



ISSN : 2350-0743

www.ijramr.com



International Journal of Recent Advances in Multidisciplinary Research

Vol. 10, Issue 09, pp.8891-8896, September, 2023

RESEARCH ARTICLE

SUPER POWER RIVALRY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NONALIGNMENT: ASSESSING AFRICAN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WAR

***Bamnjo Herman Yenika (PhD)**

The University of Bamenda, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Department of Political Science

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 08th June, 2023
Received in revised form
20th July, 2023
Accepted 16th August, 2023
Published online 30th September, 2023

Key Words:

Non Alignment,
African Policy towards Russia-
Ukraine war.

ABSTRACT

The Ukraine-Russia conflict has garnered global attention due to its geopolitical implications. It is perceived to be the superpower rivalry that has a spillover effect on Africa with some African countries gradually going back to the old doctrine of non-alignment that was observed by most African States during the Cold War. This paper aims to address this gap by assessing the policy of African States towards the Ukraine-Russia war. Utilizing a qualitative and exploratory design, this study analyses official statements, speeches, and media coverage from African States on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The study is carried out within the ambit of the Constructivism. It is a theoretical approach in international relations that emphasizes the role of social norms, beliefs, and ideas in shaping state behavior. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, a constructivist analysis of African states' positions would consider the ways in which their beliefs about sovereignty, international law, and regional stability influenced their responses to the conflict. The study found out that the majority of African States adopted a neutral stance towards the conflict, with a few countries expressing support for either Russia or Ukraine this is because Africa wants to take its responsibility and not always work under the influence of the West to make a particular decision. Moreover, African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict is primarily driven by economic interests, regional alliances, and ideological principles.

INTRODUCTION

The Ukraine-Russia conflict has been ongoing since 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatist movements in eastern Ukraine (Koetse, 2020). Russian forces invaded Ukraine on the 24 Feb 2022 staging what Moscow called a special military operation. The Russian forces had been building up along the borders for months and Western intelligence agencies warned of an imminent attack, this invasion of Ukraine by Russia destroyed Russia's relationship with the West. This according to Douglas & Slobodchikoff (2022) ended all efforts at reproachment, created the conditions for a new Iron Curtain between NATO member States and Russia. US/Russia Relationship according to them halted in areas that the two powers has have cooperated with each other such as joint efforts to support the International space station which Moscow and Washington had expended much, but with this war it ended the collaboration. The situation between Moscow and Washington is an indication that the world order of the Cold War era has returned. Following the World War II, the two allies that defeated the Germans became rivals and were dominated by two ideologies. The first was liberal democracy, adhered to by the United States and its allies.

***Corresponding author: Bamnjo Herman Yenika (PhD),**
The University of Bamenda, Faculty of Law and Political Science,
Department of Political Science.

The second was communism, adhered by the Soviet Union and its allies the war in Ukraine it had signaled the return of great powers competition in Europe. Douglas & Slobodchik off (2022) posits that in terms of demography, Russia and most of Western Europe are declining powers while the United State and Russia are preoccupied with fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, China and India are carefully watching the situation with their views of challenging the global order. This has caused most African States to go back to the International Relations doctrine of non-alignment. This policy of alignment can be traced back to world war II. When most of the new States got their independence from colonial rule soon after this inception they faced the problem of maintaining their sovereignty, asserting national identity and ensuring economic security by keeping themselves apart from the two Cold War blocs headed by the United States and Soviet Union. According to Badiul (1977), the division of the world into two major armed group camps had begun with soviet expansion which to many scholars it is the same thing that is happening now with Russia Expanding to Europe and Africa. With the socio Political crisis in Africa and the problem of governance, the war in Ukraine put some African countries to adopt the old doctrine of non-alignment given that the two blocs as in the case now are benefiting. The conflict has led to heightened geopolitical tensions, with many countries expressing support for either Ukraine or Russia. However, there have been some African countries that have taken diplomatic actions in response to the conflict.

