



## RESEARCH ARTICLE

### EUROSCEPTICISM AND BREXIT: IMPLICATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN UNION AS A MODEL OF INTEGRATION

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#### ARTICLE INFO

##### Article History:

Received 24<sup>th</sup> October, 2018  
Received in revised form  
27<sup>th</sup> November, 2018  
Accepted 21<sup>st</sup> December, 2018  
Published online 30<sup>th</sup> January, 2019

##### Keywords:

Brexit, Euroscepticism,  
EUROScepticism,  
European Union, Integration

#### ABSTRACT

The burgeoning challenges against the logic of regional integration in Europe, French fear of falling behind, concern about Germany's predominance, the significance of Franco-German leadership, British detachment and the small-country syndrome of fear of hegemony (Dinani, 2014) cast the European Union (EU) as a model of integration in the spotlight of virulent academic debate. Even though the EU has stimulated the globalisation of socio-economic and environmental processes (Mesjasz-Lech, 2016), it has, equally, generated Euroscepticism and EURO scepticism (Riedel, 2016), particularly from the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), France (Front National) and, to a lesser degree, the Czech, Hungary and many other EU Member States who show their dissatisfaction due largely to the EU integration policies which have created migration crisis (Nová, 2016; Horváth, 2016; Olejárová and Čajka, 2016), against EU' demographic modeling (Šimpach and Pecorová, 2016), eroded European national and cultural identities (Nenička, 2016) and threatened the future of the EU. Although Britain reluctantly joined the EU in 1975 by a referendum, the UK's prodigal 'no-vote' referendum on the 23 June 2016, targeted at Britain's exit (Brexit) from the EU was not only perceived as a serpentine plot against the future of EU and, by extension UK, but also the Europe-Transatlantic Cooperation. The broad objective of the paper is to re-examine the strategic vision, policies and practices of the EU in the context of the politics of Brexit. The specific objective is to draw lessons from the Brexit and its impact on the future of Union to appraise EU as a global model of integration. With the theory of regionalism, we concluded that the EU as a global model of integration faced post-Brexit extinction in the event of lack of EU-UK compromise agreement which would undermine the future of Europe and Britain in global power and influence.

#### INTRODUCTION

European Union (Europäische Union, Union Européenne, or Unione Europea) is a supranational organisation of 28 countries of the Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, which originally was confined to Western Europe (referred to as the rise of the west). EU took its root in the West as a strategic containment of Soviet expansionism but undertook a robust expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, which were occupied by the Soviet Union, in the early 21st century and governs common economic, social and security policies (Gabel, 1 November 1993; Dinani, 2014: 5). The United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in a speech at a meeting in Zurich 1946, called for a new, united Europe. Winston had sympathy for federalism and reservation for supra-nationalism. However, the head in the French economic planning office Jean Monet and his disciples in the political administration of the EU, except Robert Schuman who played major role in the creation of common market in Europe, "took an un-heroic, low-key approach, preferring to move piecemeal toward European union via the unglamorous path of functional

economic integration" (Dinani, 2014) and triggered off divisive nationalism. Progress was made with the signing of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957, which created two new organisations – the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in furtherance of economic integration and establishment of the institutions (the European Court of Justice, European Commission and Council of the European Union, European Parliament) that today constitute the European Union. Even though Churchill played very crucial role which set the political firmament that created the ECSC, Euratom and EEC, Britain, with Denmark and Ireland were admitted in the first enlargement that moved the EU from six to nine member states in 1973, whereas the UK government howbeit grudgingly consolidated its stay through the referendum of 1975. Despite the lofty objectives and achievements in stimulating the globalisation of socio-economic and environmental processes (Mesjasz-Lech, 2016) of the EU integration, the Union was haunted by Euroscepticism and EUROscepticism (Riedel, 2016), born out of nationalist fervour regarding "the logic of economic integration, French fear of falling behind, concern about Germany's predominance, the significance of Franco-German leadership, British detachment, and the small-country syndrome of fear of hegemony (Dinani, 2014: 9), particularly

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from the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), France (Front National) and, to a lesser degree, the Czech, Hungary and many other Member States who showed their EU dissatisfaction due largely to the EU integration policies which have created migration crisis (Nová, 2016; Horváth, 2016; Olejárová and Čajka, 2016), against EU' demographic modeling (Šimpach and Pechrová, 2016), eroded European national and cultural identities (Nenička, 2016), and states' control of the EU, its organ and institutions as well as threatened the future of the EU. The specific objective is to underscore the implication of the 23 June 2016 'prodigal' Britain's exit (Brexit) vote and its serpentine "soft" plan on the future of UK, EU as well as the Europe-Transatlantic Cooperation and proffer policy-steps to mitigate possible backlash. The paper was organised in seven sections to accommodate the spectrum of issues discussed, thus: 1. Background to the Study; 2. Evolution, Visions, and Policies of the EU; 3. Admission of the UK in EU Enlargement; 4. Britain and League of Euroseptics and EUROseptics; 5. EU as a Global Model of Integration; 6. The Road to Brexit; 7. Potential Post-Brexit Challenges for UK-EU relations and Global Influence; and 8. Concluding Remarks on the Way forward for Stability of EU's Global Influence.

### Evolution, Vision, and Policies of the European Union

The evolution of the EU began with the end of the Second World War and threat of Soviet domination which led Winston Churchill to call for a new, United Europe (Kaarbo and Ray, 2011: 432). Despite Europe's potential of dual revolution – industrial and democratic - the post-World War II left the region with socio-economic and military-diplomatic challenges, including but not limited to:

- Difficulty in the process of identifying the goals of European foreign and security policy with the US and NATO;
- Difficult choice to identify with multi-polar or a cooperatively structured world order;
- Unsuitability to fulfill the role of a traditional great power due to its peculiar situation and possibilities to act only as a civilian (soft) power; and
- Difficulty to act as a global player without a stronger military backing on which European security strategy must be based.

Following the idea of Juan Monnet which was announced by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, negotiations was begun under the Schuman Plan, name derived from the French foreign minister Robert Schuman, the plan called for the creation of common market in Europe for the coal and steel industries which led to the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951 and launching of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) the same year. The success of the ECSC and the obvious benefits derived by its members further pushed the six founding states of France, West Germany, Italy and Be-ne-lux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) countries to sign the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957, which created two new organisations – the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in furtherance of economic integration and establishment of the institutions that today constitute the European Union. The Euratom was a political creation to conduct nuclear research, construct nuclear installations, work out safety code and set up a body to own and secure pre-

emptive rights over nuclear raw materials. Part of the political aim was to find solution to Europe's German problem. For the most part, to ensure that war could no longer break out between France and Germany, for instance, as was the case in 1870, 1914, and 1939, the Treaty of Rome created executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, which have been enlarged and reflected by the presence of the following:

- (i) **European Court of Justice (ECJ)** – interprets community law (regarding the two important legal doctrines – “direct effect” of European law, and the “supremacy” of the community law over national law in cases where the two laws conflict), and determines whether Member States have fulfilled their obligations arising from the provisions of EU treaties and law;
- (ii) **European Commission (later referred to as ‘the Commission’)** – to represent EU interests as a whole and propose and implement policies;
- (iii) **The Council of European Union** – composed of single-member representatives, jointly with the European Parliament exercise legislative and budgetary functions as well as carry out policy-making and coordination of functions of the EU;
- (iv) **European Parliament** – composed of directly elected representative to make laws and regulations (Kaarbo and Ray, 2011: 436; European Union, 2010: 22).

