RESEARCH ARTICLE

LEVELS AND PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES OF PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY-BASED TOURISM PROJECTS IN THE COASTAL REGION OF KENYA

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines CP levels and performance outcomes of four community-based tourism projects in the Coastal region of Kenya that has been witnessing a steadily increasing number of tourists. The attraction of visitors to this region has been due to its relatively well developed first class establishment that are juxtaposed in close proximity to pristine glistering tropical sandy beaches and world renowned wildlife attractions. The region is thus a major popular destination for international visitors, especially Europeans, North Americans, and in the recent past the Oriental Asians. Conspicuously however, the local communities that host these natural and cultural heritage and who are also in close proximity with the quality and integrity of this tourism resource base are not adequately benefitting. From this misnomer arose the purpose of this study in which examination of CP levels and performance outcomes that characterize the community-based tourism initiatives were interrogated. The study that had proceeded with the premise that community participation levels and performance outcomes in planning and decision making are a uniform process was rejected. Rather, they were found to be differentiated processes over its attendant institutions. Thus CP and performance outcomes, and consequently governance were found to have major disparities at intra- and inter-community tourism initiatives, suggesting that the level of governance is somewhat different as members' role in influencing planning and decision making varied significantly among the case studies. This was well captured by data gathered from both longitudinal and cross-sectional surveys. The empirical data were supplemented with policy documents fromNGOs and government agency reports. The data were thereafter analysed for patterns and trends in levels of community participation and performance outcomes at different community-based tourism projects using qualitative and quantitative statistical techniques. The research hypotheses were brought to close with the aid of computer software SPSS, which generated information to inform a management set of policy alternatives that would enhance community participation and hence good governance in community-based tourism initiatives not only in the coastal region of Kenya but also provide a good model for Kenya's other regions to copy. Above all the study recommends that participation be embraced at all stages of planning and decision making,and be as transparent as possible as this is likely to make members more satisfied and committed even when they disagree with the leadership of these projects.

INTRODUCTION

The past few decades of development of projects have witnessed lack of sustainability emanating from top-down approaches in many developing countries (Metiboba, 2012; Skenjana, 2011; Tosun, 2006; and Khwaja, 2004). This scenario has been attributed to lack of community participation(TMI, 2000; Lynch & Talbot, 1998). Accordingly, new development slogans such as 'community-driven' or 'people-centred' or 'bottom-up' or 'decentralization' development have emerged that emphasize local participation especially in governance (Adams *et al*., 2018). These policy reforms are being touted as among the best growing

mechanisms for channeling developmental issues (Awortwi, 2012; Vincent & Thompson,2002; and Cleaver, 2005) and hence considered a characteristic way of life common to many societies. In this regard, CP is therefore considered to be the main pillar of community development in respect to planning, developing, managing, making decisions and evaluation (Tasci et al., 2013; Giampiccoli & Kalis, 2012; and Asker *et al*., 2010). According to TMI (2000) CP as a process is recognized as both a basic human right and crucial in successful developmental efforts generally. It is in a sense one of the cornerstones of good governance (Cavaye, 2017; Awortwi, 2012; and Sproule, 1996). This is justified in terms of enhancing accountability, transparency, effectiveness of investments, contribution to democracy, empowerment and ultimately ensuring sustainability of development initiatives (Skenjana, 2011; and Cleaver, 2005).

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As Parry *et al*. (1992) pointed out; CP encompasses members of a community taking part in the process of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies whose main concern is to influence decisions taken mainly by representatives and officials. These policies express themselves in collective actions that may include planning, organizing, voting, promotion, contacting, implementing, or other group actions oriented towards influencing the representatives in an organization, rather than active and direct governance itself (Karacaoglu & Birdir, 2017; Kim *et. Al.*, 2014; Tasci, *et al*., 2013; Asker *et al*., 2010; and TMI, 2000). Therefore, the features of sustainable CBT development interventions are to involve communities who are the primary beneficiaries in the supply chain of resources, services, and facilities. In tourism, the significance of CP was recognized as early as some forty years ago (Karacaoglu & Birdir, 2017; and Mabogunje, 1980). This is the time it was observed that a minority of the population seemed to have thrived, flourished and prospered because of tourism industry. However, the miserable conditions of the majority persisted and in many cases seemed to have worsened in many developing nations (Manyara & Jones, 2008; Akama & Kieti, 2007; and Rutten, 2002). In other words, the divide between the wealthy and theneedy had not only been seen to have persisted but also widened in many of the tourism destinations countries.

Due to this paradox, the following question was raised: Was tourism capable of resolving the growing economic challenges of poor destinations? This question made some researchers to start valuing tourism in a different way. The result of this phase of tourism disillusionment and disenchantment led to the conclusion that international tourism may be beneficial for developing nations in economic and technical terms to a small segment of the population but detrimental in social and cultural conditions to the majority of the populace (Muganda, 2009; Manyara & Jones, 2008; Akama & Kieti, 2007; Jones, 2005; and Lea, 1995). Therefore, global theories about the effects of tourism on development were dismissed because of widespread lack of detailed and accurate studies. This heralded a new round of discourses on the effects of tourism (Cater & Lowman, 2004; Ceballos-Lascurian, 1996; and Boo, 1992). In response, attempts were made to develop other forms of tourism that are responsive and sensitive to the needs of local communities. The development resulted in the emergence of various concepts such as community-based tourism (CBT), alternative tourism, sustainable tourism, and ecotourism, among others. Therefore, the most important objective of these forms of tourism was not to be seen as an end in itself but as one of the several strategies that could assist local communities overcome their socioeconomic and developmental weaknesses, preserve their strengthsand enhance their developmental opportunities (Karacaoglu & Birdir, 2017; Asker *et al*., 2010; and Akama & Kieti, 2007).

In Kenya, the term CP or citizenry participation was anchored in the 2010 Constitution. It is a catchword, used to mean different things (Kanyingi, 2016). The trend appears to suggest that CP is a good concept but is not qualified in terms of degree, performance outcomes and sustainability (Khwaja, 2004; Isham *et* al., 1996; and Narayan, 1995). However, despite such interests, there is less understanding or even less agreement on what CP means and entails and under what conditions it thrives especially in the development process of CBT industry in Kenya.