For example, in March 2014, the African Union Peace and Security Council issued a statement expressing "grave concern" over the situation in Ukraine and calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Additionally, some African countries have joined international efforts to impose sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine. In the same light a delegation of African leaders from six countries arrived kyiv to begin separate peace talks on the war in Ukraine with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russia President Vladimir Putin on June 16th 2023. The leaders of Comoros, Egypt, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia travelled from Kyiv to St Petersburg to talk peace but with their top agenda being how to widen access to Russian and Ukrainian grains and fertilizers to ease food security in Africa. Gopaldas (2023) posits that. *The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia's actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa's ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to get distracted from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support (Gopaldas, 2023).* The relationship that exist with Africa and Russia may have accounted for their current policy toward the War

METHODOLOGY

This study utilizes a qualitative and exploratory design, analyzing official statements, speeches, and media coverage from African States on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Data was collected from sources such as the African Union, individual African country governments, and African news outlets. The sources were selected based on their relevance to African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The data was analyzed using thematic analysis to identify common themes and patterns in African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia war.

Theoretical consideration

Constructivism Theory: Constructivism is a theoretical approach to international relations that emphasizes the role of social norms, beliefs, and ideas in shaping state behavior. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, a constructivist analysis of African states' positions would consider the ways in which their beliefs about sovereignty, international law, and regional stability influenced their responses to the conflict. One possible argument that a constructivist approach could make is that African states' positions on the conflict were shaped by their belief in the importance of upholding the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Many African States have a history of struggling against external interference and may see the conflict in Ukraine as a matter for the parties involved to resolve without outside intervention. For example, South Africa's foreign ministry released a statement in 2014 calling for "the people of Ukraine to find peaceful solutions to their challenges," while emphasizing the importance of "respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine." This statement reflects a constructivist emphasis on the norm of sovereignty, which holds that States should be able to govern their own internal affairs without external interference.

Another possible argument is that African states' positions were shaped by their belief in the importance of regional stability. Some African States may have been concerned that the conflict in Ukraine could have wider implications for regional stability, particularly if it were to lead to a broader conflict between Russia and Western powers. For example, in 2014 the African Union released a statement expressing concern about the "potential escalation of the crisis in Ukraine and its implications for international peace and security," while calling for "restraint and dialogue among all concerned parties." This statement reflects a constructivist emphasis on the norm of stability, which holds that States should work to prevent conflict and instability in their regions

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The majority of African States adopted a neutral stance towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict, with a few countries expressing support for either Russia or Ukraine. For instance, Zimbabwe expressed support for Russia, citing historical ties and shared economic interests (The Herald, 2015). Conversely, Nigeria voiced support for Ukraine and condemned Russia's actions in Eastern Ukraine (Ezeibe, 2015). However, most African States did not express overt support for either side, but were instead calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict is primarily driven by economic interests, regional alliances, and ideological principles. African States with strong economic ties to Russia, such as Angola and South Africa, were more likely to adopt a neutral stance towards the conflict (Mail & Guardian, 2015). Additionally, African States belonging to regional organizations, such as the African Union, tended to support their respective organization's position on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Finally, African States with a history of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism expressed sympathy towards Russia's actions, viewing them as a response to Western imperialism (Gondwe, 2015). The findings of this study suggest that African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict is shaped by a variety of factors. One of these factors is economic interests, as several African States have significant trade and investment ties with Russia (Mail & Guardian, 2015). For instance, Angola is a major recipient of Russia's arms exports, while South Africa has significant investments in Russia's mining and energy sectors (Koetse, 2020). The study found that African states' policy positions have complex multiple factors. Still, one of the most significant factors that shaped these positions was the economic interests shared between the African continent and Russia. Russia has continuously offered economic ties to African nations as an alternative to the United States and Europe. Russia's vast mineral and energy wealth and technological advancement offered more leeway for bilateral economic cooperation. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the increasing Western economic sanctions against Russia pose difficulties for African nations that wish to diversify their economic alliances (Koetse, 2020). African states' governments had to choose between their economic ties with Russia and conforming to the Western narrative. Another important factor that structured African states' policy positions was their regional alignments. Several African nations belong to regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), which has taken positions both critical of Russia and Ukraine, and neutral declarations aimed at restoring peace. African States in the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development

Community (SADC), among others, have opted for neutrality in the crisis to maintain their relationships with Russia (Gondwe, 2015). Thus, African States may be reluctant to take a strong stance on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, fearing that it may harm their economic interests. Another factor influencing African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict is regional alliances (Gondwe, 2015). Thus, African States may feel compelled to support their respective regional organizations' positions on the conflict, rather than expressing a stance based solely on their national interests. Additionally, ideological principles also play a role in African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Several African states, particularly those with a history of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, view Russia's actions as a response to Western imperialism (Gondwe, 2015). Thus, these States may express sympathy towards Russia, viewing the conflict as a struggle against Western influence.