The EU had remained a product of long and continuous negotiation, transformation, revision and signing a forest of international treaties namely the ECSC Treaty, 1951; EEC Treaty, 1957; EURATOM Treaty, 1957; Merger Treaty, 1965; Single European Act (SEA), 1986; Treaty on European Union, 1992; Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997; Treaty of Nice, 2001; Reform Treaty; and Treaty of Lisbon, 2007. See Appendix on European Union Treaties, Signers and Content from 1951 to 2013. The policy outcomes of the negotiations and transformation of three most discussed constitutive treaties that provide the framework for the implementation of EU integration policies are discussed in brief as follow.

### The Treaty of Rome

The Treaty of Rome created the EEC with four fundamental freedoms of common market – free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour; a common agricultural policy (CAP) and a common external trade policy, by abolishing national trade policies for the introduction of common rules on anti-competitive and monopolistic behaviour and for common inland transportation and regulatory standards. It also created the European Social Fund to enhance job opportunities by facilitating workers' geographic and occupational mobility, i.e., through the European Citizenship. However, due largely to the fact that the Treaty of Rome did not extend its common market reforms to agriculture, as in trade, CAP turned both the costliest and most controversial of policies of the EEC after it was implemented in 1962. The controversies left the implementation of CAP in the hands of national government's intervention “to protect the living standards of farmers, to promote agricultural self-sufficiency, and to ensure a reliable supply of products at reasonable prices (Gabel, 1 November 1993). As it were, even the common external trade policy was not left out of controversy. Consequently, in 1975, the European Regional Development Fund was created to ameliorate regional economic disparities and provide additional resources.

### The Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty was a product of EEC's opportunity in the post-cold war to play more global role through enhanced political and economic strength and which was duly ceased to officially create the EU as a new model for the Community based around three 'pillars' -- the European Monetary Union (EMU) towards actualising single currency (the *euro*), a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and a common Justice and internal policy regarding common citizenship rights, regular meetings of the foreign ministers of each Member State to coordinate foreign policy against the controversy that mired the CFSP, and by extension, advanced cooperation in the area of immigration, asylum, and judicial affairs. The Maastricht Treaty created Citizenship of the EU in 1991 with different rights, terms of access to participation, and identities in Article 8, including right of residence, free movement, vote and be voted to the European Parliament (EP), diplomatic protection, and petition the EP (Wiener, 2003: 399). The content of the Citizenship Article in the Maastricht Treaty was slightly revised and renumbered but retains the major contents in Articles 18 to 22 and Article 255 (<http://europe.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/123001.htm>). The right of residence for workers and their families and for students was possible based on three policy considerations: (i) the Social Charter, preventing social dumping, which evoked the awareness of; (ii) 'democratic deficit'; and (iii) the instability of the Paris-Bonn axis (Wiener, 2003). The controversy surrounding the *euro* stems from the Treaty designation of *eurozone* and compounded the more by the enraging and unsettled Constitutional Treaty debacle, which was vehemently rejected by the Dutch and French voters in referendums in 2005 for being less innovative in its claim to become the sole legal document of Europe as well as undermined characteristics of authority, sovereignty and independence of Member States.

### The Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty was a legal framework which tried to reform and unlock EU foreign policy and diplomacy (Vimont, 2015:3; Paul, 2008:13; Christopher Hill in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008: 20) and to bring changes to the EU and its Member-States to function under federal principles, supported by Germany against confederal option defended by France. The Treaty created the military arm of the second pillar of the EU in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) "to counter the post-cold war threatening security challenges in the European neighbourhood or on global scale" by a group of Member-states that are willing and have the necessary capability for a "lead role" (Zotti, 2013) on behalf of the Union and entrusted by the Council. At a meeting in Berlin in September 2003, German Chancellor Schröder, French President Chirac, and UK Prime Minister Blair had muted the idea, howbeit, to equip the EU with military planning and leadership capabilities of purely European Defence Agency in order to enable independent military operations without having to revert to NATO. Five key threats pointed out by the European Security Strategy (ESS) to ensure effective and efficient functioning of the EU include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime (European Council, 2003). The European Council, in December 2008, agreed to fight the security scourge through a "more capable, more coherent and more active" policies to reach EU's full potential

(Kaňa and Mynarzová, 2016) through a combination of military force, when permitted, and the traditional exercise of 'soft power' (Aggestam, 2016) towards "a deeper transformation of foreign policy" (Smith *et al*, 2016) under peace and security in Europe. The Lisbon Treaty was entered into to make the EU's external action more efficient and powerful as a global actor. Although the Treaty of Lisbon became a "compromise conclusion of the European Constitution," much maligned, it strengthened the EU institutions, broadened its policy scopes, improved policy coherence by integrating foreign policy instruments and thereby improved "the European balance of centralism and flexibility" (Moravcsik, 2010). The Treaty of Rome has, since 1957, been retrospectively amended, the Maastricht Treaty deleted the word "economic" from the Treaty of Rome's official title; and the Lisbon Treaty rechristened the Treaty of Rome as "Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." The underlying objectives for creating the EEC by the original "Six" countries were political, economic as well as cultural with corresponding specific desire to:

- (i) Bring an end to Franco-German conflicts in Europe and take the continent to a better future through lasting peace;
- (ii) Help construct the economies of the continent of Europe; and
- (iii) Make people to see the world through a European lens as a third force alongside the U.S. and USSR.

The basis for the EU institutional framework is to "promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests - those of its citizens and those of its Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions" (European Union, 2010: 22) through mutual cooperation by the institutions, performing within the limits of powers conferred on them in the Treaties, and in conformity with the laid down procedures, conditions, and objectives of the Union. The EU institutions serve as policy gatekeepers for the attainment of the broad integration objective - *See* the development and objectives of the European Union Treaties, 1951-2013 in *Appendix*.

### Admission of the UK in EU Enlargement

The process of admission of the UK into EU began early with the invitation of UK delegates in 1955 to join the ECSC. The UK government sent a representative to observe discussions about development in the ECSC, but the UK membership was declined by the Labour government led by Clement Richard Attlee (1883-1967) because of the illness of key ministers, desire to maintain economic independence, and failure to understand the potential significance of the Community. Not until 1 August 1961, the UK indicated interest to join the ECSC. Behind the UK's interest was fear that the Community might lead to Atlantic community, dominated by the U.S. Worse still, French President Charles de Gaulle, on 15 January 1962, laid down "impossible conditions," and blocked the UK's admission. However, Britain mustered courage and applied for membership of the EEC in 1963, the same year Nigeria requested for associate membership of the EEC to secure favourable trading conditions (Eke, 2009: 225). In 1966, President De Gaulle vetoed British admission up until 1 January 1973 when UK was admitted, despite that Britain was a founder member of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. Though Britain entered the EEC with the

aspiration of being a “nation of shopkeepers... not a nation of second-hand car dealers”, it was, nonetheless, marked with apprehension and no “fireworks” (*The Guardian*, 1 January 1973) partly because its entry was necessitated not by economic but more by geopolitical interest and manoeuvre by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who used “the renegotiation of EC membership terms and the 1975 referendum to overcome strong opposition to the EC from within the Labour Party” (Dinani, 2014). With the UK’s referendum vote and consolidation to stay in the Economic Community (EC) to solve its economic crisis, it was disappointed that despite the fact that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher secured budget rebate from the EC, on 27 June 1984, the Great Britain’s Pound (GBP) dropped out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) on that “Black Wednesday” because the EC failed to protect the fall of the value of the pounds at the international currency market. The slump in pounds value occasioned “sluggish economy” and trade unions that had a stranglehold on UK’s economy in the Pre-Thatcher years without appreciable improvement to the lives of British citizens, even though Britain belong to the EC (Zakheim, 24 June 2016). The sad experience sowed *Eurocepticism* in the minds of the leaders and citizens of Britain.