It was therefore against the above backdrop that this study was considered to be timely in drawing a question on whether the 2010 Kenyan Constitution was optimal through participation in CBT projects since many development policymakers were passionately signing up to its benefits. This would be a significant question because up-to-date, systematic research on measurement of effective CP in terms of levels and performance outcomes and other participant-dynamics is scarce. Consequently, the critical challenge is the need for expanded knowledge on CBT initiatives so that scaling-up of successful experiences are made and if possible replicate the models of success for the benefit of other communities.

Research Site and Methodology and Strategy

Research Site: This study was conducted in the coastal region (Figure 1.1), which is not only a popular tourist destination for local and international touristsespecially Europeans, North Americans, and in the recent past the Oriental Asians, but also leading with the highest concentration of tourism attractions (Table 1.1) hospitality facilities and infrastructure in Kenya. This is because tourism is a high value economic activity in this region. It has in its traditional context a rich biodiversity with a wide range of ecosystems, communities, habitats, a variety of flora and fauna, which have supported mass tourism since World War II (Alila& McCormick, 1997). The diverse biophysical and cultural resources that are harnessed for tourism include: beautiful sceneries, marine parks, sacred forests, sand beaches, warm shoreline waters, picnics, water sports, the Swahili culture, and facilities such as lodges, museums, cottage industries among many others.

Methodology and Strategy

This paper is drawn from part of a larger study that was conducted between July 2018 and August 2019 which investigated the dynamics of CP in CBT projects in the coastal region of Kenya.The study targeted CBT projects which were purposivelysampled from two clusters that were peculiarly endowed with some rich cultural histories, substantial variations in biodiversity, gender, marginalized and sensitivity among others. A good number are appealing case studies because of their changing micro-socioeconomic realities in the respective areas. These projects are situated along the most popular tourist circuit, the Coast. They are located outside major national parks and forest reserves such as Diani-Chale Marine, Kisite-Mapungte Marine and Tsavo (East and West) Parks (Figure 1.1). The clusters were picked from Upper Coast (The LUMO Wildlife Sanctuary – Mramba, Oza, and Lualenyi Projects) and Lower Coast (Kaya Kinondo Ecotourism project - KKEP) with the former mostly being joint ventures between the communities and private investors. Respondents from whom the data were solicited to correlate with the levels of participation and performance outcomes were primarily chosen on simple random basis from the registers of the projects. Incidences where particular information had to be obtained, purposive sampling was resorted to in order to pick persons who were peculiarly endowed with the necessary knowledge. The choice of officials for interview was based on whoever was available but with a bias towards those who head the projects. The information was intended to inform on whether or not the parties were satisfied with governance issues in these CBT projects. Data were mainly collected by administration of questionnaires (n=280)and interview guide (n=8)with the former eliciting information on participation levels and

performance outcome; and other CP dynamics using closed and open-ended questions. The empirical data were supplemented with policy documents from non-governmental organizations and government agency reports. The mixed methods approach allowed for triangulation of information from a diversity of sources while addressing the same research question. Interviews were conducted at the projectswith support of research assistants and local translators. Analysis of the level of CP (governance) involved a composite of many variables such as knowledge on the conception and initiation of the projects, the constitution and its objectives, composition of the projects' leadership, attendance of meetings, elections of office bearers, and consultation, among others. The data were thereafter subjected to statistical analysis for patterns and trends using SPSS.

Case Study 1: LUMO Conservancy (Mramba, Oza and Lualenyi Projects)

The LUMO wildlife conservancy is located in the southern region of Tsavo West National Park (Figure 1.2) in Taita-Taveta, Upper Coast, Kenya at an altitude that varies from 419 to 1,677m (1,375 to 5,502ft).As one ascends, there is a general decrease of temperature of 3.5°F per 1,000 ft, suggesting that there wide climatic differences within the conservancy. The sanctuary has a climate characterized by hot and dry conditions. During the day, temperatures can on average rise up to around 29°C/84°F, while 18°C/64°F is typical at night. The coolest months are also full of sunshine, but with very little rain. The mornings are normally cool requiring warm clothing for early game drives. April and November are the wettest months of the year with brief afternoon showers being very common leading to worsening of road conditions in the months of April and May. In between these wettest periods is a dry stretch, which falls in the months of January and February. February is the hottest month with the average afternoon temperatures soaring to 32°C/90°F. These months represent a dry spell between the short and long rains (Chart & park data, 2019).

The word LUMO is an acronym for Lualenyi, Mramba and Oza projects. The conservancy is a consortium and therefore does not have its own members but a grouping of members who are drawn from Mramba, Lualenyi, and Oza projects in Taita-Taveta County, Upper Coast of Kenya. Itwas set up in 1997 with Mramba, Lualenyi and Oza ranches contributing 20,000 ha, 15,000 ha and 10,788 ha, respectively. The two main objectives were to avert human-wildlife conflict and develop tourism mainly through conservation. The founding of the sanctuary was mooted by Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) whose main objective was to achieve socio-economic development for the local (Manyara and Jones, 2007). This led to tourism being seen as the most viable option through consultation and support from donor agencies such as: Pact Kenya, CDTF/BCP, EAWLS, Peace Corps, Volunteers, ACC, SAMED and CORE. The original idea was to benefit 60 founding members of Mramba project who had bomas (shambas) in the area. However, the community land on which the sanctuary had to be located did not have a title deed certificate and the acreage size was inadequate to permit the establishment of a wildlife sanctuary. In order to circumvent the challenge, they brought theneighbouring Lualenyi and Oza projects on board to accommodate the donors' interests. Upon the latter two projects enjoining the Mramba project, the donors started providing the seed money for the sanctuary.

Some of this money was used to fence-off the sanctuary and built the offices (Plate 1.1). It was also used to build the lodge in the sanctuary.

