



## RESEARCH ARTICLE

### THE STRATEGY OF CHINA TOWARDS XINJIANG AND ITS IMPACT ON REGION

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#### ABSTRACT

This paper examines China's policies towards Xinjiang and its effect on the region. Xinjiang is wealthy in natural assets, is geologically important, and has a unique economic zone. China is also financing in Central Asia to additionally fulfil its energy needs. A system of pipelines and significant rail systems associate sources from China to Central Asia. Xinjiang's economy will profit by the setup because it is the corridor and gateway to Central Asia and a centre for the traffic of Silk Road. This study proposes that Xinjiang's economic growth prompted a couple of destabilizing things, including Han relocation, salary disparity, and work discrimination. The entirety of this is occurring while the administration is also managing other social issues, such as education and religion. It imagines that China's development strategy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Independent Region decreases, increases, or is a subsidiary element to ethnic instability.

#### INTRODUCTION

The incomparable western growth of 1999 (Christopher Smith, February 1, 2005) was China's policy to improve the economy of western China. The top economic improvement priorities of the Communist Party of China was to diminish neediness and decrease ethnic clash between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese (Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, January 2008). China is rising Xinjiang on three factors— SEZ status, the Silk Road, and rich resources (Nicolas Becquelin, June 2004). The XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) has a wealth of rich assets that will to support and develop the economy of China. Xinjiang is also geologically situated in the focal point, where the Silk Road passes from various directions, uniting goods and dealers from China and Central and South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. To oblige the traffic, China is forming Xinjiang into a social, logistical, and financial exchange place. Because foreign business has become an indispensable piece of the XUAR's economy in ongoing years, forming stability through economic development in that region to pull in business is important to Xinjiang's monetary success (Clifton W. Pannell and Philip Schmidt, May 15, 2013: 247). To advance Xinjiang's economic growth, China chosen Kashgar City in the Tarim Basin as an SEZ to draw in foreign investments. Furthermore, China has economic links with the nations of Central Asia. The states of Central Asia have more resources than Xinjiang, which supplies China with continuous flow for a long time. For the assets to arrive at China, Central Asia, and the PRC have been working together on rail systems and pipeline construction projects to connect the natural resources to the China Seas. Construction ventures further connect China, through sea and land, to nations as far as Belgium.

XUAR is cost-effective, yet instability continues, such as Uyghurs' want for self-governance or autonomy, dissatisfaction with the administration, Han relocation, salary disparity, work discrimination, and resistance to assimilation (Davide Giglio). These elements can compromise the states and regional security and economy. Moreover, ethnic clash may make economic barriers for the Chinese government in achieving its developmental targets such as China's Belt and Road Initiative. The region may experience extra difficulties pulling in Chinese and foreign investors who feel undermined for the absence of a secure investment. This article suggests three potential hypotheses: China's economic growth strategy for Xinjiang expands ethnic clash, diminishes ethnic clash, or is a subsidiary element to ethnic clash. One of the CCP's top needs is economic development, with the expectation that this encourages ethnic security among Hans and Uyghurs (Shan Wei and Weng Cuifen). A few researchers have proposed other significant elements also, including educational and social development, and ethnic arrangements to settle Xinjiang (Arienne Dwyer, 2005: 124).

**China Economic Growth Strategy:** China's economic growth in the XUAR is, for the most part, in energy. Interest in mining and energy areas spiked 33 percent in 2012. In September 2012, the investment in the XUAR was \$66 billion. Besides, one of the world's biggest undiscovered warm coal reserves exists in the XUAR. The coal production was 141 million metric tons in 2012. The estimation is that by 2020, its production will be roughly 750 million metric tons. In 2013, China Petrochemical Corporation, or, Sinopec Group was one of 35 organizations that presented an offer to lead a \$32 billion venture to make synthetic petroleum gas. Besides, the administration has a strategy to stretch out the XUAR's activity to turn into the middle to store and process coal, gas, chemical, oil, and wind power production.