The grudge over perceived betrayal by the EC played out on 23 July 1993, when Conservative Maastricht rebels voted and won the Tory government on the amendments to the treaty. Following the official unveiling of the *euro* on 1 January 2002 and despite that the President of European Commission Romano Prodi insisted that “The euro is your money, it is our money. It’s our future. It is a little piece of Europe in our hands” (*The Guardian*, 1 January 2002: 1), the UK government received the news with a pinch of salt and the feeling was amply demonstrated at the gathering of EU Member State governments during the signing of the Lisbon (EU) Treaty on 11 December 2007, when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown avoided the signing ceremony and EU family photographs (Tickell, 25 June 2016), for inexplicable late arrival. Brown was ridiculed and pressed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the European Commission’s president Jose Manuel Barroso to join the other EU heads of government albeit belatedly. UK became a grudging member of the EU, failed to give proper leadership through strong political role as the perceived “balancer between France and Germany (Tickell, 25 June 2016) and, in 2011, for example, under Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign Secretary William Hague, the UK government blocked over 70 EU statements to UN committees referring to the phrase “on behalf of the EU” instead of “EU and its member states” (Borger, 20 October 2011).

The blockade aimed to stop what the UK government perceived was a drift towards a common EU foreign policy that could tie UK to EU authority and rob UK of permanent membership of the Security Council. Even though Churchill’s speech set the political firmament for a new, united Europe, beginning with the creation of the ECSC, UK’s role in EU was marginal: refused to play strong role and virulently criticised its own handiwork and moved for the serpentine Brexit plot. While the six founding members saw the EEC as progress when they came out of defeat and produced victory, the UK entry was perceived as a defeat; “a fate she had resisted, a necessity reluctantly accepted, the last resort of a once-great power, never for one moment a climactic or triumphant engagement with the constitution of Europe” (Young, 25 June

2016). The sense of self-imprisonment to EU’s diktats and UK’s nationalistic fervor to hold its faith in its hands by larger section of UK polity promoted more by Boris Johnson and anti-EU UKIP leader Nigel Farage forced David Cameron in his 2012 election campaign, to promise and set the pace for the Brexit. Nonetheless, a travesty, the British that prodded the EU to protect its internal market suddenly turned against that stance with reproach because of its serpentine plot to exit from the Union.

### UK and League of Euroceptics and EUROceptics

The UK had demonstrated cold feet towards the EU, from declaration of intent to admission up until participation. As a member of the EU, UK and many others who were skeptical of the EU policies fought relentless to achieve and defend their national interests. The major controversial issues surrounding EU operations include in broad terms, common agricultural policy, common currency, illicit immigration and the overbearing power and authority of the EU, its organs and institutions over the Member States that created them. From the beginning, Britain was sceptical because it felt British steel would undersell European steel because despite the posture of the integration process as multinational in scope was a Franco-German venture to political and economic objectives at a period Coal and Steel were at the heart of Franco-German economic and military competition. By proposing to place coal and steel industries under joint international control, France was opening up for partnership with Germany than trying to be an independent actor. Britain and Denmark were more critical than other Member States of the aim of the Maastricht Treaty towards deeper European integration because of the political upheaval in Britain and across Europe. As a result, the UK government narrowly won a vote on the treaty in the House of Commons and subsequently ratified it but strove among other 12 Member States, including Denmark, to secure special status under “opt-out” clause, meaning that Britain and Denmark are at liberty to choose whether or not to adopt the *euro*. UK still nursed the sense of betrayal by the Community in the 1980s at the heat of economic integration when the GBP crashed in the international market at a period the EU economic integration was facilitated following fears of “Economic uncertainty, widespread concerns over ungovernability in the Member States, an increasing fear of Eurosclerosis, unsolved budgetary problems, and a general feeling of pessimism” (Wiener, 2003: 408).

Under the “opt-out” clause, Britain and Denmark enjoyed special status among other Member States exempted from the euro-area or eurozone based on high degree of “sustainable convergence” of the Member States as set out in Article 121 of the Maastricht Treaty. The convergence requirement is assessed on the basis of provisos requiring the Member States to meet, a high degree of price stability; sound public finances; a stable exchange rate; and low and stable long-term interest rates. It was, therefore, because of the hard choices placed for Member States’ participation that developed EUROcepticism (Dinani, 2014: 8) and Eurocepticism driven by desperation accentuated by “economically, spiritual and moral crisis” (Margan, 2016: 584). The overlap between domestic and international spheres of authority within the EU creates “Eurocepticism of Euroenthusiasts” (Riedel, 2016) and by extension, sanguinary divisions between the EU and its Member States. For instance, although Britain, France, and Germany hold different views on the prospects of enlargement

for member-states to meet their peculiar needs, Britain and France have always avoided any discussion that would radically affect their formal sovereignty and independence. The French, a ‘con-federalist’ with cautious optimism, favours Europe *puissance* (power) without U.S. torso (*hyper-puissance*) and NATO involvement in the area of foreign, security and defence policies; Germany a ‘federalist’, argues for strengthening European independence and deepening of the process of European integration: and it is much more accurate to talk of the EU as “German Union” (Margan, 2016: 589). The Germans argued for deepening European integration not as an alternative but an addition to the U.S. and NATO involvement in Europe in the spirit and letter of Europe-Atlantic Cooperation; and Britain views the prospect of enlargement as an opportunity to slow down the deepening process of European integration to ensure more flexible Union. Despite the different perceptions of the three largest Member States of the EU based on their vision of future European security architecture, the EU served them the fulcrum to multilateralise their policies and delegate substantial powers of setting the agenda, framework on issues and implement decisions on controversial topics.

Britain demonstrated its reservation against the EU policies at the Lisbon Summit when Prime Minister Tony Blair was reported by the *BBC News*, on 18 June 2007, to have read out four British “red-lines”:

- First, we will not accept a treaty that allows the charter of fundamental rights to change UK law in any way.
- Second, we will not agree to something that replaces the role of British foreign policy and our foreign minister.
- Thirdly, we will not agree to give up our ability to control our common law and judicial and police system.
- And fourthly, we will not agree to anything that moves to qualified majority voting, something that can have a big say in our own tax and benefit system. We must have the right in those circumstances to determine it by unanimity (Laursen, 2009: 5-6).