Case study 2: Kaya Kinondo Ecotourism Project: The project is located in a Kaya forest, which is classified as a ground water forest in Kwale County, South Coast Kenya. It is 40 KM south of Mombasa and lies 5 KM north of Chale point and 100 metres from the Indian Ocean at 5-10 m (UTMn37 MEF 6015) (Figure 1.3). It is on a patch of 30 hectares of relatively undisturbed coral rag forest, a few miles of Diana beach airstrip. The kaya is located in one of the most intensively developed tourist resorts in the south coast. According to Nyamweru and Kimaru (2008) Kaya Kinondo is an 'island of indigenous tourism' in the ocean of mass tourism. At the moment, there is nothing like it at the Kenyan coast, or indeed elsewhere in Kenya. It represents a hitherto 'a pristine area' that is, an attempt to conserve what was left of an increasingly threatened natural ecosystem. The project was the first conservation and income generating activity (IGA) among the Mijikenda sacred forests. Founding of the initiative was a response to introduce an initiative that could diversify the tourism product in an area which was predominantly mass tourism. Through support from World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Coast Forest Conservation Unit (CFCU) and National Museums of Kenya (NMK), the community managed to build an office block under the banner of the project (Plate 1.1). The building houses a market for the artefacts made by the local women groups. Some percentage of the money from the sales of the products goes to the conservation groups, while the rest is given to individual women groups.

The choice of kaya Kinondo as a possible site for ecotourism can be attributed to the need for sustainable utilization, conservation and management of the forest in order to achieve social and economic development for the neighbourhood communities. The site has a good road network and is easily accessed by graveled road. Therefore, it is well known to the tourists and has facilities and cultural features that are still identifiable and practised by the Mijikenda tribe. Kaya Kinondo, a sacred site for the Digo sub-group of the Mijikenda community has a number of values ranging from cultural, religious, historical, educational and scientific. Some of these values are authentic and of universal nature. This necessitated the Government of Kenya to gazette it together with other kayas as national monuments under the care of National Museums of Kenya (NMK). During major feats, representatives from other kayas especially those who originated from kaya Kinondo return to participate in the ceremonies.

Community Participation (CP) Levels and Performance Outcomes (POs)

Introduction

For the last few decades, the concept of participation has been used widely in the discourse of development. The increased attention on this concept prompted Kenya in 2010 to anchor it in her Constitution. This was meant to ensure that people provide input into governance of their institutions. In the past, government officials had assumed they had all the knowhow for everything and anything including people's needs, wants and desires. The officials, planned, decided and implemented projects on behalf of the people without consulting them. They

did what Un-Habitat (2007) describes as top-down development process, where all the decisions are made by the government or other agencies without seeking the consent of the people who matter most. Many of these projects became white elephants with the resultant effects being not felt by the intended stakeholders but meant to benefit the architects of the development ideas. Therefore, anchoring participation in the established structure of governance has made it become a bottom-up tool of providing for people to contribute in the planning, structuring, implementing decisions made, and management at national and county level, and other public institutions including NGOs, CBOs and other community development initiatives (Kanyingi, 2016; and Karacaoglu & Birdir, 2017).

In this study, analysis of CP in the four case studies used participation as a proxy indicator for measure of governance. As a prerequisite for effective development, good governance leads to better management of the natural resources and hence the very basic foundation of CBT development (Sproule, 1996). Consequently, successful projects are those whose governance comes from within, where members take keen interests from conception and initiation stages (Cavaye, 2015; Kearney*et al*., 2007; Cole, 2006). These interests involve history of the project, election of office bearers, accountability and good management. Other interests that touch on good governance include: involvement of the community in day-to-day running of community projects, knowledge of constitutions and their objectives, regular attendance of meetings and consultation on major decisions among others.

Participation Levels: According to Giampiccoli& Saayman (2018) the fundamental concept of participation in CBT must be clarified with its various levels of community involvement. The levels of participation are considered to be important because they determine whether a particular destination can be classified as CBT (Riuz-Ballesteros & Gaceres-Fena, 2016). In other words, it is fundamentally essentialto be knowledgeable in the measurement of community involvement levels and types, community awareness, community complexitiesand community benefits from any type of tourism (Naik 2014). Subsequently, true CBT is all about people initiating, owing, and controlling the development process from the beginning. Several scholars have identified various levels and categories of community participation in the context of tourism development (Rasoolimanesh, 2015; Zhang *et al,* 2013; Arnstein, 1969; and Pretty, 1995), which fall into three main categories of Tosun (2006). These levels are passive, induced and spontaneous.This study however hada fourth level of CP described as redundancy. This redundancy membership whose level of participation score was 0% was found in three out of four case studies and it comprised 42.8% of the sample (Table 1.1).At individual case studies,Oza ranch had the highest score of 64% ofredundancy membership.This was followed by Mramba and KKEP projects whose scores were 54% and 30%, respectively. Only one ranch, Lualenyi was an exception; the fact that it did not have 0% redundancyparticipation score like the other three case studies (Table 1.2). These redundancy participation level comprised members who appear in the register of the projects but were never involved at all in the running of the projects' day-to-day activities for one year before this study was conducted. Most ofthese members were contacted at the conception and initiation stages ofthe projects when the founders wanted them to provide documents for registration ofthe projects.

They were invited to the first few meetings of launching the projects, and after that everything went quiet. One of the imams who belonged to this category of membership in one of the case studies (Kaya Kinondo Ecotourism Project, KKEP) when contacted had this to say:

"Some kaya elders came to my house and told or rather convinced me to join them in a project they were about to launch. The project was to buy water tanks for members, build schools and mosques, and conserve the kaya Kinondo sacred forest. The project was being sponsored by a mzungu. For the mzungu to give funds, we had to register an organization whose bank account the money would be channeled. The elders requested me and many of my neighbours to give them our cards (national identity cards) for the registration of the organization... A few months later we were called to a meeting and informed the organization had been registered. They were now waiting for the mzungu to send funds for the projects to take off... Unfortunately, this was the last meeting they invited me to attend. I met the elders severally and asked them about the organization and why they were not calling us to meetings? They told me several times to give them more time to consult the people who write letters for the meetings (secretary). When we met again, they had forgotten to find the answers for me. It reached a point I had to give up. But I hear that the project is doing well and was meant to benefit some elders who used our cards to enrich themselves."

It is clear from the foregoing that these are the people who formed the bulk of the redundancy membership. Although the members appear in the registers, they "ceased" to be members immediately the founders registered the organizations and started receiving funding from the donors. There was also a sizeable number who were active in the yesteryears but the interest to actively participate has waned over the years. This membership gave a number of reasons for lack of enthusiasm to participate: Some were opting out because of the projects' failure to meet their expectations, for example, the dividends were not delivered as promised by the leadership. After some years in the projects and lack of tangible benefits accruing from attending these meetings especially in monetary terms, this type of membership decided to be redundant. Some could not participate because the meetings wasted their valuable time which could be used elsewhere to secure livelihoods for their families.

