Searle, 2010, 154). The debate on the status of the collective intentionality is in my view not important in itself in the context of this work, because I'm not trying to argue how the collective intentionality works in itself. I only try to prove that Searle's idea of ceasing and destruction of forces is flawed because it relates to negations of deontic forces that work through the collective intentionality. Therefore it is possible to think that effects of speech acts based on re-iteration of texts are outside the definition of the collective intentionality and therefore also social forces, if it is assumed that a solution to this question is found, when the importance of contents in terms of the causation. In this case one may think that the contents of the collective intentionality could work like the recordings in the theory of Ferraris.

I will now only find that the definition of the contents of the collective intentionality based on the registrations would probably lead to rise of perlocutive acts if this distinction from Searle/Austin axis is held onto. In other words, the textual deeds would not have clear cause deed relationship, but the effects wouldn't be so closely tied to the signifier, so the situation would be different than what Searle claims, because the possibility of illocutionary acts would be undermined. This leads in some cases to growing importance of non-agentive functions, (if analysed in relation Searle's theory. The acts would no longer be clear because they would be interpreted through the recordings or to use Searle's terminology through values, in other words acts would be "real" powers to use Derrida's interpretation of Austin).

## REFERENCES

- Adorno Theodor 2003. *The Jargon of Authenticity*, London New York: Routledge.
- Alhanen Kai 2007. *Käytännöt ja ajattelu Michel Foucaultin filosofiassa*. Gaudeamus Helsinki
- Austin, John L. 1979. "Performative Utterances", pp.220-240 J.Urmson and G.Warnock toim.. *Philosophical Papers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Austin, John L. 1975. *How to do Things With Words*. 2. edition, J.Urmson and M.Sbisà eds.. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Backman Jussi 2005. *Omaisuus ja elämä –Heidegger ja Aristoteles kreikkalaisen ontologian rajalla* Niin and Näin lehden filosofinen julkaisusarja
- Baudrillard Jean 1988. "Symbolic Exchange and Death" in book *Jean Baudrillard Selected Writings* Mark Postereds.. Polity Press Cambridge
- Beck Ulrich 1995. *Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk* Polity Press Cambridge
- Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas 1994. *Todellisuuden sosiaalinen rakentuminen: tiedonsosiologinen tutkimus*. trans. V.Raiskila. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Berlin Isaiah 2001. *Vapaus Ihmissyys ja Historia* Gaudeamus Helsinki
- Bloor David 1997. *Wittgenstein Rules and Institutions*, New York: Routledge.
- Bogue Ronald 1989. *DeleuzeAndGuattari*, Routledge, London New York
- Braidotti Rosi 1993. *Riitasointuja* Vastapaino: Tampere
- Braidotti Rosi 2002. *Metamorphoses: Towards Materialist Theory of Becoming*. Polity Press: Cambridge
- Braidotti Rosi 2013. *Posthuman* Polity Press Cambridge Malden
- Butler, Judith 1997. *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. Lontoo and New York: Routledge.
- Butler, Judith 2006. *Hankala sukupuoli*. Suom. T.Pulkkinen and L-M.Rossi. Helsinki: Otava.
- Canfield V. John 1981. *Wittgenstein Language and World*. United States of America University of Massachusetts Press.
- Choat Simon 2010. *Marx Through Post-Structuralism Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze* Continuum International Publishing Group London New York
- Collins Jeff and Selina Howard 1999. *Introducing Heidegger* Icon Books Ltd Cambridge
- Deleuze, Gilles 1988. *Foucault* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze and Quattari 2004. *A Thousand Plateaus* London New York: Continuum.
- Deleuze and Quattari 1983. *Anti-Oedipus* University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis
- Derrida Jaques 1981. *Disseminations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Derrida, Jacques 1977. "Signature, Event, Context", ranskastakäänt. S. Weber and J. Mehlman. *Glyph* 1. : 172-197.
- Derrida, Jacques 1992. "Before the Law", pp.181-220 teoksessa D.Attridge eds.. *Acts of Literature*. Lontoo and New York Routledge.
- Derrida, Jacques 1988. *Limited Inc*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques 1994. *Archive Fever*. Chicago London: University of Chicago Press.
- Dewey John 2012. *Filosofian uudistaminen* Vastapaino Tampere
- Dreyfus L. Hubert 1982. *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*. Cambridge Massachussets, London England: The MIT Press.