Many French voted “no” in the 2005 referendum because they perceived the EU as grossly “Anglo-Saxon” (Parker *et al*, 2007; Buck *et al*, 2007). As we stated earlier, migration is one of the main socio-economic phenomenon of the post-cold war that significantly influences the future of nations (Zanker, 2008: 23) both in the source region and the target region. The intensification of migration is one of the gravest of all global challenges of the 21st century which acts as an accelerator and is also accelerated by the completion of the globalisation process (Zorkóciová and Ďuranová, 2016: 1121). EU is confronted with associated challenges of migration ‘misery’, terrorism and climate change, among others. Although migration has positive and negative impacts on countries, illegal migration has more negative impacts. Illegal migration is deleterious to mechanisms for effective control of data and regulation of entry and movement of aliens to the targeted countries and encourages socio-political and economic crimes against positive integration. The illegality of migrants stems from three possible offences: entry into destination country with false/fake documents; entry under authority of residence permit and exceeding the validity of the obtained permit; and deliberate exploitation of the asylum system (Ďuranová, 2015: 62). Illegal migration routes to Europe are mainly two - the Balkan and the Mediterranean (Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, and north Africa) to the

destination of their choice in western and northern Europe – Germany, Sweden, Austria, France, and the countries of Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) (Nová, 2016: 673). International migration to Europe provides a critical model of a “rapidly ageing” regional population (Šimpach and Pechrová, 2016: 970) through geographic and demographic change because Europe constitutes the “dream destination for migrants” (Zorkóciová and Ďuranová, 2016: 1120) with relative economic prosperity and political stability (Šimpach and Pechrová, 2016: 972) based on common identity of democratic values, history and culture, anti-immigration sentiments in EU Member States, for example Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Czech Republic, have promoted violence, racism and anti-Semitism (Caldwell, 2018: 12; Savage, 2018: 12; *The Economists*, 2007a: 18 & 56).

Although, for example, Germany and Switzerland, particularly attracted immigrants from European as well as non-European countries into their labour force temporarily as “gastarbeiters” or “guest workers” in mining and industries, Germany’s 20% population comes from an immigration background and the figure is continually growing. Illicit immigration is a presentiment to positive integration of Europe yet some Member States grant resident permit through the “Golden visa,” the “citizen-by-investment programme,” “victims of trafficking,” etc (Sumption and Hooper, 2014; Lipkova, 2014). Germans without immigration background fear that immigrants could strip them of their *Heimat*, their sense of home, particularly with about 4.7 million Muslims and at least one mosque in Germany cities. With the ideology of centralism in the Western open democratic societies, “the Muslim immigrant in fact cannot reach prosperity, and western values are alien to him/her” (Nenička, 2016: 659). Paul Schelfer in Nenička (2016: 659) reinforced that “multiculturalism had not prevented the rise of ethnic segregation.” Michelle Martin reporting for *Reuters* (16 March 2018) quoted the German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer as contradicting both the stance of former president Christian Wuff and Chancellor Angela Merkel that Muslims living in Germany belong to Germany when he recreated the Germans’ common sentiment and stated that “Islam does not belong to Germany” and he would push through a “master plan for quicker deportations.” The associated threats of immigrants to the integration process of the EU have questioned its original tolerance (Nenička, 2016). The challenges of immigration or refugee crisis in EU integration effort led the Member States to evolve “competent” and “effective” migration policy measures (Horváth, 2016: 371-372; EEAS, 2016: 28) to tame the tide of negative integration.

### EU as a Global Model of Integration

The EU is no doubt a global model of integration in many respects. With constitutive policy and stringent enlargement rules for economic pragmatism, through foreign political instruments such as intergovernmental agreements, common and joint strategies and actions, the EU has tried to tame negative integration. Through the EU enlargement, it is argued, European norms in reshaping Member States’ interests and the supranational role of the European Commission in framing and implementing the decisions were promoted and stabilised the Union. One of the most successful agreements of the European integration is the freedom of movement of EU citizens, under the “Schengen agreement (O’Nions, 2011: 371). Despite early skepticism by the Western countries of the EU to “cooperate

within the UN” (Götz, 2008), EU global strategy for foreign and security policy adheres to the position of the UN, the key EU partner and an indispensable global supranational forum for taking global challenges, to use multilateral system, founded on universal rules and values as “one of the core principles and priorities” to successfully respond to global crises, threats and challenges (EEAS, 14 September 2017). No wonder, the UN General Assembly granted *observer status* to the Community in 1974. The EEC became the first non-state entity to be granted *observer state* in the UN. Following coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU wrote the General Assembly and proposed that it be granted equal representative (but not voting) rights as full members. In 2011, the EU was granted the right to speak among representatives of major groups in the UN and thus gained enhanced participation over and above other normal observers such as Arab League and the Red Cross. With the enhanced participation status, the EU gained rights, outside voting and sitting at the Security Council, to speak in debates among representatives of major groups and individual states; submit proposals and amendments; and reply and raise points of order and circulate documents. The EU is also party to about 50 international agreements of the UN, including but not limited to the Commission on Sustainable Development; the Forum on Forests; and Food and Agriculture Organisation.

The EU is also a full participant at some UN summits, including the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in Brazil and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse emissions in Japan, as well as hosted a summit, the 3rd UN Conference of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) held from 14 to 20 May 2001 in Brussels, Belgium. The EU has contributed massively through UN aid agency, Social and Economic Council with the following sparkling examples:

- EU Member States provided 30.4% of UN budget in 2006 (EEAS, 16 September 2016), compared to U.S., 22% and Japan’s 9.7%;
- EU Member States provide 33.2% of the funding for UN peacekeeping missions and about half of the budgets for UN funds and programmes (EEAS, 16 September 2016);
- About one-third of the European Commission aid budget goes to the UN;
- EU Member States provided 13.5% of peacekeeping personnel around the globe in 2006;
- EU operates its own missions to support the UN;
- EU maintains expansive global outreach including funding the African Peace Facility (Mpyisi, 2009: 3; UNRICH, 2007; *The Economist*, 24 November, 2007: 15).

In principle, the EU supports the UN values of freedom, democracy and human rights and was instrumental in setting up the UN system of Special Rapporteur on human rights challenges (UNRIC, 2007). Accessing to UN principles and values, the EU high Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini at the UN Security Council, on 9 May 2017 alluded to Articles 21-1 and 21-2 of the Lisbon Treaty of the EU and vociferously declared:

The European way is also the United Nations’ way. This explains why all our actions, all our initiatives are always taken in full coordination and partnership with the UN. We believe in the UN because we believe in the same principles; in

the same values; and our communities are built upon the same fundamental ideals” (EEAS, 14 September 2017). The EU is committed to effective multilateralism as core principles and priorities in pursuing the common values it shares with the UN in its external action. EU’s external action is strengthened by legal mandate provided by the Lisbon Treaty which states that: The Union ... shall promote multilateral solution to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations (Art. 21-1 TEU); and that the Union ... shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to (...) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (Art. 21-2) (EEAS, 14 September 2017). The rating of the EU in UN is spectacularly growing steadily with responsibility and accomplishments in international peace, democracy and human rights. Today, except U.S. with 22% fund-contribution and Japan’s 9.7%, as single states, the 28-member EU’s 33.2% block-fund contribution is mouth-watering to be ignored in any political weighted voting system on the floor of the UN General Assembly.