Subsequently,other members could not actively participate because they felt that the leaders did not have their interests at heart; they engaged them in fake and sham participation, and asking for opinions, which of course they intended to ignore. In other words, even if they were involved in decision-making, their opinions would hardly be implemented. Due to deception and disrespect by the leadership as well as having very little influence over the decisions made, members felt that attending these meetings was meant to rubber-stamp the decisions of the executive.However, the leadership used and continued to use their names with other levels of CP members to solicit donor funding for the development of these so-called "community projects".These observations were consistent with other scholars who argued that equal participation in community-based decision-making is a complex and difficult goal to achieve especially in the contexts of highly unequal gender and class relations. In particular, the poor cannot afford to be involved in community development activities because they

spend most of their valuable time and energy struggling to meet the basic needs and survival (Muganda, 2009).

The next level, coercive community participation which ranges from 0.1 - 0.33 had an average membership of 24% of the target population. In Oza, Mramba, and KKEP, involvement of members in planning and decision-making in this low level of community participation were 24%, 27%, and 38% respectively. In this category, according to Tosun (2000) members have no power over the course of development process. However in this level, members' involvement is limited to predefined activities in accordance with decisions made by leaders who also determine how members will act to promote the projects and what benefits members will be entitled. In other words, this type of participation was a top-down approach, mostly indirect formal participation in the projects, where benefits were not shared, and members had very limited alternatives or choices. The members were also controlled, and everything they got was tokenism and highly manipulated (Tosun, 2000 & 2006; Arnstein, 1969; and Preety, 1995).

The level of participation ranging from 0.34 to 0.67 had an average membership of 21% for the four case studies with Lualenyi, KKEP, Mramba and Oza scoring 46%, 24%, 14% and 8.3% in that order. This range, known as induced participation (Tosun, 2000 and 2006), is also a top-down approach where participation is passive, formal, mostly indirect with high level degree of tokenism, manipulation and pseudo-participation. Members' participation is only at implementation stage. Sharing of benefits and choices between proposed alternatives and feedback are limited. In this category, although members might have a say in the development process, they have no actual power or control over the decisions being made by those in positions of authority. In short, leaders and management determine whether the opinions of members will be accepted or rejected and how they will affect the planning and development process. In this regard, this type of participation often takes the form of public hearings, and usually occurs late in the development planning process when most issues have already been resolved and decisions have been made (UN-Habitat, 2007). From the ensuing discussion, the last two levels of community participation coercive and induced are all symbolic, or at tokenism level. This means that community members at these levels are invited into their 'own spaces' to plan and develop programmes. This happens mostly at the implementation level, where the members are often invited to listen, accept information, and ultimately requested to give consent. In this scenario, participation is being used as a requirement for programme approval: that is, the programme has gone through consultation process and is well informed by the public and therefore should be accepted by public (Fandeli, 2017) in order to dupe and hoodwink the sponsors and government.

The last and highest level of participation, ranging from 0.68 to 1.0 had only 11% of the target membership with Lualenyi, KKEP, Mramba and Oza having 44%, 6%, 3% and 2.5% of their membership in that order (Table 1.1). This type of participation called self-planning is the truly recommended community participation (Tosun, 2000 & 2006). It is a bottom-up approach or what may be described as direct and genuine CP in planning and decision making. In this category, the membership has the power to make decisions and control the development process (Tosun, 2006).

This is the level that coincides with Tosun's model of highest level of CP; Petty's model of citizen power and Arnstein's typology of self-mobilization and interactive participation. In this category, because it is members who are doing it themselves, it generates trust, ownership and social capital among the members (Rasoolimanesh, 2015 and Innes 1996). It is important to summarize that Lualenyi project was the only one among the four case studies that did not have redundancy membership, which was scoring zero (0%) participation level (Table 1.1). It had more than 44% of the membership who belonged to the highest participation level ranging from **0.68 to 1.0**, meaning that the project membership was actively involved in planning and decision-making at all stages of the project. This project was founded in the 1970s by the Taita-Taveta County elites whose membership is limited to 52 people. The project was a professionally-run commercial venture. Unlike the other projects covered in the study, majority of the membership was active in the activities of the project; for example, actively taking part in elections, knowledgeable in the constitution and its objectives, and attending meetings regularly among others as we shall see later.

1.4.3 Disaggregating the Composite Variable, Participation
(a) Leadership and Attendance of Meetings

One of the variables which constituted CP *was* leadership and attendance of meetings. The notices of these meetings are required under the Ministry of Social Service Legislation to be communicated to the members in not less than 21 days every year. The meetings are one of the most important events in the projects' annual calendar. It is at these meetings the balance sheet and books of accounts are supposed to be made available for scrutiny. It is also at these meetings, in particular Annual General Meetings (AGMs), where the leadership of these projects is supposed to seek fresh mandate to govern as well as discussing any pressing issues. When participation was disaggregated into leadership knowledge, the findings revealed that only 42.8% of the respondents knew the committee members, against 57.8% who did not know them well. At individual projects the results were even more disturbing with 75%, 72%, 48, and 4% of Oza, Mramba, KKEP and Lualenyi, respectively having no idea of their leaders (Table 1.4). Thus the hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the number of members who know their executive officials was rejected ((α = 0 .478).

The next question was whether those who knew the leaders took part in their elections. The results showed that 56% of the sample did not participate. At individual projects, the findings revealed a lot of disparities ranging from 32% and 89%. At Mramba, Oza, KKEP and Lualenyi having 89%, 87.5%, 76 and 32% in that order responding in the negative (Tables 1.5). Thus the hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the number of members who took part in the election of the office bearers in the respective community projects was rejected ((α = 0.540). If they got involved in the election exercise, the subsequent question was to name the three executive committee officials (chair, secretary and treasurer) they had elected. Indeed, the findings in Table 1.6 demonstrated that 54% had no idea or members were only capable of correctly naming either one or two but not all the three officials. As per individual case studies the findings were more profounding with Oza, Mramba and KKEP having 74%, 71%, and 44%, respectively of their membership not able to correctly name the leaders.