Before, the region's economic growth, framework, and workforce confronted a lot of limitations, which restricted its development. As of not long ago, Xinjiang didn't have the assets, innovation, and manpower to profit by the region's oil and mineral deposits. To make up for the national average GDP, the administration's Five Year Growth Plan actualized the "Western Development" strategy, from 2001 to 2005, to enliven western and central region's growth and to balance the economic development between regions. The administration's investment energized eastern Chinese people to "Go West" and pick up prosperity. Simultaneously, the expansion of migrants expanded the workforce, supported the number of skilled tradesmen, changed regional development, propelled urbanization, built up maintainable rural practices, and built up a sound electrical framework to give green power to the upgrading effort (The World Bank Saber Country Report, 2014). The plan increased the XUAR's economic power, in spite of the conflict between Hans and Uyghurs over economic elements. With the flood of skills and migrants, the region's GDP in the most recent ten years over the national GDP (Deutsche Bank Research, February 2015). In light of Peter Bernat's examination, there was a time during the 2000s when the GDP of XUAR expanded from a yearly 150 billion to 220 billion yuan.

The CCP has been fortifying the XUAR's framework and economic strength. Enormous scope framework has been in construction, particularly railways and pipelines to transport assets and give access to Central-Asia's much bigger resources fields. For instance, to oblige the east coast's vitality demand and to support Xinjiang's economy, China declared in 2000 the build-up of the West program to build up a pipeline that connects the west to eastern China. In 2001, consortia and PetroChina banded together to build up the Tarim Basin gas fields and develop the "West-to-East" pipeline. Shell, Gazprom, Exxon-Mobil, China Light and Power, and Stroytrans gas agreed to build its first gas and oil deliveries through the pipeline to Shanghai. In 2004, the pipeline quickly moved 29 billion cubic meters of natural gas toward the eastern region. Another progressing venture is the \$196 billion power production and high voltage transmission lines associating the XUAR coalfields to purchasers in the east.

**Special Economic Zone and Silk Road:** Besides building up the XUAR with its rich assets, Beijing is additionally restoring the noteworthy Silk Road. The Silk Road has a notable part in the XUAR and the other way around. China is modernizing railways, highways, and media communications lines. The improvements will support the infrastructure and mechanical and financial participation with the developing markets that stay along the course (Mandy Zuo, February 17, 2015). The Silk Road is indispensable to the XUAR in light of the fact that it is the centre for visitors from South and Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East as they enter China. Travelers, diplomats, soldiers, pilgrims, monks, commanders, investors, and traders traversed the course, with Kublai Khan and Marco Polo leaving their well-known footprints. The Silk Road trade course was not a real fixed road. A superior method to depict it is that it a system that traders used to trade plenty of buyer merchandise: paper, coins, silk, flavours, utensils, workmanship, and even thoughts (JunJie Ma, February 10, 2015). The Silk Road may work correspondingly in contemporary time, with the exception of more prominent speed and capacity.

The XUAR is critical to China's renewal of the Silk Road since it is China's entryway toward the west and the crossroad for Kazakhstan, Russia, and China. In 2013, Beijing suggested the "Belt and Road" venture. President Xi requested to its neighbours to quicken the connecting of infrastructures and collaboration in development. Beijing's methodology to broaden the Silk Road to Central Asia and Europe. This economic line may influence in excess of 40 Asian and European nations and perhaps three billion individuals. In 2014, 21 Asian states and China built up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to fund the infrastructures of the regional network, for example, mobile phone towers and roads, and infrastructure of the Belt-and-Road. In 2015, member of AIIB's expanded to 26, including Cambodia, Brunei, Bangladesh, China, Kazakhstan, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, Oman, New Zealand, Nepal, Qatar, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Singapore, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan. Chinese leaders introduced the needs for activities, accentuating the transport infrastructure, coordinated financial effort, investment, and trade campaign, and social collaborations.