From the relevance and influence of the EU in and outside the UN, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2012 to the EU for its six-decade-long contribution to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe. The Committee noted that EU represents “fraternity between nations” which is a form of the “peace congress”, Alfred Nobel, founder of the Nobel Prize Award, referred as criteria for Peace Prize in his 1895 will (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2012). From the foregoing, the EU’s non-voting observer status is expected to improve given its massive social, political and economic clouts and contributions. Mark Malloch Brown, former UN Deputy Secretary General hold the view that the EU will gradually move up the ladder of representation from the aid departments to take up a seat on the Security Council. However, the prospect of Brown’s stance remains to be realised with Britain and France as Member States of the EU that have permanent seats at the UN Security Council; and both in support of admission of Germany. Today, it can be publicly argued that Europe emerged the “cooperative giant” and “most ambitious and successful international organisation of all time,” a “quiet” global superpower larger than the U.S., through the use of economic influence, international law, and “soft” or “civilian” power of attraction to accession which is the single most powerful instrument of Europe, reinforced by its neighbourhood policy (Moravcsik, 2010: 93-93, 98). The EU has become the global model of integration and peace project for its State and societal resilience, integrated approach to conflicts and crisis, preemptive peace, security and stabilisation, conflict settlement, humanitarianism and development assistance, cooperative regional orders, dialogue and negotiation over regional conflicts, and above all, its commitment to “a global order based on international law, involving the principles of the UN Charter” (EEAS, 2010: 39).

### The Road to Brexit

The road to Brexit started slowly and incrementally from reluctance to join the EU family, disappointing failure in the value of GBP, EUROscepticism and Euroscepticism accentuated by British ‘conservatism’ over the domineering posture of the EU policies, organs, and institutions on Member States. UK’s scepticism navigated from one administration to

another up until Prime Minister David Cameron capitalised on the provision of Article 50 of the consolidated version of EU Treaty, during his 2012 election campaign promise and set the stage for the 23 June 2016 referendum that cost him his political office. Brexit had been the most important project of UK administrations in the post-war history based on its logical interpretation of the UK citizens to ‘cost-benefit’ calculation, ‘fear of outsiders’ in the community and the ‘clue’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 420) about European integration. The UK citizens who voted 53% (17.4 million) in the Thursday 23 June 2016 referendum to divorce the EU did not lack idea of what it portends as an “advisory” outcome (Holden, 3 November 2016: 11.20 AM) for the UK Parliamentary approval. Brexit created shock in the European integration which led to trading of blames between the EU and UK administrations; EU for not appeasing the UK; and the UK for not educating its citizens on the underlying dangers of Brexit. The twist of irony is that since UK is the first Member State that triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty which allows members to opt out of EU (if they chose), there was no specific provision about the method of breakout by parties. Brexit is a new development to the Union and a handshake too far to the elbow. Surprised and frightened, the embattled EU perceived Brexit more as a tinder-box raising up many issues for renegotiation to protect interests of parties – EU and UK, EU and the remaining 27 Member States, guide future breakup and forestall possible bandwagon effect by other disillusioned Member States. The Lisbon Treaty, in European Union (2012: 43-44), specifies exit procedure that:

A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with the State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament (Article 50(2)). The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend the two year period (Article 50(3)). As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union (Article 16(4)).

May inherited Brexit as an imposition from David Cameron and as a pay payback to EU by British citizens who felt betrayed by EU in the Pre-Thatcher years. May’s letter to the President of European Council Donald Tusk dated 29 March 2017 triggering Article 50(2) of the TEU stated that the UK referendum vote was not to “harm” the EU or any of the remaining Member States but “to restore” UK self-determination. The logic of the payback, it would seem, was for Britain to take back and control its borders, disentangle itself from European socio-political and economic challenges and rediscover itself, independently grow its economy for the wellbeing of its people rather than being constrained by fledgling economies of invertebrate Member States of the

Union. May came to the centre of Trilemma of interests between her Cabinet officials, the Brexiteers, and the EU. Based on May’s reading of the political cloud that made her Cameron’s successor, she succumbed to pressure and assured the world that “Brexit means Brexit” (Schröder, 12 September 2016). Given UK’s cumulative lack of leadership in the EU, prodigal exit from the family and unredeemed legal obligations, EU invoked Article 50 which was triggered by the Brexit for negotiations in two phases: (i) both sides to settle the basic terms of Britain’s departure from July and ended with an agreement on “sufficient progress” in December; and (ii) officials to hold phase II negotiations on the post-Brexit relationship between Britain and the EU (*Media Center*, 14 June 2017).

In equal measure, May approached the EU conditions for Brexit with UK counter 12-point “soft” proposals, formulated by her Cabinet at Chequers on 6 July 2018, for the EU Council’s consideration, detailing:

- (i) Leaving the EU on 29 March 2019;
- (ii) Ending free movement and taking back control of British borders;
- (iii) No more sending vast sums of money back to the EU;
- (iv) A few business-friendly customs model with freedom to strike new trade deals around the world;
- (v) EU-UK free trade area with a common rulebook for industrial goods and agricultural products which will be good for jobs;
- (vi) Commitment to maintain high standards on consumer and employment rights and the environment;
- (vii) Parliamentary look on all new rules and regulations;
- (viii) Leaving the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy;
- (ix) Restoring the Supremacy of British Court by ending the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the UK;
- (x) No hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland or between Northern Ireland and Great Britain (GB);
- (xi) Continued close cooperation on security to keep people safe; and
- (xii) An independent foreign and defence policy working closely with the EU and other allies (*BBC News*, 17 September 2018).

In May’s ‘soft’ plan, she sought for UK’s divorce of EU, EU-UK free trade area with common ‘rulebook’ and EU-UK close cooperation on security to achieve ‘deconfliction’ mechanism between EU and UK. Howbeit, May insisted: “Let me be clear ... We are not leaving the European Union only to give up control of immigration again. And we are not leaving only to return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice” (Smith, 4 November 2016: 10.50 BST; *The Spectator*, 3 December 2016: 9.00 BST). But how European Court of Justice would be out of the jurisdiction under the EU-UK major thematic areas of cooperation proposed by May remained bizarre. Brexit became a self-inflicted sore and twist of faith on British conservative stance against secession by captive groups across the world (for example, Northern Ireland and the Igbo in Nigeria) and May administration’s ‘soft’ plan aimed at working out a post-Brexit EU-UK relationship to retain a neocolonialist grip on non-European countries was regarded by ardent Brexiteers as irreconcilable malfesance based on the weighting vote of UK’s “out” referendum and the unreceptive stance of EU officials to British soft Brexit,

insisting that in the EU-UK renegotiation for post-Brexit relationship, there was no window for talks on the basic principles of EU regarding equality, democracy, rule of law, etc. The Brussels' leaders see the UK Brexit plan as divorcing the EU while "cherry picking" advantages to its national interest but are willing to offer UK a tariff-free, quota-free trade deal (Forsyth, 2018: 11). For example, Ireland's Prime Minister Simon Coveney reportedly stated that UK cannot eat its cake and have; enjoy EU tariff-free trade and bilateral deals around the globe in a post-Brexit era (O'Carroll, 31 January 2018). Back home, Brexiteers are critical of May's "soft" Brexit plan arguing that the plan was a decoy to keep UK closely tied to the EU through a new EU-UK free trade areas for goods, with "common rulebook" which limits UK's ability to strike trade deals with countries such as the U.S., with the effect that securing market access for American farmers could be a costly bargain. The issue bordering on market access for American farmers constitutes serious impediment to the American national interest much more to the President Trump administration's "America first" principled realism.

No wonder, Trump blisteringly condemned May's "soft" Brexit plan and warned: "If they do a deal like that, we would be dealing with the European Union instead of dealing with the UK, so it will probably kill the deal" (*Euractiv*, 13 July 2018).