According to Cascais (2022) The reservations of many African nations in taking sides over the war in Ukraine were highlighted back in April when the UN General Assembly voted to suspend Russia's membership of the Human Rights Council. Only 10 out of 54 African States voted in favor of the resolution, whereas nine were opposed, and 35 abstained or were absent. This is considerably less than the 28 African countries who supported the UN's resolution held in March that called for Russian troops to withdraw from Ukraine "immediately, completely and unconditionally" Cascais (2022). The observation of neutrality has been a result of the benefits derived by these African States from the bilateral military cooperation they have with African countries. Political scientist N'Kilumbu said that Russia's propaganda is also directed at other African countries, especially in the south of the continent, whose liberation movements have political and military support from the former Soviet Union. By abstaining from voting on the UN's Ukraine resolution, countries like Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia had this "historic friendship in mind," N'Kilumbu said. "Especially in Angola and Mozambique, there has been virtually no political change since the Cold War era. And that's why the umbilical cord that connects these countries to Moscow has never been severed," said N'Kilumbu. The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), for example, continues to maintain close ties with Russia's military, business and political elites, N'Kilumbu points out. "At the military level, we still have Russian instructors. Our military academy is Russian-influenced," he said. To Cascais in his article in recent years, Russia has increasingly used these historic Soviet connections to expand its political, economic and, above all, military relations with African nations. In 2019, Vladimir Putin hosted a Russia-Africa Summit attended by 43 African leaders. Just one year later, Russia became Africa's biggest arms supplier. According to Gopaldas (2023) In the first vote, the assembly voted overwhelmingly (73 percent or 141 of the 193 members) to reaffirm Ukraine's sovereignty and demand an unconditional Russian withdrawal. Twenty-eight of those votes were from Africa's fifty-four States. (White & Holtz, 2022 as cited in Gopaldas 2023).

To him Africa is a sizeable voting bloc, constituting 28 percent of the general assembly's members. To illustrate how disjointed Africa's stance was, there were fifty-two countries that did not vote in favor of the resolution half of which were African nations (Gopaldas, 2023). In the second vote, just 19 percent of African States voted to suspend Russia from the UNHRC.

Gopaldas (2023) went further to argue that In the third vote, 56 percent of African countries voted not to recognize the annexation claims of Ukrainian territories, and the UN noted in a press release on the vote outcome that most countries abstaining were African nations. In the fourth vote, which was on whether Russia should pay reparations to Ukraine, 50 percent of African countries abstained from voting, while less than a third voted in favor. The fifth and most recent vote, calling for an end to the war, saw the highest number of African States voting yes across all resolutions. Six of the fifty-four African countries voted "Yes" in all five votes, while an additional nineteen countries supported at least three of the resolutions. Joseph Siegle, (2022) as cited in Gopaldas 2023 head of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, broadly grouped Africa's voting alignments into four categories after the first vote. The first category, was made up of those, who exclusively abstained or voted no across all five votes, and consists of the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan, which to him the leaders all lack political legitimacy but have been brought to and kept in power through Russian arms and mercenary support. The second grouping, who either abstained or did not vote on the first resolution, are those whose leaders and elites have close ties to Russia and benefit from its political cover: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

A third group—Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa—likely disagreed with Russia's actions but upheld their tradition of nonalignment by refusing to be drawn into voting. The fourth and final group Siegle identifies, who voted in favor in the majority of votes, are among Africa's more advanced democracies—Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Zambia (Tawat, 2022) Of course, these are not clear-cut groupings. There are areas of overlap and opacity, and while Siegle developed his groupings at the time of the first vote, subsequent voting suggests these categories largely hold. The motivation for each country's decision shows Russia's targeted but limited presence on the continent and the extent to which Russia is still well regarded by Africa for its backing of the continent's liberation movements and history of standing up to perceived Western neocolonial slights.