Improved infrastructure and network on the Silk Road could commonly profit China and different clients, upgrading economic collaboration, and participation. To oblige Xinjiang's predictable development, CCP entrusted the district with changing its financial, trade, logistical centres. The southern region will turn into a significant traffic centre point. Its transportation system will spread every which way, associating China to Europe; and South, West, and Central Asia. Furthermore, the Silk Road getting economic success, President Xi additionally guarantees it will bring stability, security, and peace to China (Xinhua, February 13, 2015). The Southern Xinjiang economy, similarly, has not proceeded just as northern Xinjiang. To give the southern an economic lift, Beijing assigned Kashgar as an SEZ (Special Economic Zone) in 2010. As Kashgar is an SEZ, financial specialists may profit by particular policies in the fund, tax assessment, trade, businesses, and land use. Utilizing Shenzhen, for instance, the Chinese government intends to form Kashgar into a blasting economic centre point. The Special Economic Zone reform was Deng Xiaoping's strategy to upgrade the PRC's financial growth. He considered the open market as China's success in the future. Toward the beginning, Deng recognized coastal urban areas and regions, for example, Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, as the objectives, to get foreign investment, set up joint endeavours, and export. Ultimately, SEZ permitted overseas organizations to contribute. The SEZ strategy succeeded. At the national level, China's economy growth was double for over 25 years. Somewhere in the range of 1980 and 2004, Shenzhen's GDP found 28 percent growth for each year, which was the most noteworthy of any China city. However, it is hazy if different SEZs follow a similar developing model. In 2010, an enormous poster that read, Pays Honor to Shenzhen, and Learns from Shenzhen, hung in People's Square of Kashgar. Kashgar Airport is the second busiest air terminal. It suits China's longest interstate air course of 7.5 hours to Shenzhen. China's vision is to assemble a "Silk Road noticeable all around" that will associate the XUAR to Europe, East Asia, and Central Asia (Cui Jia, December 31, 2014). Despite the fact that the government put resources into Kashgar's foundation, for example, the air terminal, it is questionable whether Kashgar can create as effectively as Shenzhen. Shenzhen has the benefit of being a sea city found

near Hong Kong, which has pulled in a great deal of Foreign Direct Investment (Christopher B. Primiano, March 22, 2013). Kashgar might be more averse to draw in such FDI as it is landlocked by desert and mountains. China expects that infrastructure improvements and financial aid will empower outside and household financial specialists to see similar possibilities in Kashgar as they found in Shenzhen. However, in light of the fact that Kashgar and Shenzhen are definitely different, Wang Ning, chief of the Economic Research Institute in Urumqi at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, and her group suggested a customized model for Kashgar. The Shenzhen model run in China's key coastal urban areas, Wang suggested that in the early stage, Kashgar's monetary advancement should concentrate on the travel industry, while being bolstered by growth in farming, assembling and local administration enterprises. Kashgar should begin by exploiting its old architecture, rich culture, and local art scene. After the travel industry develops, fabricating and different areas are probably going to follow (Wang Yan, February 2012).

**Beyond Borders:** Xinjiang is pivotal to China's vitality investment in the nations of Central Asia, and it is the main entryway and land connect between China's centre provinces and Central Asia. As a resource hub and transport corridor, the resources that move through the XUAR are significant for consistent industrialization and continuous supply from Xinjiang toward the South China Seas. The XUAR is additionally the intersection for exports and imports of assets from Eurasia, the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe. Its intersection clarifies President Xi's purpose behind for restoring the Silk Road with trade growing in a few ways from Xinjiang. Transportation infrastructure and Pipelines have been built to link Xinjiang, South, and Central Asian nations, the Indian Ocean Basin, and Europe. Since the time Central Asian nations picked up their freedom, the region was prepared to extend its business. China responded with extraordinary interest. In 1997, Kazakhstan and China began helping out an intergovernmental understanding about teaming up in gas and oil fields. One such task was the Central Asia and China gas and oil pipelines to move assets from the west to the Coastal areas of China. The two nations likewise connected rail lines to associate people to the Atlantic Ocean.

In 2004, West-to-East pipeline began delivering oil from Shanghai, President Hu, and President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev signed an agreement worth \$3.3 billion to broaden the pipeline to Atasu in Kazakhstan (Ernar Sagatov, November 20, 2010). The pipeline was fundamental to fulfil China's vitality need and was depicted as an extension of friendship between the two nations. The transnational Atasu pipeline completed in 2015. During a similar gathering, the two presidents additionally signed different deals to mutually investigate and upgrade gas and oil resources in the Caspian Sea, and make plans for a gas pipeline to connect the Caspian Sea gas fields to China. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan likewise cooperated with China to assemble pipelines. In 2006, President Hu and the President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov signed a deal to cooperate on gas and oil, for example, the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. Since the deal was signed, the three nations quickly finished the construction of Lines A and B. The Line-C construction began in 2012. After a year, the pipelines were linked, permitting the underlying portion of the Central Asia and China Gas Pipeline to operate. Before the finish of 2015, the Line-C will be completed, which will permit Line-C to work in full capability to ship 25 billion

cubic meters for every annum (Hazar Strateji Enstitüsü, April 23, 2014). The combined capacity of the three lines will add up to 55 bcm/a. Besides fulfilling 20 percent of China's gas demand, replacing coal with gas will decrease sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions. In 2013, China's President Xi and Tajikistan's President Rahmon Emomali participated in the ceremony of the fourth Line-D gas pipeline. The 998-kilometer pipeline will begin working from the Galkynysh field at around one bcm/a. The course for gas pipeline A, B, and C's is Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, China, while line-D's course is Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, China (Yen Ling Song, March 10, 2014). The four active pipelines will have a capacity of 80 bcm of natural gas to China, completing 40 percent of the China demand. Line-D is likely to start in 2016 to satisfy China's needs.