From the list of May's "soft" plan, three issues are more critical to reaching agreement with EU: first, avoidance of hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland or between Northern Ireland and UK; second, achieving UK's independent foreign and defence policy working closely with the EU and other allies; and thirdly, EU-UK free trade area with a common rulebook for industrial goods and agricultural products which will be good for jobs. These issues are treated in more detail under the section 7, dealing on the Post-Brexit challenges for UK-EU relations. Even though Prime Minister May vociferously declared that Brexit "gives the United Kingdom opportunities as an independent and sovereign state to build a better future for all our people" (Bennett, 18 September 2018), Brexiteers perceive May through the soft-plan lens as the British Gorbachev with political and economic reform package to tie UK to EU rules despite the democratic "out" verdict by the UK citizens. Brexiteers have been bombastic against May's "soft" plan in preference to a "hard" Brexit which will cut off every linkage between the UK and EU. The "soft" and "hard" Brexit have created deep divisions between UK officials and ardent Eurosceptics. The hard Brexit school contended that UK should not pay a penny to EU *sans* UK under hard Brexit (Ferguson, 4 October 2018: 15.29 BST). On the other hand, the soft Brexit school argued that a hard Brexit has the potential of drifting Britain outside Europe's trade and regulatory framework into a "cliff's edge" (Hutton, 24 January 2018: 01.00 EDT; *The Economist*, 25 June 2018; Smith, 4 November 2016: 10:50 PM).

However, EU-UK alliance in common security and defence, as proposed by May was geared towards achieving deconfliction mechanism between the EU and UK, for instance, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which entered into force on 25 May 2018. The UK Data Protection Act (DPA) contains "provisions to extend GDPR standards to data processing... to create a simple framework under which data controllers and processors can apply a single standard (Madge, 22 June 2018). UK was forced, by the provisions of the DPA, to strive for legal certainty and partnership with EU in data-sharing to avoid hindering

personal data security of UK citizens and businesses under the GDPR regime and thus seeks preferential seat in the GDPR governing board that applies data laws on companies (Boffrey, 23 May 2018). The GDPR ties UK to EU rules like any other area of activities in EU-UK relations up until the end of December 2020 Brexit transition period and beyond safe if UK despite its legislative overload from Brexit pressures and complications rephrased its DPA to extricate its provisions from complimenting EU GDPR. MEP Tim Aker who accused May of accepting EU's proposal for a deal with a "begging bowl," and failing to maintain key Brexit blood "red lines" maintained:

...the Prime Minister should take note seriously about the dissatisfaction at the grassroots level of the strength of feeling about capitulation to Brussels. It was quite clear that the vote to leave the EU meant taking back full powers from Brussels – not a loose, 'semi-permanent' in the orbit of the EU model (Robinson, 27 August 2018; 4 September 2014). Boris Johnson, the British foreign secretary, Eurosceptic and Brexit leader who resigned from office on account of May dilly-dally approach on the UK-voted Brexit, described the "soft Brexit" plan for a second and final "in-or-out" referendum (Blatt, 13 September 2018) before the March 2019 exit date, as a crisis of democracy. Although the principle of leaving the EU did not clearly and emphatically spell out the form of relationship after divorce, it serves an open-ended cheque to Westminster's government to protect the interest of the population in the administrative execution of the Brexit vote. EU Chief Negotiator Michael Barnier urged May to adopt the Tusk-proposed "Canada-plus" deal against the proposed Chequer's plan (Hope and Swinford, 4 September 2018: 8.18 PM). The Canada-style free trade deal (Forsyth 2018: 11) with the challenges of the backstop and UK's industry complex vis-à-vis Europe-wide supply chain, it is thought, favours the EU Member States, UK, and constituent units of GB by retaining *status quo* trade arrangements with additional bonuses of slightly deeper relationship in which the Irish border would be kept open to both parties.

The somewhat arm-twisting demands by the EU on UK lead to May's confession that:

Here the EU is still only offering us two options. The first option would involve the UK staying in the European Union Economic Area and a customs union with the EU. That would make a mockery of the referendum we had two years ago. The EU should be clear, I will not overturn the result of the referendum nor will I break up my country (Wyllie, 21 September 2018: 2.28 PM).

Under the situation, Dimmock (2018: 50-52), urged May to draw lessons from the Elizabethan prescient strategy for Brexit in five ways:

- Division in government doesn't end well;
- Don't expect too much from your new allies;
- Selling weapons doesn't endear you to the neighbours;
- The promise of China is illusory;
- You can't keep clear of the continent for long.

The road to Brexit practically started with the UK referendum vote on 23 June 2016, May's letter of 29 March 2017 which triggered EU-UK negotiation plans on their future relations. While the EU Council met on 18 October 2018 for the tipping



point of the divorce agreement which takes effect on 30 March 2019 and declaration on the future framework of EU-UK relations, the critical issues concerning the Irish backstop remained unresolved, depicting UK-in-crisis scenario in the negotiation with EU. While May insisted on no-border, no-deal situation, Barnier canvassed for more time for EU and UK to make the deal (*BBC World*, 18 October 2018: Commission 8.40 PM CET). The President of European Commission Jean Claude Juncker emphatically reasoned that a no-deal situation will hurt the EU and the UK. A conflict resolution scenario would open a transition or implementation period ending 31 December 2020 (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018: 2) when the European integration laws – TEU, TFEU, EURATOM Treaties, Treaties of Accession and the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU – “shall be applicable to and in the United Kingdom”, unless otherwise expressly stated (European Commission, 2018: 74) for purposes of supervision and enforcement. All in all, “hard” or “soft” Brexit depended on a two-way street to meeting of minds halfway by the EU-UK parties.

### Post-Brexit Challenges for UK-EU Relations

Brexit has caused profound ripples about the future of EU-UK relations. May’s implementation of Brexit is compounded by the challenge of cooperation by the “original governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland” (Schröder, 12 September 2016). Ireland is the only UK’s land border and in an uncertain EU-UK economic arrangement without resolution of the trilemma border issue between Ireland, Northern Ireland and UK in a post-Brexit era, UK as a senior partner could harden up the border which had been open and kept peace for 20 years under EU based on a compromise. While UK and Ireland excluded Northern Ireland in their discussion on how to ensure ‘frictionless’ border control (O’Carroll, 12 February 2013, 19.31 GMT), the EU strove to retain Northern Ireland in the EU customs union and single market to have control over the Northern Ireland and Ireland border. At the EU Council meeting held on Thursday 4 October 2018 to discuss Irish land, sea and air border, May conceded to UK matching customs union rules while Northern Ireland also follows single market rules after a full trade deal between EU and UK. However, UK’s concession paved way to foreclose what “could undermine one of Europe’s greatest success stories” (Ellis, 21 August 2018).