States, China, and Russia. The African Union (AU), Africa's representative body, was clearer on its position: while it stopped short of outright condemnation, it asked Russia to respect international law and Ukraine's sovereignty. The AU even offered to mediate talks between the two countries.¹² A 2021 study by two independent South African public policy think tanks, the South African Institute for International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies, scoured the voting data of Russia and African countries on the UN Security Council (UNSC) between 2014 and 2020.¹³ The UNSC is made up of five permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the P5)—and ten nonpermanent members. Of the ten nonpermanent members, Africa is allocated three seats (the A3), but countries serve as individual members and not on behalf of the AU or its Peace and Security Council. By contrast, the UNGA is the main policymaking body of the UN, comprising all 194 member States with equal voting rights. While Russia was a clear outlier in its willingness to employ its veto power or abstain from voting altogether, African countries almost opted to abstain from voting on controversial resolutions.

The study notes that the relationship between Russia and the A3 has historically converged but is slowly diverging; voting alignment between the A3 and Russia has fallen from 91 percent in 2014 to 72 percent in 2020. According to a 2020 analysis by the Peace Research Institute SIPRI, between 2016 and 2020 around 30% of all arms exported to sub-Saharan Africa countries came from Russia. This vastly overshadows weapon supplies from other nations such as China (20%), France (9.5%), and the USA (5.4%). This increased the volume of Russian arms shipments by 23% over the previous five-year period Cascais (2022). Further, Nowhere on the continent has Russian influence grown as rapidly as in the Central African Republic (CAR). The intensified cooperation between the two nations began in 2017, when Russia delivered weapons, including Kalashnikovs and surface-to-air missiles, to the war-torn country for the first time. Since then, Russia has gradually increased its presence in CAR. In 2018, Russian military advisers were dispatched to CAR with the official aim of training local armed forces. Meanwhile, numerous Russian companies have received licenses to mine gold and diamonds in the country while its president, Faustin-Archange Touadera, is now guarded by Russians. His main security adviser is Valery Sakharov, a former employee of Russia's domestic intelligence service, the FSB.

Russia has also expanded its presence in crisis-ridden Mali. The Russian private military company Wagner has been present in Mali since the end of 2021, according to independent observers and media investigations. The *Guardian* newspaper cited seeing internal Malian army documents that refer to "Russian instructors" who are on "mixed missions". In Mali, Wagner mercenaries have been linked to a series of incidents resulting in the killings of hundreds of civilians. In the most serious case, Malian forces together with Wagner soldiers reportedly killed at least 350 people in a four-day massacre in village of Moura in March. Rights groups have expressed their concern that the activities of the Wagner group are linked to atrocities in Mali, as well as elsewhere in Africa. Wagner mercenaries have also played a role in Mozambique, Sudan, and CAR. Although the Kremlin has denied links to the Wagner group, analysts often point to its close ties to the Russian government. "Its management and operations are deeply intertwined with the Russian military and intelligence community," finds the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, in their 2020 analysis. "The Russian government has found Wagner and other private military companies to be useful as a way to extend its influence overseas without the visibility and intrusiveness of state military forces." According to Gopaldas (2023) In the first vote, the assembly voted overwhelmingly (73 percent or 141 of the 193 members) to reaffirm Ukraine's sovereignty and demand an unconditional Russian withdrawal. Twenty-eight of those votes were from Africa's fifty-four states. (White & Holtz, 2022 as cited in Gopaldas 2023) To him Africa is a sizeable voting bloc, constituting 28 percent of the general assembly's members. To illustrate how disjoint Africa's stance was, there were fifty-two countries that did not vote in favor of the resolution half of which were African nations (Gopaldas, 2023).

In the second vote, just 19 percent of African States voted to suspend Russia from the UNHRC. Gopaldas (2023) went further to argue that In the third vote, 56 percent of African countries voted not to recognize the annexation claims of Ukrainian territories, and the UN noted in a press release on

the vote outcome that most countries abstaining were African nations. In the fourth vote, which was on whether Russia should pay reparations to Ukraine, 50 percent of African countries abstained from voting, while less than a third voted in favor. The fifth and most recent vote, calling for an end to the war, saw the highest number of African States voting yes across all resolutions. Six of the fifty-four African countries voted "Yes" in all five votes, while an additional nineteen countries supported at least three of the resolutions. Joseph Siegle, (2022) as cited in Gopaldas 2023 head of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, broadly grouped Africa's voting alignments into four categories after the first vote. The first category, who exclusively abstained or voted no across all five votes, consists of the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan, which to him the leaders all lack political legitimacy but have been brought to and kept in power through Russian arms and mercenary support. The second grouping, who either abstained or did not vote on the first resolution, are those whose leaders and elites have close ties to Russia and benefit from its political cover: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