**Impact on Region:** The Han relocation to Xinjiang is one cause of uncertainty in the region. Not at all like bingtuan, whom Uyghurs viewed all the more favourably, Uyghurs' assessments of some ongoing migrants are negative. In the 1960s, the Mao-period, migrants, for example, convicts, soldiers, and laborers sent for state migration purposes, generally, adjusted to the Uyghur lifestyle. A few Hans even distinguished themselves as Xinjiangren, or locals of Xinjiang, or Lao Xinjiang, which means old Xinjiang local. The early Han migrants were soldiers. After the PLA control the Xinjiang in 1949, soldiers stayed to work in territories, for example, animal husbandry and horticulture, road building, industrial development, and water system channel construction. In 1954, Beijing built up a state-run army association call PCC, which got known as bingtuan. The PCC had purview over territories dispersed all through the region that equalled the size of two Taiwan. The soldiers got the land and settled in Xinjiang.

The government "go west" strategies to profit the XUAR are frequently seen distinctively by the Uyghurs. To build up the XUAR, the Chinese authority built-up projects to profit everybody included. Numerous Uyghurs can't associate the Han movement to profiting local ethnic minorities. For example, the "develop the west" campaign was an activity to enrol a large number of Han workers to move toward the western border to build a railroad, road, and infrastructure construction (Fuller, Graham E., and S. Frederick Starr). Uyghurs' perspective on the administration's push for the Han Chinese workers to move west was deciphered as a CCP goal to debilitate the Uyghurs' position. Likewise, Uyghurs see Han migrants as better paying employments, while Uyghurs involve the harder and lower-paying occupations. By the 1980s, the push toward the west brought in benefit-driven migrants. Because of loosened up family enlistments, contemporary migrants have choices to be flexible, and uncertain remain. Because of this reality, ongoing migrants or wilfully left their house in search of a good life. While migrants have deliberately moved to look for the benefit, local and central governments may have additionally made good conditions to allure organizations to build production lines, and draw individuals with abilities to work in Xinjiang. The migrant pool didn't really coordinate with the administration's aim. Rather than pulling in skilled staff and long-period settlers to Xinjiang, numerous ongoing migrants are temporary workers and business people who are in the XUAR considering just benefit (Joniak-Luthi, Agnieszka, 2013: 155-174). Thusly, Xinjiang's Han issue isn't all in the CCP's control. Revenue driven migrants ran to Xinjiang during the 1980s when the region was introduced as the land of chance where money can be

effectively earned. Whether migrants were relocated by the administration or independently inspired to go the XUAR, migration to work, enormous enterprises, and construction ventures expanded. Before all else, Xinjiang offered a job to Han migrants to work in the north of the Tengri Mountains. Because of tax reductions and economic land, private and state-claimed ventures from eastern China put resources into Xinjiang. Han movement proceeded into southern Xinjiang, especially to work the railroad and street construction destinations, urban construction ventures, Taklamakan Desert's oil fields, Kashgar cotton fields, and Tarim Basin extraction places. Superficially, financial development may appear to benefit the XUAR; however, information gathered somewhere in the range of 2011 and 2012 demonstrated that a large portion of these organizations used Han Chinese workers. Temporary and seasonal migrants to Xinjiang, in some cases alluded to as the Drifting Population, carry an issue to the region. They don't notice local guidelines nor have a settlement design, which is a test to the CCP. Han migrants have undermined the XUAR's social solidness, for example, with the birth-control strategy. They break the one-child strategy and don't really accept the local laws. Without the possibility for all time settle, a Han Chinese said during a meeting, Xinjiang isn't an area you need to live after retirement. For this explanation, considerably following quite a while of living in Xinjiang, numerous Hans keeps their hukou status and don't see the need to build up hukou in the area where they earing. For instance, farmers can rent their land during their nonattendance from their hukou. They profit by extra rental income and the cash they make in Xinjiang. Floaters are susceptible and self-driven to the next job opportunity.