Figure 1.1 the coastal region of Kenya

Table 1.1 Physical nature of Kenyan shores including islands (in km)

County	Sand	Coral rock	Mangrove/sacred forests	Total shores
Kwale	25.8	51.6	109.1	186.5
Mombasa*	18.3	6.5	-	24.8
Kilifi	85.7	87.6	72.4	245.7
Tana River	67.8	1.0	0.6	69.4
Lamu	116.6	55.7	444.1	616.4
Coast (in km)	314.3	202.4	626.2	1142.8
Coast (in %)	27.5%	17.1%	54.85%	100%
*excluding Mombasa islands and harbor (*source: Bachmann 1988:119*)				

Figure 1.2 the location of LUMO sanctuary in the neighbourhood of Tsavo West National Park

Plate 1.1 the LUMO Sanctuary main office

Figure 1.3 Kaya Kinondo Sacred Forest, the study area in Kwale County

Plate 1.1 Women members of Kaya Kinondo and a tourist outside the project house

Table 1.2 Participation Levels for Mramba, Oza, Lualenyi and KKEP in the Coastal region of Kenya (n=280)

Participation range Case studies	0.00	0.1-33	0.34 – 0.67	0.68 -1.0	missing	Total (n)
KKEP	30	38	24	6	2	n=50
Mramba	54	27	14	3	2	n=100
Oza	64	24	8.3	2.5	1.25	n=80
Lualenyi	0	5	46	44	0	n=50
Total (%)	43	24	21	11	1	n=280

Table 1.4 number of members who know/do not know executive committee officials in the KKEP, Mramba, Oza, and Lualenyi projects

Case studies		No	Yes	NA	Total
	KKEP	24	26	0	50
	Mramba	72	27	1	100
	Oza	60	19	0	79
	Lualenyi	2	48	0	50
Total		158	120	1	279

Table 1.5 number of projects' members who participated in the election of current office bearers

Case studies		Total			
		No	Yes	missing	
	KKEP	38	12	0	n=50
	Mramba	89	11	0	n=100
	Oza	70	10	0	n=80
	Lualenyi	16	33	1	n=50
Total		213	66	1	280

Table 1.6 number of projects' members with corresponding known number of executive office bearers

Case studies		Known no. Office bearers				Total
		.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	
	KKEP	22	11	5	12	n=50
	Mramba	71	18	8	3	n=100
	Oza	59	19	2	0	n=80
	Lualenyi	0	17	10	23	n=50
Total		152	65	25	38	280

Case studies			No	Yes	missing	Total=n
	KKEP	0	30	20	0	n =50
	Mramba	0	67	32	1	n =100
	Oza	0	55	25	0	n =80
	Lualenyi	0	2	48	0	n =50
Total		10	154	125	1	280

Table 1.8 known number of constitution objectives per project

Known no. of objectives/ Case Studies							Total
		0.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	missing	
	KKEP	31	7	5	7	0	n=50
	Mramba	66	14	9	10	0	n=100
	Oza	58	17	2	3	0	n=80
	Lualenyi	2	10	14	23	1	n=50
Total		157	48	30	43	1	280

Table 1.9. Numbers of members on the history of KKEP, Oza, Mramba and Lualenyi Projects

| No. of members	No	Yes	
Case studies			
KKEP	40	10	n=50
Mramba	76	24	n=100
Oza	63	17	n=80
Lualenyi	10	40	n=50
Total	189	91	280

Figure 1.4 Performance outcomes for KKEP, Mramba, Oza and Lualenyi Projects

Plate 1.3. Communal grazing grounds for Mramba ranch community. See the destruction of vegetation as a result of "Tragedy of the Commons"

Therefore the hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in number of projects' members and their corresponding known number of executive office bearers in Oza, Mramba, Lualenyi and KKEP was dismissed ($\alpha = 0.745$). From the foregoing, it is clear that except for Lualenyi project, it was only 14% of the target population who participated in the elections of the office bearers in the last AGM. It is also imperative to note that the number that participated in these elections of office bearers equals the number of possible structure establishment positions in the projects' constitutions, suggesting that people involved in the choice of leaders in these projects are the leaders themselves who during the election decided to award themselves leadership positons. Specifically, given the established governance structure of these constitutions have a provision of between 5 and 12 members with representatives from surrounding communities, KWS, NMK and NFS as well as the project managers, it is likely that the people who participated in the last elections in the last AGM all held leadership positions in these community projects. This implies that these so-called CBT initiatives are run and owned by few community elites. Respondents in theseprojects, who did not participate in the

elections,reportedth at they did not know when the committee metas they had not been invited to the meetings (Table 1.5). However, the elders and majority of women purported to know the committee members although they were not involved in their elections. In the words of one youth who is a member of Mramba ranch and a resident bordering LUMO conservancy lamented:

> *"This project is on our ancestral land and we should be involved in every step the management is and intends to make. If the leaders are calling us for meetings, they should ask us to tell them our priorities. However the leaders of our project are not calling meetings, and if a meeting is held in this place, it is impossible to know when they are called or held. The leaders are only inviting their friends and relatives, and only those with whom they eat together. In this village of ours, the only meeting all community members would be aware of, although you are not supposed to be invited is when there is a funeral."*

The preceding excerpt is just one example of growing discontent, which was found to be palpable among many members who described their projects as secretive organizations, with leaders ignoring the constitution and

leveraging on exclusionary practices to further their own interests. This points out to a desperate situation where the leadership of these projects found themselves in. They were not calling for the meetings and if they did, the invitation to the meetings went too only a select-few. In all the projects, it was reported that at the beginning the founder members invited and ensured that almost all members attended the meetings. The leaders would send vehicles mounted with public address systems which went round the villages to inform the members, or the leaders went personally to the households to inform members of the impending meetings. However, as the years went by, the leaders were no longer enthusiastic to invite the ordinary members to these meetings (Table 1.5). This observation agrees with Adams *et al*. (2018) who had also noted that meetings are always many and follow the bye-laws of the community development projects at the beginning but they become less and less common as the years go by and if dates for elections are announced, they were never publicized on time or held transparently.