Britain is faced with the challenge to redeem its soaring £39 billion legal obligation from £20 billion divorce bill, which had potential to occasion slump of between 5.4% and 9.5% in GDP, massive loss of tax revenue and crisis in the protection of citizen’s rights. To forestall the Treasury estimates of between 5.4% and 9.5% of GDP fall after 15 years (Press Association, 11 October 2016: 00.29 BST), May promised to pay off the £39 billion divorce bill (including liabilities of British EU officials’ pensions and guarantees for EU projects it made) in decades up until 2064 (Ferguson, 4 October 2018: 15.29 BST; Stone, 4 October 2018: 3.00 PM). Britain also faced losing membership of EU-block trade negotiation with its advantages of less cost on individual Member States. The risk of trading off EU single market for the control of immigration policy may not serve better alternative for negotiating new trade agreements between UK and the EU 27, on one side and EU trade partners, particularly the BRICS countries (Britain, Russia, India, China and South Africa) which are the “drivers of global economic growth” (Matovska, Trajkoska and

Siljanovska, 2014: 372) and ‘third economic power’ after EU and the U.S. with approximately 3 billion (43%) world population, \$16 billion (30%) GDP and 17% share in world trade, given charms and challenges for the UK by the Member States and limiting factors of BRICS (Movchan, 8 July 2015). There are five factors that limit the effectiveness of the BRICS to promote a solid economic and political power like the EU or the U.S. The factors include:

- (i) the dominance of the Chinese economy and its role in trade relations makes the BRICS much more “a China-with-partners group” than a union of equal members. China views the organization as a useful ‘test-bed’ for its ambitious development ideas and, therefore, recreates hegemonic-type skepticism;
- (ii) BRICS countries lack mutual economic interests. Trade between them by the end of 2018 was less than \$320 billion a year and was further nose-diving. Their trade with the U.S. and EU was 6.5 times higher. China’s trade with the rest of the world within the same period was 12.5 times higher. Bilateral trade between China and South Korea was about as large as that between BRICS countries;
- (iii) Members are too similar in some key areas. All members (apart from Russia) hold huge foreign reserves (15-35% of GDP) and have low external debt (15-37% of GDP). Apart from Russia, they are heavily integrated into consumer goods production with the West;
- (iv) BRICS nations compete with one another in third markets in many areas, from clothing (China, India and Brazil), through economic influence in Africa (China, South Africa and India) to international aircraft and military equipment markets (China, Russia and Brazil). All BRICS nation are able to re-engineer and copy technologies, which means sharing research and development (R & D) results and innovations and the development of cross-cutting scientific cooperation impact limited potential; and
- (v) Diversity of culture indicate phases of economic development, ideologies, definitions of poverty, lack of common understandings about priorities that are necessary for productive sharing of experiences and other cultural differences among the BRICS members (Movchan, 8 July 2015).

Movchan argued with cautious optimism that while a union of BRICS is undoubtedly positive, its role as the ‘third economic power’ should not be overestimated because for most members, the bloc represents a means to discuss opinions and perhaps take a joint position on any areas of mutual interest. EU’s sacred and indivisible four freedoms – free movement of goods, service, capital, and people - of the EU single market (Smith, 4 November 2016: 10.50 AM) make it difficult for Britain to impose barriers on free movement of people from the EU to UK and maintain access to advantages of EU trade bloc - single market and the Customs Union. The result is that hard or soft Brexit, Britain has the inalienable right to project its national interest which may include forming an alternative economic model in Europe which the EU, as a priority, had laboured to prevent. More so, the post-Brexit UK power-position and global influence is likely to run deflated although in a dynamic global order where absolutism is not an option, aspiration for positive outcomes must be properly matched with possible ripples of backlash effect. Crispin Tickell

inexcusably stated, in *The Guardian* (25 June 2016): “Now we will have no role in Europe, and much reduced power and influence in the world generally” (Tickell, 25 June 2016). The cost of Brexit is not a one-sided challenge. A “hard” Brexit, argued Cathryn Clüver in *Blatt* (13 September 2018), will be catastrophic to both the EU and the UK. For example, the EU will suffer deep hole in its rising expenditure profile through cessation of UK’s legal obligations. A hard Brexit could further halt EU-UK security cooperation, harden borders, halt financial industry in London, cripple UK’s big industry through EU tariffs, split the EU, change the dynamics of the transatlantic security relationships with both the UK and the EU, particularly the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), comprising UK, Malaysia, Singapore, Austria, and New Zealand. The FPDA constitutes a central component of British security role in Asia-Pacific. In a scenario where the more insular senior-British partner in the FPDA enters a period of downsizing its security cooperation and losing grip on its ‘captive’ peoples across regions of the world including Europe, Africa and Asia because of economic, political and military uncertainty demonstrated, in part, by reduction of its nuclear arsenal from 160 warheads to 120 (Tan, 8 July 2016), “increasing fragmentation and a decay in domestic political support for transnational governance of the global governance architecture” (Vogt, 2016:172), anticipated economic cost of accession, reduction in growth, depreciation in currency, increase in budget deficit and reduced size of the economy. Under UK’s dwindling global power and influence, the remaining four invertebrate members of FPDA would scamper in search of a security godfather in the United States, thereby strengthening the 1951 ANGUS Treaty between the U.S. New Zealand and Australia in the ensuing balance of power against UK’s imperial power. More so, the ‘captive’ Scotland may renew its vote and finalise the process of exit from the UK. If that happens, the UK Royal Navy would automatically lose the submarine base located at Faslane. If UK loses the Faslane base by extension, it will not serve emergency need to the U.S. and the lurking aggressive Russia may seize Faslane as a new security corridor against the UK, U.S. and the remains of NATO forces if the U.S. appears uninterested.

In the post-Brexit EU, the global power position hitherto occupied by UK would be filled by Germany which is more likely to enjoy an untrammelled leadership and strengthen transatlantic cooperation that is likely to de-emphasise military for economic internationalism. The appeal for Germany’s new role in the EU derives ostensibly from existing linkages including Germany’s contributions to the EU, federalist principle, German-U.S. relations, and pursuit for strengthening and deepening European integration as an addition to the U.S. and NATO involvement in Europe. The history of the EU, its enlargement, its achievements and challenges present a mixed bag of successes and failures, happiness and sadness. Hard Brexit could thwart the expectation that, in the long-run, “internal coherence may be on the rise and might have positive effects on the EU’s external representation” by laying solid foundation for a consistent and efficient European external policy (Takman, 2013: 7). The logic of the Brexit in which Britain seeks to offload responsibility of European collective development agenda to develop its potentials for the wellbeing of the British citizens without sharing its resources with invertebrate economies under the EU points to the fact that the Union has navigated a dangerous course from Euroenthusiasm to Euroscepticism or worse from integration to disintegration. Brexit raised more anti-EU sentiment. For instance, French

President Emmanuel Macron believes that EU integration will hurt EU countries more than sovereignty. From whichever lens it is viewed, Brexit marks both the weakness of EU and a wake-up call, to re-strategise and stabilise the Union for greater future.

**Concluding Remarks on the Way Forward for Stability of the EU’s Global Influence:** Many writers and political pundits, including Dominic Grieve MP, a member of the European Research Group of bloc of bloc MPs affirm that Brexit was risky to “the economic wellbeing, national security and quality of life” of British people (Grieve, 2018: 6). EU seeming “erosion” of Member States’ independence and sovereignty in decision-making produces ugly face of nationalism which recreates philosophical differences and drives growing violence, racism, anti-Semitism, bigotry, faction fighting, terrorism and institutional indulgence (Clark, 2018: 1) signifies EU’s sickening plunge into a cancerous decay in efforts at deeper integration with prospect of, as contended by the Italian minister of interior Matteo Savini, a “league of Leagues” sitting in Brussels (Caldwell, 2018: 12). As unpleasant as the Brexit, it serves notice-on-demand for EU reform to be better able to grapple with existing and emerging anti-integration issues on the table for future effective role in political and economic global order. In a situation of endemic political and economic schism between the two global powers, EU and UK would be the worse for it in further widening and deepening of integration because dissatisfied members may toe the line of Brexit in a bandwagon. The EU, as a global model of integration, therefore, faced post-Brexit extinction in the event of lack of EU-UK compromise agreement that spells out clearly practical future economic and security relations for the survival of Europe. In the absence of EU, after over six decades of mercurial growth and achievements, Europe-Transatlantic cooperation is more likely too to vapourise and consign Europe to the margin of global power and influence against the original objectives of the EU at birth. To mitigate the challenges of Brexit and the dangerous sore in Europe’s unity, the parties should avoid purist zero-sum game politics and reach compromise agreements on broad issues in the EU-UK Brexit proposals. A concession of a tariff-free, quota-free trade deal by the EU to UK which guarantees that UK “unambiguously leave the single market, the custom union and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice” (Forsyth, 2018:11) would create a more favourable balance of interests between parties to the negotiation for healthy future EU-UK relationship. If the EU and UK parties to Brexit negotiations fail to reach compromise agreement for future strategic partnership that permits collaboration whenever the need arises, both sides would likely face a scenario where each would attack and undermine the other to the detriment of the UK, EU, and Europe as a whole.