Another damaging Han migrant element is seen as social displacement. Some Han migrants experienced issues incorporating with society. Some moved to the UAR just for cash and not the culture or land. Many profit-driven Han companies carry their families with them; however, have no aim to live forever while floaters moved their hukou so their kids get an education and medicinal services. Meanwhile, some migrants become socially disappointed on the grounds that they don't relax even with their local home, because of argument contrasts, Hans doesn't understand, associate, or relate with all Hans. For instance, a Sichuanese will undoubtedly associate with a Sichuanese rather than a Cantonese in light of the fact that their language and perhaps, culture are contrasted. Social displacement can be an issue among Hans and Uyghurs. Some migrants are so scared by the local culture and language that they stay close links with their families back home, cook their own dishes, eat at cafés that serve their own traditional food, and associate with their native fellows. Some of these migrants remain socially isolated. The negative delineation fortifies Uyghurs' and long-period Han settler's contrary recognition that floaters are in Xinjiang just to make money; lack biological interest; are impassive with the people, land, culture, and history; and voided obligation regarding the region.

**Income Disparity:** Income dissimilarity is another destabilizing element between ethnic minorities and the Hans. Income dissimilarity between the urban-rural area in Xinjiang originated from the Mao time when state-claimed projects, for example, the XPCC (Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) and development and advancement of natural assets were overwhelmed by Hans. Hans watched out for organizations and oversaw state and private possessed transport and media communications enterprises.

**Table. Demography of Uyghurs and Hans in Xinjiang (2002)**  
Source: Remi Castets (September 2003).

Name & States of the Administrative Unit	Uyghur Population (%)	Han Population (%)	Per Capita GDP (yuan)
Karamay (north)	13.6	77.9	43,926
Urumqi (north)	12.8	73.2	16,493
Turpan (north)	69.6	23.5	12,831
Shihezi (north)	1.2	94.6	9,738
Changji (north)	4.0	74.8	8,399
Kumul (north)	18.4	68.7	7,351
Ili (north)	15.9	44.9	5,344
Aksu (south)	74.9	25.0	4,939
Kashgar (south)	89.2	9.1	2,411
Khotan (south)	90.7	3.0	1,643

Uyghurs lived in horrible areas that needed human resources and infrastructure, which adversely influenced their monetary improvement and income. The two cases clarify Uyghur-Han income difference: spatial isolation and an examination directed by Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan explicitly on market contrasts and compensation gaps in Urumqi. Han and Uyghur spatial distribution is part of two: ethnic minorities command the less developed and rural southern Xinjiang, and most of Hans live in developed and modern urban areas of northern Xinjiang. One-fourth of Xinjiang's urban areas are situated in the southern region. Farming is the main element of the southern economy. This region is topographically distraught with financial hindrances. The region needs a framework, particularly streets. The endeavor to ship produce to Urumqi is an incredible test for minorities. The administration assigned 20 of its 25 districts "poverty-stricken areas (Cao, Huhua, October 2010: 965–982)." Northern Xinjiang, where Han live, is progressively developed, industrialized and urbanized. The Tianshan monetary belt on the northern slant, for instance, has developed transportation framework, overflowing human capital and rich assets. The region gives all the elements to monetary improvement while the zone covers just five percent of Xinjiang's area, 20 percent population of Xinjiang's lives here.

The educational difference is a factor that builds the pay gap. Southern Xinjiang's education rate from 8 percent to 14 percent. The eastern Xinjiang from 6 to 8 percent. The northern portion of the Xinjiang's ranges from 2 to 6 percent. The urban-rural salary difference is due to lacking education in rustic zones. Fewer education Uyghurs make less talented and lacking workers in remote minority regions and in the urban communities. This investigation may clarify the huge Han-Uyghur salary difference, however rising standard of life when contrasted with the Han. Howell and Fan led an examination in 2008 that concentrated on Han migrants' and Uyghur migrants' selection of business sectors, and how their disparities influenced their pay gaps. The 2008 data outlined that in 2005, 11 percent of Uyghurs increased in salary, while 36 percent of Hans salary increases. Additionally, the Uyghur-Han salary gap in the Xinjiang found 28 percent more for the Hans without thought for their professions (Anthony J. Howell, December 2013: 17). This specific examination, utilizing explicit parameters, indicated that city Uyghur migrants' salaries were not off guard contrasted with Han migrants (Howell, Anthony and C. Cindy Fan, 2011: 119–139).