This resulted in subdued or stifled participation but ended up protecting and insulating project officers, as well as leading to less knowledge of and influence on project decision making by community members whom the projects serve. This kind of challenge is not only limited to its inability to bring members to the meetings, but also its failure to meet an important legislative requirement. Then the question is why were the leaders not attracting/inviting members to these meetings resigning? Mukandala (1998) and Gaventa & Valderrama (1999) have attributed the non-attendance to weak participatory skills in running many both government and non-governmental institutions. Accordingly, most of the community work is done by the willing few, who are dedicated individuals. However, these community leaders more often than not get burnout and therefore becoming not useful to the community but serving self-interests in the long-run (Cavaye, 2017).

Constitution and Constitution objectives: Good governance in CBT initiatives requires empowerment of the local communities in the decision making process and this must be captured in the constitution and understood by persons who have come together and organized themselves for a specific a purpose. For these people to harmoniously work together, a constitution will serve to clarify their purpose, draw the basic structure and provide the foundation for building an effective group. The constitution will also permit members to have a better understanding of what the organization is all about and how it functions. It will in addition provide the foundation for ensuring accountability and transparency in planning and decision making. Consequently a constitution will ensure increased accessibility to information and decision making process is entrenched in enhanced growth of the organization. In regard to knowledge to the existence of this important instrument, the findings revealed that 44.6% of the respondents were ignorant of the constitution. Whilst as high as 69%, 67%, 60% and 4% of Mramba, Oza, KKEP and Lualenyi memberships, respectively have no idea of this important tool of governance. This was a major concern for those who knew about constitutions but did not bother to know whether theirs had one or not. The latter group assumed that all projects are supposed to have a constitution and therefore in turn expecting their constitutions to have objectives (Table 1.7). Probing further on member's knowledge of the constitution objectives, only 14.8% were able to recall at least three objectives of their

respective constitutions with the remaining 85.2% not remembering or knowing any three objectives (Table 1.8) of the sample. What was worrying most about the constitution was that 56% of the respondents could not recall any objective of their constitutions. At individual projects, 72.5%, 66%, 62% and 4% of Oza, Mramba, KKEP and Lualenyi, respectively scored naught in remembering constitution objectives of their projects. Thus, the hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the number of constitution objectives known by members was rejected (α = 0.745). This high number of respondents who have little knowledge of the constitution is recipe for the failure of these projects and therefore should be a major concern for the management and their benefactors.

History of Conception and Initiation of the Projects: The history of these projects is important because it enables the leadership to learn as much as possible from other leaders' successes and failures. They use their experiences to leverage against the future. While the superficial details of failure might differ dramatically from project to project, the root causes or team actions that led to them might be entirely transferable (and avoidable). Even on our own projects, we need to avoid the habit of running away and hiding from failures. Instead, we should see them as opportunities to learn something. What factors contributed to it happening? Which ones might be easy to minimize or eliminate? According to Roger (1994) real knowledge from real failure in the past is the most powerful source of progress we have, provided we have the courage to carefully examine what happened. In regard to this study, the knowledge of projects' members on conception and initiation of the four case studies was tested. At α= 0.05, the study found that there was significant variation (0.742) in the historical knowledge among members of the four case studies with KKEP, Oza and Mramba having 80%, 78.8% and 76.8%, respectively who did not have an idea when the project was conceived and initiated (Table 1.9). However, it was only at Lualenyi project whose membership at 80% was quite knowledge on the project's history. It is apparent that therefore that in these other projects, the percentages that were knowledgeable of their respective projects' history could have comprised the leadership, with the rest of the members having been used to meet the requirements for registration purposes.

Performance Outcomes: Performance-outcomes can be described as the final outputs expected by the intended beneficiaries of the community projects. They are measured by the percentages of membership that approve or do not approve the outputs of their projects. In regard to KKEP, Lualenyi, Oza and Mramba, the approval scores were 80%, 90%, 82.5% and 54%, respectively. These were huge percentages that supported the projects. Lualenyi which founded LUMO conservancy with Mramba and Oza has the highest approval rating of 90% of performance outcomes. This was followed by Oza and KKEP whose scores were 82.5% and 80% respectively (Figures 1.4). The high score rating at Lualenyi is related to the way their businesses are run professionally. Unlike the other sampled projects. The project is a serious business venture where things like book-keeping is done properly, meetings are held regularly, and members are assured of dividends from the project revenue. The project which was founded in 1970s by Taita-Taveta County elites, for example, has a very good policy on how to handle inheritance between the departed members and their heirs. The policy requires that members exiting the company nominate only one of their heirs as a representative in

the project. The nominee takes care of the interests of the family and is the only one recognized to be involved in the running of the project's day-to-day activities. In the event that a member dies without leaving a will, the heirs will convene a meeting where an administrator is chosen for the estate of the late member by going through the Kenyan courts' process. At the end of the year, dividends are paid to the administrator who in turn shares them with the other entitled beneficiaries.

At Oza project, the performance outcomes were also high, 82.5% (Figure 1.1) but the projects had its own share of challenges all related to its conception and initiation. By the time of this study the project was not operational. Mramba and Lualenyi members were not happy with the Oza membership: they were questioning the dividends the Oza membershipcontinued to receive and yet their project having been closed and hence not contributing to the LUMO conservancy's revenue. The problem with this project wasthat majority of shareholding in this projectwas also the same membership of Lualenyi and Mramba elites. When the Mramba projectordinary members were not getting anything in terms of dividends, some of their elite members seem to have outmaneuvered the large and unknown number of membership at the Mramba to receive dividends at another project, Oza.

At KKEP: Although performance outcomes were high, 80% (Figure 1.1,the membership wasnot constant. Except for the few founding kaya elders everybody else was a temporary member based on duties, roles and responsibilities one can perform at any one given time. These other members possessed and contributedsome special talent such as knowledge, know-how and skills such as singing, dancing, traditional medicineand carving among others to showcase at the project for profit making.The members were also required to contribute time and labour. Once the special talents got diminished, the membership to this project too ceased to be meaning most members in this project were serving at the pleasure of the kaya elders.