A third group Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa likely disagreed with Russia's actions but upheld their tradition of nonalignment by refusing to be drawn into voting. The fourth and final group Siegle identifies, who voted in favor in the majority of votes, are among Africa's more advanced democracies Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Zambia (Tawat, 2022) Of course, these are not clear-cut groupings. There are areas of overlap and opacity, and while Siegle developed his groupings at the time of the first vote, subsequent voting suggests these categories largely hold. The motivation for each country's decision shows Russia's targeted but limited presence on the continent and the extent to which Russia is still well regarded by Africa for its backing of the continent's liberation movements and history of standing up to perceived Western neocolonial slight States, China, and Russia. The African Union (AU), Africa's representative body, was clearer on its position: while it stopped short of outright condemnation, it asked Russia to respect international law and Ukraine's sovereignty. The AU even offered to mediate talks between the two countries. A 2021 study by two independent South African public policy think tanks, the South African Institute for International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies, scoured the voting data of Russia and African countries on the UN Security Council (UNSC) between 2014 and 2020.¹³ The UNSC is made up of five permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and ten nonpermanent members. Of the ten nonpermanent members, Africa is allocated three seats, but countries serve as individual members and not on behalf of the AU or its Peace and Security Council. By contrast, the UNGA is the main policymaking body of the UN, comprising all 194 member States with equal voting rights. While Russia was a clear outlier in its willingness to employ its veto power or abstain from voting altogether, African countries almost opted to abstain from voting on controversial resolutions. The study notes that the relationship between Russia and the A3 has historically converged but is slowly diverging; voting alignment between the A3 and Russia has fallen from 91 percent in 2014 to 72 percent in 2020. According to Gopaldas (2023) In the first vote, the assembly voted overwhelmingly (73 percent or 141 of the 193 members) to reaffirm Ukraine's

sovereignty and demand an unconditional Russian withdrawal. Twenty-eight of those votes were from Africa's fifty-four states. (White & Holtz, 2022 as cited in Gopaldas 2023) .To him Africa is a sizeable voting bloc, constituting 28 percent of the general assembly's members. To illustrate how disjoint Africa's stance was, there were fifty-two countries that did not vote in favor of the resolution half of which were African nations (Gopaldas,2023). In the second vote, just 19 percent of African States voted to suspend Russia from the UNHRC. Gopaldas (2023) went further to argue that In the third vote, 56 percent of African countries voted not to recognize the annexation claims of Ukrainian territories, and the UN noted in a press release on the vote outcome that most countries abstaining were African nations. In the fourth vote, which was on whether Russia should pay reparations to Ukraine, 50 percent of African countries abstained from voting, while less than a third voted in favor. The fifth and most recent vote, calling for an end to the war, saw the highest number of African States voting yes across all resolutions. Six of the fifty-four African countries voted "Yes" in all five votes, while an additional nineteen countries supported at least three of the resolutions.

Joseph Siegle, (2022) as cited in Gopaldas 2023 head of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, broadly grouped Africa's voting alignments into four categories after the first vote. The first category, who exclusively abstained or voted no across all five votes, consists of the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan, which to him the leaders all lack political legitimacy but have been brought to and kept in power through Russian arms and mercenary support. The second category were those, who either abstained or did not vote on the first resolution, are those whose leaders and elites have close ties to Russia and benefit from its political cover: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. A third group Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa disagreed with Russia's actions but upheld their tradition of nonalignment by refusing to be drawn into voting. The fourth and final group Siegle identifies those, who voted in favor of the majority of votes, are among Africa's more advanced democracies Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Zambia (Tawat ,2022) Of course, these are not clear-cut groupings. There are areas of overlap and opacity, and while Siegle developed his groupings at the time of the first vote, subsequent voting suggests these categories largely hold. The motivation for each country's decision shows Russia's targeted but limited presence on the continent and the extent to which Russia is still well regarded by Africa for its backing of the continent's liberation movements and history of standing up to perceived Western neocolonial slights.