**Religion and Education:** Religious pressures among Uyghurs and the authority are significant reasons for minority turmoil. Since religion is firmly interconnected to numerous features of

Uyghurs' lives, about any demonstration of contradiction can qualify as religiously inspired. In the mid-1980s, many Xinjiang public schools were confined from religious lessons. Religious instructive hardship drove numerous Uyghur students in Xinjiang to stop their secular teaching with the public school. Rather, they went to private Muslim scholarly organizations called madrassas. Uyghur guardians needed their kids to study Islamic values, traditions, scripts, and rituals rather than the government's secular lessons. This interest for organizations with Islamic lessons in the end added to the introduction of Islamic sects in Xinjiang. Social elements, for example, religion, have been an urgent component of ethnic insecurity in the XUAR. For instance, Xinjiang lawmakers passed a law in 2014 that restricted the wearing of burqas. Since Islam is woven into each part of Uyghurs' lives, limiting cultural clothing may handily be deciphered as religious concealment despite the fact that burqas are not conventional dress for Uyghur ladies, and wearing them is restricted in nations, for example, France and Belgium (Frances Martel, January 13, 2015). Still, local officials instituted the law in light of a spate of savage attacks, for example, the March 1, 2014 attacks at the railway station of Kunming, where attackers with blades cut 31 individuals to death and injured 141 (Katie Hunt, September 12, 2014).

Besides the restriction on the burqa, in 2014 due to a game competition in Karamay, the Xinjiang incidentally disallowed travelers with long beards, veils, headscarves, burqas, hijab, and clothing with Islamic images to board public transportation (Loveday Wright, August 8, 2014). The administration took safety steps with an end goal to control potential Islamic terrorism in Xinjiang. One final example: during 2014's Ramadan, some teachers, students, and government workers were prohibited from fasting on the grounds that the government dreaded fasting would prompt violence. Eyewitnesses claimed that during "Ramadan rage," the mix of exhaustion, hunger, and thirst added to the increase of brutal acts—attacks, fights, disputes, burning of religious structures, accidents, and beating of ladies and kids (Jeremy Wilson, July 7, 2014). Understanding the China reaction to past brutality may assist one with seeing why state and local administer certain limitations against contemporary clashes. Without the background data, one could confuse the administration's activities as strict concealment as opposed to safety efforts. Understanding the minority activities that made the administration to apply certain strict policies may uncover that the administration is putting energy into balancing out the region. In spite of government endeavors, strict policies are augmenting the social gap between the Xinjiang and the state.

The education framework in Xinjiang is another element that causes erosion between Hans and ethnic minorities. Hans claims opposite discrimination because of special treatments that give ethnic minorities points of interest on their school entrance tests. Han students feel that special educational treatment is turn around discrimination because of schools' distinctive confirmation criteria that support minorities, devastating Hans' opportunities. Ethnic minorities are given additional focuses on their school selection tests. For instance, in 2004 (QiuGuiSu), who took the Mandarin test were granted 50 points if their parents were minority (James Leibold, 2014). In increasingly distraught regions, minorities have the choice to take school entrance tests in Uyghur or Mandarin. The test in Uyghur is easier than the Mandarin test, and the students of the minority are still enhanced with sufficient additional points. However, the score gap between Hans and minorities has been

narrowing. Preferential strategies empowered, trained, and developed a sizeable group of minorities in various fields. In 2009 analysis done by the Xinjiang Bureau of Education indicated 89,538 minorities in tertiary organizations and 1,705 minorities in graduate school. In any case, without preferential contracting policies, minority students experience fewer work chances than Han students. Critics of the favored strategy contended that settle for the easiest option and absence of Mandarin familiarity for minorities contrarily influenced their post-school work possibilities. From now on, to make everything fair for Hans and minorities, China started bilingual education, explicitly Mandarin and the local language, in schools to improve minorities' competitiveness with Hans.