- Dreyfus, Hubert L and Rabinow, Paul 1982. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
- Due, Reidar 2007. *Deleuze*, Cambridge: Polity Press
- Elder-Vass, Dave 2010. *The Causal Power of Social Structures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferraris, Maurizio 2013. *Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces*. Trans. R.Davies. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Ferraris, Maurizio 2015. *Introduction to New Realism*. Italiasta käänt. S. De Sanctis. Lontoo: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Ferraris, Maurizio 2014. *Manifesto of New Realism*. Trans. S. De Sanctis. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Gilbert Margaret 1989. *On Social Facts* Routledge London New York
- Habermas, Jürgen 1993. "Comments on 'Meaning, Communication and Representation'", pp.17-30 teoksessa E.Lepore and R.VanGulick eds.. *John Searle and his Critics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harre.R and E.H Madden 1975. *Causal Powers*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Hart.H.L.A and Honore. T 1985. *Causation in the Law*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hindriks, Frank A. 2003. "The Role of the New Constitutive Rule", pp.185-208 teoksessa D.Koepsell and L.Moss eds.. *John Searle's Ideas about the Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms and Reconstructions*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hodgson M Geoffrey 2004. *the evolution of institutional economics: Agency structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism* Routledge London New York
- Härkönen Juho 2004. "Kausaalinen päättely ja sosiaalinen tutkimus" pp55-70 teoksessa P.Räsänen, H.Ruonvaara, I.Kantola toim. *Kiistoja ja dilemmoja: Sosiologisen keskustelun <vastakkainasetteluja>* Turku: Kirja Aurora.
- Jaegwon Kim 1993. "Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation" pp 60-74 teoksessa E.Sosa, M.Tooley eds.. *Causation* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Johansson, Ingvar 2008. "How Philosophy and Science May Interact: A Case Study of Works by John Searle and Hernando De Soto", pp.79- 95 teoksessa B.Smith, D.Mark, I.Ehrlich eds.. *Mystery of Capital and Construction of Social Reality*. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing.
- Laclau Ernesto 2005. *On Populist Reason*, New York and London: Verso.
- Latour Bruno 1987. *Science in Action* Harvard University Press Cambridge Massachussets
- Loizidou Elena 2007. *Ethics Law Politics* Routledge Oxon New York
- Ludlow Peter 2005. "Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology" pp11-50 teoksessa G. Preyer, G.Peter eds.. *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge Meaning and Truth*, New York: Oxford.
- Marazzi Christian 2006. *Pääoma ja kieli* Tutkijaliitto Helsinki
- Mulligan, Kevin 2003. "Searle, Derrida and the Ends of Phenomenology" pp 261-286. From: ed. Barry Smith *The Cambridge Companion to Searle* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meijers W. M Anthonie 2003. "Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized", pp.167-184 teoksessa Koepsell S Moss eds.. *John Searle's Ideas about the Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms and Reconstructions*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Meillassoux Quentin 2010. *Ääreellisyyden jälkeen tutkielmia kontigentenssin välttämättömyydestä* Gaudeamus Helsinki
- Moati, Raoul 2014. *Searle/Derrida: Deconstruction and Ordinary Language*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schatzki Theodore 1996. *Social Practises: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schatzki Theodore 2002. *The Site of the Social: a philosophical account of the constitution of social life and change*. Pennsylvania State University
- Smith, Barry 2008. "Searle and de Soto: The New Ontology of the Social World", pp.35- 51 teoksessa B.Smith, D.Mark, I.Ehrlich eds.. *Mystery of Capital and Construction of Social Reality*. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing.
- Searle, John R. 1977. "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida", *Glyph* 1. : 198-208.
- Searle, John R. 1983. "The Word Turned Upside Down", *The New York Review of Books*, October 27 1983 numero, saatavilla osoitteessa <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1983/oct/27/the-word-turned-upside-down/> 5.9.2015. .
- Searle, John R. 1996. *The Construction of Social Reality*. Lontoo: Penguin.
- Searle, John R. 2005. "What is Institution?" *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 11. : 1-22.
- Searle, John R. 2010. *Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Searle John R 2002. *Consciousness and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shearmur, Jeremy 2008. "The Construction of Social Reality: Searle, de Soto, and Disney", pp.53- 78 teoksessa B.Smith, D.Mark, I.Ehrlich eds.. *Mystery of Capital and Construction of Social Reality*. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing.
- Stuckard von Kocku 2010. *Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric Discourse and Western Identities*. Leiden, Boston: Brill's studies in intellectual history.
- Sumic Jelica 2004. "Anachronism of emancipation or fidelity to politics" pp. 182-198 in book *Laclau a critical reader* Chritchley Simon and Marchart Oliver eds.. Routledge Oxon New York.
- Thalos Mariam 2003. "Searle's Foole: How a Constructionist Account of Society Cannot Substitute for Causal One", pp.105-122 teoksessa Koepsell S Moss eds.. *John Searle's Ideas about the Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms and Reconstructions*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein Ludwig 2001. *Filosofisia Tutkimuksia*, Bookwell Oy, Juva
- Zepke Stephen 2009. "Becoming a Citizen of the World: Deleuze Between Allan Kaprow and Adrian Piper, in book *Deleuze and Performance* Laura Cull eds.. Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh Zerilli M.G. Linda 2001.
- Wittgenstein between pragmatism and deconstruction" pp 25-42 in book *Legacy of Wittgenstein Pragmatism or Deconstruction* Frankfurt am Maim Berlin Bern Bruxelles New York Oxford Wien