CONCLUSION

African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict is primarily driven by economic interests, regional alliances, and ideological principles. While some African States expressed support for either Russia or Ukraine, the majority adopted a neutral stance towards the conflict. Given Africa's growing economic ties with Russia, it is likely that African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict will continue to be shaped by economic considerations. This study highlights the importance of considering nonWestern perspectives in the analysis of global conflicts. This study has highlighted the

diverse factors that shape African states' policy towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict. While most African States have adopted a neutral stance towards the conflict, the study has shown that economic interests, regional alliances, and ideological principles may influence their policy. Given Africa's growing economic ties with Russia, it is likely that African States will continue to be cautious in expressing their stance on the conflict. Furthermore, this study underscores the importance of considering non Western perspectives on global issues

REFERENCES

- Ezeibe, C. (2015, March 3). Ukraine conflict: Nigeria backs Kiev. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31715782>
- Gondwe, L. (2015, July 15). The Ukraine crisis and the scramble for Africa. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/7/15/the-ukraine-crisis-and-the-scramble-for-africa/>
- Koetse, M. (2020, February 18). Russia's ties with Africa: Unpacking Moscow's media push. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/russias-ties-with-africa-unpacking-moscows-media-push-131095>
- Mail & Guardian. (2015, February 23). Angola: Benefits for both sides in closer Angola-Russia ties. <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-23-benefits-for-both-sides-in-closer-angola-russia-ties/>
- The Herald. (2015, April 23). Zimbabwe rallies behind Russia. <https://www.herald.co.zw/zimbabwe-rallies-behind-russia/>
- Ezeibe, C. (2015, March 3). Ukraine conflict: Nigeria backs Kiev. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31715782>
- Gondwe, L. (2015, July 15). The Ukraine crisis and the scramble for Africa. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/7/15/the-ukraine-crisis-and-the-scramble-for-africa/>
- Koetse, M. (2020, February 18). Russia's ties with Africa: Unpacking Moscow's media push. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/russias-ties-with-africa-unpacking-moscows-media-push-131095>
- Mail & Guardian. (2015, February 23). Angola: Benefits for both sides in closer Angola-Russia ties. <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-23-benefits-for-both-sides-in-closer-angola-russia-ties/>
- The Herald. (2015, April 23). Zimbabwe rallies behind Russia. <https://www.herald.co.zw/zimbabwe-rallies-behind-russia/>
- Antonio Cascais , (2022) Deutsche Welle , <https://www.dw.com/en/russias-reengagement-with-africa-pays-off/a-6106401>
- South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation. (2014). Statement on Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.za/speeches/statement-ukraine-19-mar-2014-0000>
- African Union. (2014). Press release on the crisis in Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20140418/press-release-crisis-ukraine>
- Gopaldas, R (2023) Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Institute working Paper
- Abraham White and Leo Holtz, "Figure of the Week: African Countries' Votes on the UN Resolution Condemning Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," Brookings Institute,

- March 9, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine>.
- “How Have African Countries Voted on Russia and Ukraine at the United Nations?,” *Development Reimagined*, April 8, 2022, <https://developmentreimagined.com/2022/04/08/africanvotesonukraine>.
- Joseph Siegle, “Ukraine War: Fresh Warning That Africa Needs to be Vigilant Against Russia’s Destabilising Influence,” *Defence Web*, March 11, 2022, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence>.
- Mahama Tawat, “Russia-Ukraine War: Decoding How African Countries Voted at the UN,” *Conversation*, March 8, 2022, <https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663>.
- Gopaldas, R (2023) *Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace working Paper
- Abraham White and Leo Holtz, “Figure of the Week: African Countries’ Votes on the UN Resolution Condemning Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” *Brookings Institute*, March 9, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine>.
- How Have African Countries Voted on Russia and Ukraine at the United Nations?,” *Development Reimagined*, April 8, 2022, <https://developmentreimagined.com/2022/04/08/africanvotesonukraine>.
- Joseph Siegle, “Ukraine War: Fresh Warning That Africa Needs to be Vigilant Against Russia’s Destabilising Influence,” *Defence Web*, March 11, 2022, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence>.
- Mahama Tawat, “Russia-Ukraine War: Decoding How African Countries Voted at the UN,” *Conversation*, March 8, 2022, <https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663>.
- Douglas ,D and Slobodchikoff , M (2022) *Great Power Competition and Russian Invasion of Ukraine* , *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* , Air University Press
- Badiul A (1977) *The concept of Non alignment :A critical analysis* , *World Affairs* , Volo 140 ,No 2