The capacity to communicate in Mandarin and another language advances the development; however, minorities have doubts about the educational strategy. China's lawmakers give Xinjiang's education management the freedom to build up its own education strategy. The Xinjiang has two sorts of schools: Hans and minority (AblimitBaki, 2012). Up to a language has a composed content, minorities are allowed to have separate colleges using their local language for essential guidance; Kazakh colleges communicate in Kazakh, and Uyghur colleges communicate in Uyghur. The two colleges additionally learn Mandarin as a subsequent language. Han colleges, then again, communicate in Mandarin; however, their subsequent language is English (Baki, Ablimit, 2012: 41–62). Minority college students, however, began bilingual education from the start of school, may not be capable in both Mandarin and the minority language. Their low ability in Mandarin could be a supporter of their absence of competitiveness in the employment market against Hans, which regularly prompts contact between Hans and the minorities.

## Conclusion

To the CCP, instability in economic can prompt ethnic insecurity. Beijing has been economically improving Xinjiang; it expects that economic stability will drop ethnic brutality. Xinjiang's economy has been developing steadily as the accomplishment of the "Western Development" Plan. China is using the area's rich resources to satisfy the state's vitality need. Likewise, China is reviving the Silk Road, which passes the XUAR. Xinjiang is China's entryway toward the west, a crossroad for Kazakhstan, Russia, and China; and the center point for traffic from South and Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. To geologically connect the various nations to Xinjiang, China, and its neighbor's nations have policies to improve the infrastructure and network along the Silk Road, which could upgrade economic association, incorporation, and collaboration. To additionally propel Xinjiang's economy, the CCP chosen Kashgar a SEZ, to draw in investors by breaks in tax, finance, industries, land use, and trade. Also, China is investing in the natural resources of Central Asia to ensure the nation has enough energy to maintain economic development and stability. China and Central Asia have been collaborating in transportation infrastructure and pipeline projects to link the Chinese east coast to Europe. China's economy is developing, yet how is development influencing ethnic stability in Xinjiang? Is it a deciding element that either increases or decreases ethnic clash, or is it simply a secondary element? While Giglio contends that long period economic development is a vital segment of ethnic stability, he believes the main driver of Xinjiang's conflict is religion and culture (Giglio, Davide). Xinjiang's economic growth made extra ethnic pressure among

Hans and minorities. Accordingly, the current social, ethnic clash factors, Hans and minorities, need to manage Han migration, salary disparity, and job discrimination. Han migration is vital to the growth of Xinjiang because Hans has the ability to manufacture infrastructure. While the area is modernizing with telecommunications lines, railroads, and highways, which have been pulling in different investors, Uyghurs see development profiting Hans and not them. Moreover, revenue driven, seasonal, and temporary migrants will, in general, carry chaos to the region. Income disparity is commonly seen as being supportive of Hans, yet subsequent to investigating the contributing elements, for example, spatial segregation, wage gaps, Urumqi's market differences, and income difference is increasingly fluid.

The gaps could limit, or reverse if minorities modify their professional and social characteristics to most of China. Work discrimination creates tension among Hans and minorities, especially when employers categorize based on religious belief, nationality, sex, and race. Minorities who are good in ethnic languages yet not scientific and specialized terms can block their abilities to impart, gain a trade, and be offered jobs. Minorities may emphasize their familiarity with Mandarin. Capability in the national language can assist them in the trades, in this way lessening the chances of job discrimination. Between the two social elements of education and religion, religion is more unstable than—the three economic threatening elements of Han migration, salary dissimilarity, and job discrimination. Religious contrasts, whenever permitted to raise, can conceivably weaken Xinjiang's economic advancement. The presence of social clashes can show ethnic instability, which the CCP realizes as a key risk to economic development.

So as to make long-period ethnic stability and economic improvement in Xinjiang, China needs to stand up to the more profound and progressively historical foundations of the social elements that influence XUAR's violent exercises. The author contends that social factors impact peace the most when the economy is immature, or during the time of improvement. When the region accomplishes a specific formative limit, the social elements can be reduced by the pursuit of property and stability. The social elements, which are the foundation of numerous contentions, should be the China principle focus. Long-period prosperity and stability in Xinjiang may need the CCP to initiate reasonable strategies, open communication, and equivalent education opportunities. This article contended that Xinjiang's economic development could contrarily and emphatically influence regional ethnic stability, yet just as an auxiliary factor, as China keeps on exploiting Xinjiang's resources, extend the Silk Road, develop Kashgar, and invest with the nations of Central Asia.

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