Mramba had the lowest performance outcomes of approval rating which were not as good as in the other three case studies. For Mramba, the support for the project was only 54%, slightly above the average (Figure 1.4). The outcomes were low because of challenges the project was facing, ranging from poor vision at inception and initiation to village politics. First, when the LUMO conservancy was being conceived and initiated, the people who had shambas neighbouring the conservancy were not convinced that the project would be useful to them. In particular, the fencing off of the sanctuary faced resistance from the locals who felt they were going to lose their grazing land. In order to loosen the tension, the local residents were promised that the sanctuary would be managed like a game reserve, where pastoral activities could be permitted to co-exist with wildlife. Over the years, the story changed that the management started running it like a national park, where human activities are not permissible. At the time of this study, the majority of Mramba project members was very hostile to the conservancy and they neither trusted the leadership nor wanted anything to do with the conservancy. Their anger with the LUMO leadership and management is well captured in the following excerpts:

"I can't stop to be unhappy when I once woke up in the morning and only to find carcasses all over in my compound. Another time I found my mango and papaya trees, and maize destroyed and eaten. It has not been better for my neighbours either: one of them lost two acres of blossoming maize to monkeys, zebras and baboons, which normally roam in the compound at night. You see this other neighbour, and you can see for yourself. These animals destroyed and cut a barbed wire fence, walked into his compound, scaring away his dogs before they almost brought down his house. We keep repairing our fences and houses at our own cost, nobody comes to compensate you and you are on your own. For the government (KWS), the life of an elephant, lion or other wild animals is more important than us. Nobody would come to rescue you when you are besieged but let them hear that you have killed or wounded their elephant, you will see a whole battalion of police (KWS) here."

This kind of hostility was highly manifested by residents of Mramba whose shambas were bordering the LUMO conservancy. As much as being members and most recipients of the worst effects of the conflict with wildlife, these people were not being compensated or were not receiving dividends from the conservancy. Because of poor record keeping and/or destruction of project registers, the surplus income at the end of the year was given out as bursaries to the needy in Taita. Some of it was used to buy water tanks, and building the schools, as well as assisting in funeral arrangements for members whose shambas are very far from the boundary of the conservancy. This means that little regard was given to the people who suffer most from the conflict. Secondly, in the year 2000, the LUMO management opened membership to the neighbouring communities as long as they could pay a nominal fee of kshs.100 and a registration fee of kshs.1000. Inthe event that any would-be member was unable to raise the registration fee, the sanctuary introduced a work-for-share scheme, whereby a certain number of hours of work entitled a member to a share, which of course was equivalent to what the founders of LUMO ranch had paid. Whereas this augured well for the new members but it had opposite effects, causing resentment among the founders of the sanctuary, with the latter complaining that they had been shortchanged by the former who are now enjoying the benefits of the sanctuary without paying the market price of membership.

Thirdly, the first private investor was introduced into the sanctuary in year the 2003. The investor owned 50% of the restaurant and a tented campsite whilst the local community owned the rest. Community ownership was through LUMO sanctuary membership scheme restricted to the local community members. The local community in addition owned and controlled the sanctuary and therefore benefiting from the entrance fees. Everything went on well until 2009 when the community membership felt that they had been short-changed by the investor and LUMO conservancy leadership. This resulted in a confrontation that led to locking the offices of the sanctuary, and closure of the restaurant and the tented campsite. It was during that time important financial files and membership registers vanished. It was suspected that the private investor colluded with the then sanctuary management to destroy evidence that could have implicated them in financial malpractices. The loss of membership registers created more problems especially for the Mramba project membership: (a) people who were not known to be members of the conservancy came forward to claim a share in the conservancy, (b) more confusion reigned as the investor was also thrown out of the restaurant and the campsite, hence unable to assist in sorting out the confusion in LUMO

sanctuary of membership register. The disgraced investor litigated, but the management that had taken over agreed to settle the dispute out of court. They later agreed and invited a new investor who is currently working with the management to reconstruct the membership register. They were also in agreement that the first investor had put in a lot of money in the project and needed to be compensated. By the time this study was conducted, the first investor was still receiving payment for his investment in the sanctuary. Fourthly, the policy for members exiting the project was more of populist nature than one meant for the growth and development of the project. For example, members who have exited, all their dependents automatically become shareholders. During the study, the number of membership was unknown and none of the shareholders was receiving dividends. As mentioned early, the dividends that could have been paid to the members were given out as donations to schools, educational bursaries, and assistance in funerals among others. Fifthly it was observed that employees were also shareholders in all these projects, which was a conflict of interest. Chances were that these projects werenot employing people who were competent. For example, many of the employees may not have met qualifications but recruited on criteria tailored to influence and shape the role and description to suit the directors rather than the needs of the projects. However, even if the employment body was impartial in assessing the quality of the applicants, for the job, the perception alone creates risk for the projects' reputation and could lead to discontent amongst other directors who do not have one of their own as an employee.

Finally, there were a few wealthy oldmen who seemed to be happy with the management of the conservancy. These were people who had a lot of livestock (cows and goats) who could take them to the grounds set aside (at the border the LUMO conservancy) for communal grazing. However, this kind of grazing has set in motion what Hardin (1968) described as the 'Tragedy of the Commons, referring to a scenario in which commonly held land is inevitably degraded (Plate 1.3) because everyone in a community is allowed to graze livestock there. This is commonly manifested by the wealthy landowners who deliberately put too many animals onto the pasture in order to weaken their much poorer position of their neighbours in disputes over the enclosure (privatization) of common lands (Bromley, 1989).

Summary and Conclusion of Findings

- In this study, the respondents were asked questions related to community participation in planning and decision making of the CBT initiatives. The questions included knowledge on the founding of the project, if they were consulted, knowledge on the CBT project constitution and its objectives, if they knew the composition of the project's leadership, attendance of meetings, and consultation among many others.

- The first few years of founding CBT projects, CP was very good but involvement in planning and decision making started waning thus leading to an increasing sizeable number of members, referred to as redundancy that scored 0% in CP. However, in all these cases except for Lualenyi, there wasa small percentage scoringhighly between 0.68 and 1.0which constituted mainly executive office bearers, i.e. the chair, secretary and treasurer who were actively involved in running affairs of the projects.