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**Appendix: European Union Treaties, Signers, and Contents, 1951 – 2013**

Treaty	Signer	Content
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty), Rome 1951.	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	The Parliament Assembly originally had only an advisory role and its members were not yet elected by direct universal suffrage. The Treaty also provides for the creation of the Court of Justice. For further information , please see <a href="http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.tn">http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.tn</a>
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty), Rome 1957.	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	the EEC Treaty provided for the establishment of a common market, a customs union and common policies. Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty directly address these three issues. The state that the Community’s primary mission is to create a common market and specify the measures that it must undertake to achieve this objective. The EEC Treaty consists of 240 articles in six separate parts, preceded by a preamble: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the first part is devoted the principles which underline the establishment of the EC via the common market, the customs union and the common policies;</li> <li>• the second part concerns the foundations of the Community. It comprises four titles devoted respectively to the free movement of goods, agriculture, the free movement of persons, services and capital, and finally transport;</li> <li>• the third part concerns Community policy and includes four titles relating to common rules, economic policy, social policy, and the European Investment Bank;</li> <li>• the fourth part is devoted to the association of overseas countries and territories;</li> <li>• the fifth part is devoted to the Community institutions, with one title on the institutional provisions and another on the financial provisions;</li> <li>• the sixth and final part concerns general provisions.</li> </ul> The institutional balance is based on a triangle consisting of the Council, the Commission , and the European Parliament, all three of which are called upon to work together. The Council prepares the standards, the Commission drafts the proposals and the Parliament plays an advisory role. Another body is also involved in the decision-making procedure in an advisory capacity, namely the Economic and Social Committee. The Commission, in an independent college of the governments of the Member States, appointed by common agreement, represents the common interest. It has a monopoly on initiating legislation and proposes the Community acts to the Council of Ministers. As guardian of the treaties, it monitors the implementation of treaties and secondary law. In this connection, it has a wide assortment of measure to police the Member States and the business community. In the framework of its mission, the Commission has the executive power to implement Community policies. The Council of Ministers is made up of representatives of the governments of the Member States and is vested with decision-making powers. It is assisted by the Community of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which prepares the Council’s work and carries out the task conferred on it by the Council. The Parliamentary Assembly originally had only an advisory role and its members were not yet elected by direct universal suffrage. The Treaty also provides for the creation of the Court of Justice. For further information, please see <a href="http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm">http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm</a>
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM Treaty), Rome 1957.	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	The general objective of the Treaty is to contribute to the formation and development of Europe’s nuclear industries, so that all the Member States can benefit from the development of atomic energy, and to ensure security of supply. At the same time, the Treaty guarantees high safety standards for the public and prevents nuclear materials intended principally for civilian use from being diverted to military use. The institutional structure of the Euratom Treaty is broadly similar to that of the EEC Treaty and is built around the same “institutional triangle” (Council, Commission, and European Parliament). Thus, the fulfillment of the task entrusted to the Community is ensured not only by the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, but also by the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. Each institution acts within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaty. The Council and the Commission are assisted by the Economic and Social Committee acting in an advisory capacity. The Community institutions are responsible for implementing the Treaty and for the two specific Euratom bodies: the Supply Agency and the Safeguards Office (which carries out physical and accounting checks in all nuclear installations in the Community).
Merger Treaty, Brussels 1965	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	Provided for a Single Commission and a Single Council of the then three European Communities.
Single European Act (SEA), Luxembourg and The Hague, 1986	Belgium, Denmark France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.	Provided for the adaptations required for the achievement of the Internal Market. For the full text see <a href="http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre509.html">http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre509.html</a> .

Treaty on European Union, Maastricht 1992	Belgium, Denmark France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.	The Maastricht Treaty changed the name of the European Economic Community to simply “the European Community”. It also introduced new forms of cooperation between the Member State governments - for example on defence, and in the area of “justice and home affairs”. By adding this intergovernmental cooperation to the existing “Community” system, the Maastricht Treaty created a new structure with three “pillars” which is political as well as economic. This is the the European Union (EU). The full text is available at <a href="http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html">http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html</a> .
Treaty of Amsterdam	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.	The Amsterdam Treaty amended and re-numbered the EU and EC Treaties. Consolidated versions of the EU and EC Treaties are attached to it. The Treaty of Amsterdam changed the articles of the Treaty on European Union. For more, please use <a href="http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html">http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html</a> .
Treaty of Nice, 2001	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.	It dealt with reforming the institution so that the Union could function efficiently after its enlargement to 25 Member States. The Treaty of Nice, the former Treaty of the EU and the Treaty of the EC have been merged into one consolidated version. The full text is available at <a href="http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_en.htm">http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_en.htm</a>
Reform Treaty	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.	After the fall of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” at the request of the European Council in June 2007, the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2007 drew uob a new Reform Treaty to enable the EU to face the challenges of the 21st century and realize its true potential. This Treaty focuses on the EU’s need for modernization and reform. The signature of the Treaty will be followed by the ratification process in all 27 countries.
Treaty of Lisbon, 2007	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.	The Treaty of Lisbon defines what the EU can and cannot do, and what means it can use. It alters the structure of the EU’s institutions and how they work. As a result, the EU is more democratic and its core values are better served. This treaty is the result of negotiations between EU member countries in an intergovernmental conference, in which the Commission and Parliament were also involved. The treaty was ratified by each of the EU’s 27 members. It was up ti each country to choose the procedure for ratification, in line with its own national constitution. On 1December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, tus ending several years of negotiation about institutional issues. Te Treaty of Lisbon amends the current EU and EC treaties, without replacing them. It provides the Union with the legal framework and tools necessary to meet future callenges and to respond to citizens’ demands. Read more in <a href="http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/take/index_en.htm">http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/take/index_en.htm</a> .
<b>Treaties of Accession</b>		
<b>Year of Signature (Entry into force)</b>	<b>Countries</b>	
1972 (1 January 1973)	Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom	
1979 (1 January 1981)	Greece	
1985 (1 January 1986)	Portugal, Spain,	
1994 (1 January 1995)	Austria, Finland, Sweeden	
2003 (1 May 2004)	Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia	
2005 (1 January 2007)	Bulgaria, Romania	
2012 (1 July 2013)	Croatia	

**Sources:** EUR-Lex (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/treaties/index.htm#accession>); Europa ([http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm)), both accessed 12 July 2013, Julieth Kaarbo and James Lee Ray, *Global Politics*, 10th edition. Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, p.443; Smith et al, *Foreign Policy*. UK: Oxford University Press, 2016, p.433.

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