- The performance outcomes, and both CP and its disaggregated variables differed significantly, suggesting that CP was somewhat incomplete in most of the case studies, as the project members were missing their role in participation as a means of influencing the planning, and decision-making processes of tourism development. By and large, such differences were manifested in lack of democracy, dictated by the will of the leadership and management of these projects. The errors committed by the leadership of these CBT projects of not permitting genuine community participation were not accidental. The errors appear to be deliberate in many of these cases. Notably, those involved made certain key decisions knowing very well that genuine community participation would take away their intention to manipulate budgets for their self-seeking interests. As Kanyingi (2016) would put it, the decisions are made in a way with a view to provide opportunities of getting the community off the eating tray.

- The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which was supposed to breathe new life and inject good governance into CBT initiatives, has not succeeded. It seems the constitution has not managed to have the intended far-reaching effects on the calibre of leaders eligible to seek elective office in these initiatives. As observed in the four case studies, the committees have taken all the major decisions without involving the members.

- The leadership of these communities have issues with eitherthe control of power, or not being acquainted or lack of important participatory skills as a tool in itselfin resource management to empower the communities in the development process of tourism industry in the coastal region of Kenya. The issues of power are a barrier for effective involvement of citizenry because they have been high-jacked by the local elites who want to further their own agendas by controlling participatory procedures that affect the opportunity of the common member to participate.

Recommendation

This study suggests a number of avenues for moving forward.

- Tenets of good practicerequire projects to develop in such a manner that local communities are permitted to have genuine CP especially accessing information to which they have every right. Above all, the community must in all aspects be consulted, i.e. members should be involved in planning and decision making at all stages of the project's development. However, the case studies have demonstrated that if information sharing and transfer were not to require a community to really participate but for the management to simply imagine preferences for the community members to get informed, then that is not empirically supported. What is being witnessed is simply, the community members have been disfranchised as they are not involved in making major decisions for these projects. Except for Lualenyi (all the other case studies KKEP, Mramba and Oza), local members have been denied access to their local resources to which they have every right. The only way to go about it is for the management to

regularly share information with the community members whose influence in decision making is more important in the long-term development of the CBT initiatives. Moreover by giving all members a chance to invest in matters of decision making, the project's sustainability is assured because the community has high incentive to make investment and thus leading to greater benefit for all.

- From the onset of these projects, members were given promises that have been undeliverable. Such promises befell all the CBT initiatives in the study area, with one classic example found at LUMO conservancy, where the plot owners had to make room for the conservancy. However, immediately the land was surrendered and the conservancy fenced-off, the management changed tune by running the conservancies like a national park, where human activities are excluded. This has created tension for the conservancy and neighboring communities. It is recommended that the decision-making process be as transparent as possible. As Gandrud (2016) argues this is likely to make members more satisfied and committed even when they disagree with the leadership of the CBT initiative.

- There is need to build capacity in order to empower each and every member. It is pertinent that the leadership and management on the one hand, and the supporting institutions on the other hand, invest more in training to enhance management skills and good governance in these projects. The membership can demand the partnering institutions and government to continuously monitor and mentor them by providing training on capacity-building of committees and managers. This should involve development of procedure manuals for decision making that are compliant with benchmarks of good governance. The areas that are critical include regular training on good governance on financial management, book-keeping, group dynamics and good communication among others. For example, financial management training which emphasizes the separation of powers between those who approve the expenditure and those who keep the books of accounts, should involve independent auditors to assist in exposing or warding-off any malpractices.

- Although good laws require CBT projects to practise good governance in terms of members being involved in the planning and execution of decision making of their projects, little was witnessed on the ground. One such law that was enacted in the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 and considered to be good is citizenry (local participation). The concept is defined so that the stakeholders are supposed to contribute ideas for inclusion in policy development through interrogating (holding) discussions and open forums in advocacy (DWAF, 2005). From the research findings, although local participation appears to be portrayed with considerable optimism, it is characterised with intense disillusioning based on experience with some real participatory practices of CBT projects in the study site. It seems that the concept is theoretically and logically an effective approach in development but has many difficult issues they are facing in practice. It is thus recommended that active participation be embraced in all these projects by developing a policy framework that ensures that the majority of members are actively involved.

- The main challenge facing many members of these groups' growth and development is lack of knowledge on the constitution and its objectives. It is in the constitution good governance which includestransparency and openness, how decisions are made, who makes them, and who is accountable among others to them are captured. However, it appears that most of the initiatives' constitutions were developed to meet registration requirements with very little consultation with the community membership. Thus failing to provide room for the members to have knowledge of the contents of the constitution or know how the constitution could be used to ensure good governance. It is important to point out that as the groups' activities grow, so do the needs for the changes in the structures and decision-making procedures, which means that their constitutions should be revised to accommodate the new developments. The management should therefore put more effort to raise awareness and more importantlyhave a clear vision and methods of giving feedbacks to the rank and file of the membership. This is important because it will reduce internal conflicts and disagreements.

- It has also been noted that the leadership of these projects who have been in the office for a long time get burnt out. It is suggested that the following measures be taken into account: (a) nurturing new leaders by creating opportunities for novice to gain experience in running meetings or attending seminars or arranging leadership training which contain some incentives, (b) making meeting activities fun and social and be held at a time that is convenient for a broad cross-section of members to attend, (3) strengthen social capital by individually inviting members to participate personally because their contributions will be valued and (4) ask members to give a temporary commitment to lead the projects, say for a few months, rather than join a committee indefinitely.

- It is important that collective actions can be useful in situations where challenges associated with the Tragedy of the Commons in order to manage rivalry in regulating the use of pastures in the communal grazing grounds. This can take the form of limiting access to the grazing resources on quota basis to only those who are parties to the collective action arrangement, and thus effectively converting a common pool of the resource into a very good use.

- If expectations especially in monetary terms of members are not met a few years into the initiation of the project, the odds are very high that the project will end up with a sizeable number of redundancy members. It is recommended that all projects adopt a **Lualenyi model**. In this model, the shareholders are assured of receiving dividends from the net income generated at the end of the year. Since the project is run on a community land, part of the proceeds must be given to the locals for a project of their own choice on a priority basis. Secondly, the membership number must be restricted, for example, if a member dies or departs the project for one reason or another, only one

heir can be nominated through the Kenyan court process to represent the other heirs. When this member receives dividends, he/she would in turn share them with the other dependents of the late.

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